Reconciling Democracy and Bureaucracy: Towards a Deliberative-Democratic Model of Bureaucratic Accountability by Morgeson III, Forrest Vern
 
 
RECONCILING DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY: TOWARDS A 
DELIBERATIVE-DEMOCRATIC MODEL OF BUREAUCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Forrest Vern Morgeson III 
 
 
BA, Western Michigan University, 1997 
 
 
MA, University of Pittsburgh, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of  
 
 
Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment 
 
 
of the requirements for the degree of  
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
2005 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
 
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Forrest Vern Morgeson III 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
 
 
 
March 28, 2005 
 
 
and approved by   
 
 
B. Guy Peters, PhD 
 
 
Michael Goodhart, PhD 
 
 
Iris Young, PhD (University of Chicago) 
 
 
Frederick Whelan, PhD  
Dissertation Director 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Forrest Vern Morgeson III, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
 
 
RECONCILING DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY: TOWARDS A 
DELIBERATIVE-DEMOCRATIC MODEL OF BUREAUCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Forrest Vern Morgeson III, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2005 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
  
Beginning in the advent of the modern discipline of public administration, and in 
some ways considerably earlier, one of the questions most troubling political thinkers and 
political scientists has been: Holding both as values, how can we reconcile the tension 
between bureaucracy and democracy? This question, addressing what is often termed the 
“bureaucracy-democracy paradox,” has taken a variety of forms, varying as a result of 
both particular definitions of democracy and competing perspectives on the proper 
understanding of bureaucratic power. Rooted in the discipline of democratic theory and 
guided by its traditions, this dissertation intervenes in this discussion, and asks four 
logically interrelated questions instrumental to a satisfactory resolution of this tension.  
First, given the diversity of perspectives surrounding the concept “democracy,” is 
there an essential definition of this concept and model of democracy we might rely on, 
one that informs both the norm and the reality of contemporary democracy, and if so, 
how does this model help guide us in identifying and resolving the tension between 
contemporary bureaucracy and democracy? Having identified this model and located one 
“most pressing” tension in processes of bureaucratic rulemaking, this dissertation 
proceeds to identify democratic modes of control, oversight and accountability of 
 iv
bureaucracy as critical to resolving this tension, and in the process asks: how effective are 
extant democratic modes of accountability and oversight within contemporary 
democracies, and thus how well-preserved is our model of democracy? Third, having 
found reasons to question the effectiveness of extant modes of control, oversight and 
accountability, it is next asked: what alternative forms of democratic control are available 
that might better support our democratic institutions and traditions? Finally, turning to a 
normative model of democracy popularized over the last few decades – the deliberative 
theory of democracy – as one useful alternative, this dissertation concludes by asking: is 
there a case that might evidence both the empirical plausibility and the normative 
desirability of deliberative democracy as an alternative model of control within a 
bureaucratic rulemaking context, and thus support this prescription as a viable one for 
resolving the enduring tension between bureaucracy and democracy?  
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Chapter One: Introduction: Bureaucracy and Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction and Abstract 
 
 Beginning in the advent of the modern discipline of public administration, and in 
some ways considerably earlier, one of the questions most troubling political thinkers and 
political scientists has been: Holding both as values, how can we reconcile the tension 
between bureaucracy and democracy? This question, addressing what is often termed the 
“bureaucracy-democracy paradox,” has taken a variety of forms, varying as a result of 
both particular definitions of democracy and competing perspectives on the proper 
understanding of bureaucratic power. Rooted in the discipline of democratic theory and 
guided by its traditions, this dissertation intervenes in this discussion, and asks four 
logically interrelated questions instrumental to a satisfactory resolution of this tension.  
First, given the diversity of perspectives surrounding the concept “democracy,” is 
there an essential definition of this concept and model of democracy we might rely on, 
one that informs both the norm and the reality of contemporary democracy, and if so, 
how does this model help guide us in identifying and resolving the tension between 
contemporary bureaucracy and democracy? Having identified this model and located one 
“most pressing” tension in processes of bureaucratic rulemaking, this dissertation 
proceeds to identify democratic modes of control, oversight and accountability of 
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bureaucracy as critical to resolving this tension, and in the process asks: how effective are 
extant democratic modes of accountability and oversight within contemporary 
democracies, and thus how well-preserved is our model of democracy? Third, having 
found reasons to question the effectiveness of extant modes of control, oversight and 
accountability, it is next asked: what alternative forms of democratic control are available 
that might better support our democratic institutions and traditions? Finally, turning to a 
normative model of democracy popularized over the last few decades – the deliberative 
theory of democracy – as one useful alternative, this dissertation concludes by asking: is 
there a case that might evidence both the empirical plausibility and the normative 
desirability of deliberative democracy as an alternative model of control within a 
bureaucratic rulemaking context, and thus support this prescription as a viable one for 
resolving the enduring tension between bureaucracy and democracy?  
 In the end, there are three primary contributions to the literature this dissertation 
claims. First, by beginning with an investigation of enduringly influential historical-
theoretical models of democracy, and working to understand how these models both 
defend administrative discretion and reconcile its existence with democracy, this 
dissertation bridges the gap between democratic thought and modern bureaucracy, a 
bridge often missing in investigations of this kind – and a useful exercise in its own right. 
Second, by working to resolve the tension between bureaucracy and democracy through 
an application of the deliberative model of democracy to a bureaucratic context, an 
institutional nexus that has been largely ignored by those working with this theory, this 
dissertation fills a noticeable gap in both the democratic theory and public administration 
literatures. Lastly, by evaluating favorably one recently adopted form of bureaucratic 
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rulemaking – labeled electronic or “e-rulemaking” – for its deliberative-democratic 
character, this dissertation evidences the empirical plausibility of the normative 
prescriptions of deliberative theory, something often lacking in studies of this kind, and a 
fact often utilized as grounds for rejecting political reforms inspired by a deliberative 
model. 
 
II. Background and Literature Review: On the Tension between Bureaucracy and 
Democracy 
 
Writing in the early twentieth century, Max Weber is usually credited with having 
provided the first theoretically rich description of the “bureaucracy” as a type of 
institution of public administration.1 Not coincidentally, Weber articulated his 
understanding of bureaucracy and bureaucratization during a period when administration 
was increasingly regarded as an important center of political and economic activity, and 
thus an increasingly important object of scholarly inquiry.2 Attempting to illuminate the 
sociological conditions and political consequences of these emerging forms of 
administrative control, Weber defined bureaucracy as an hierarchical, centralized and 
internally differentiated administrative organization staffed by a group of specially 
educated elites responsible for all administrative tasks within their own jurisdictional area 
and tasked to implement the policies enacted by political decision-makers.  
On Weber’s definition, and contrary to earlier, traditional forms of administration, 
the modern bureaucracy is characterized by a delineated chain-of-command, by a “firmly 
                                                 
1Weber, Max. “Bureaucracy.” In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Gerth, H.H. and C. Wright Mills 
(Eds.). 1946. (1922). N.Y., N.Y.: Oxford University Press.  
 
2Woodrow Wilson provided an early academic “call-to-arms” regarding the importance of a distinct branch 
of political science focused on public administration. Wilson, Woodrow. “The Study of Administration.” 
Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 2, 1887. 
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ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower 
offices by the higher ones.”3 Moreover, the modern bureaucracy is characterized by a 
“concentration of the means of administration,” and this concentration is achieved by the 
centralized control of the resources bureaucrats require to fulfill administrative tasks.4 
The modern bureaucracy is staffed first and foremost on the basis of education and merit, 
with qualifying examinations replacing nepotism and political favoritism.5 Finally, these 
educated and expert elites are differentiated within the bureaucratic agency on the basis 
of particular technical competences, and assigned jurisdictional control over issues within 
their own sphere of expertise. And while Weber notes myriad reasons for the process of 
bureaucratization and the particular traits of modern bureaucratic administration, both 
essentially arise as consequences of the progression towards economic and societal 
rationalization and the unequivocal technical superiority of bureaucratic administration 
over alternative administrative types. In short, bureaucratic institutions are more effective 
and efficient at completing their tasks than are other administrative institutions.6
Viewing Weber’s definition as an archetype, it did not take long for many to 
identify the tension between this type of elite, expertise-driven and hierarchical 
administrative institution and democracy, a system of government within which values of 
equality, publicity and public participation (for instance) are fundamental. Indeed, it is 
                                                 
3Weber, “Bureaucracy.” P. 197.  
 
4Weber, “Bureaucracy.” P. 223.  
 
5Weber, “Bureaucracy.” P. 198.  
  
6Weber has this to say on the matter: “The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has 
always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed 
bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-
mechanical modes of production…As compared with all collegiate, honorific, and avocational forms of 
administration, trained bureaucracy is superior on all these points.” Weber, “Bureaucracy.” P. 214. 
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not surprising that at roughly the same time Weber was offering his ideal-typical model 
of bureaucracy, democratic critics of these administrative institutions, recognizing these 
institutions’ increasing relevance to governmental practice, were emerging as well.7
While still in its infancy, bureaucratic administration was recognized as an 
unavoidable by-product of democracy – embodied in the ubiquitous political party – and 
bureaucratization was thought to undermine democracy within these parties.8 During the 
same period critics largely hostile to the state and its tendency to mask power relations 
between dominant and oppressed classes focused their critical energies on the 
bureaucracy, and the revolutionary importance of a “democratized” bureaucracy.9 And 
far to the other end of the political spectrum, bureaucratization was quickly identified as 
an essential impediment to the freedom and liberty requisite a free and democratic 
society.10 In short, as soon as bureaucracy became an object of serious inquiry, scholars 
concerned with the consequences of this burgeoning administrative type to the 
foundations of democracy appeared as well.  
From this perspective, recognition of the problems posed by bureaucracy for a 
democratic system and efforts to resolve the tension between bureaucracy and democracy 
are as old as bureaucratic administration itself. Indeed, over much of the last century, a 
period during which both public bureaucracy and scholarly work focused on bureaucratic 
                                                 
7It should be noted that Weber himself recognized the emerging tension bureaucracy and democracy, at 
least to the extent that he saw the dangers bureaucracy poses to the sanctity of formal law. Weber, 
“Bureaucracy.” 
 
8Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy. 1962 (1915). N.Y., N.Y.: Crowell-Collier Publishing.  
 
9Lenin, Vladimir I. The State and Revolution. 1984 (1904). Moscow, Russia: Progress Publishers.  
 
10Hayek, Friedrich. The Road to Serfdom. 1944. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
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administration grew at an exponential rate, studies driven by the explicit goal of 
reconciling the tension between bureaucracy and democracy have been nearly as 
prevalent as efforts to understand and define bureaucratic processes and institutions.11 
This task continues to occupy many today, and as efforts at the reconciliation of this 
tension have grown in number, so too have the means proposed for achieving this 
objective grown in type.  
Over the last few decades, a wide assortment of new – and sometimes not-so-new 
– recommendations for resolving the tensions between bureaucracy and democracy have 
been proffered. As a consequence of these ongoing efforts, buzzwords and catch-phrases 
such as “representative bureaucracy,”12 “bureaucratic accountability,”13 “bureaucratic 
responsiveness,”14 “administrative decentralization,”15 “participatory management”16 and 
                                                 
11For a few additional and more recent examples specifically focused on the task of reconciling these two 
principles, see: Burke, John P. Bureaucratic Responsibility. 1986. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press; Cook, Brian J. Bureaucracy and Self-Government: Reconsidering the Role of Public 
Administration in American Politics. 1996. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; Etzioni-
Halevy, Eva. Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma. 1983. Boston, MA: Routledge; 
Hyneman, Charles. Bureaucracy in a Democracy. 1950. N.Y., N.Y.: Harper and Brothers; Sunstein, Cass. 
After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State. 1990. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press; Yates, Douglas. Bureaucratic Democracy: The Search for Democracy and Efficiency in American 
Government. 1982. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
12Meier, Kenneth. “Representative Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis.” American Political Science 
Review. Vol. 69, No. 2, 1975; Kingsley, Donald. Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the 
British Civil Service. 1944. Yellow Springs, OH: Antioch Press; Selden, Sally Coleman. The Promise of 
Representative Bureaucracy: Diversity and Responsiveness in a Government Agency. 1997. Armonk, N.Y.: 
M.E. Sharpe; Selden, Sally Coleman et al. “Bureaucracy as a Representative Institution: Toward a 
Reconciliation of Bureaucratic Government and Democratic Theory.” American Journal of Political 
Science. Vol. 42, No. 3, 1998. 
 
13Light, Paul C. Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and the Search for Accountability. 1993. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution; Mosher, Frederick. The GAO: The Quest for Accountability in 
American Government. 1979. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; Rosen, Bernard. Holding Government 
Bureaucracies Accountable. 1982. N.Y., N.Y.: Praeger Publishers.  
 
14Cope, Glen. “Bureaucratic Reform and Issues of Political Responsiveness.” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory. Vol. 7, No. 3, 1997; Hatry, Harry P. et. al. Customer Surveys for 
Agency Managers: What Managers Need to Know. 1998. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press; 
Rosener, Judy. “Making Bureaucrats Responsive: A Study of the Impact of Citizen Participation and Staff 
Recommendations on Regulatory Decision-Making.” Public Administration Review. Vol. 42, No. 4, 1982; 
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“new public management”17 have, along with a host of others, become part of the 
political science and public administration lexica. All of these reform strategies, each of 
which in its own way suggests a reconfiguration of bureaucratic institutions and 
processes with the goal of making these more congenial to the principles of democracy, 
help us envision strategies towards this end. Further, to some extent most of these reform 
strategies have wielded at least some influence over the actual organization and practice 
of public bureaucracies.18  
 Nevertheless, the existing literature examining the tension between bureaucracy 
and democracy, as well as the reform strategies identified therein, often leave something 
to be desired. While useful in their own right for envisioning bureaucratic practices more 
congenial to democracy, these studies tend to detach democracy – particularly as it relates 
to administrative practices and institutions – from its historical and theoretical context. 
Consequently, these studies fail to take advantage of the enduring lessons such a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Stivers, Camilla. “The Listening Bureaucrat: Responsiveness in Public Administration.” Public 
Administration Review. Vol. 54, No. 4, 1994; Vigoda, Eran. “From Responsiveness to Collaboration: 
Governance, Citizens and the Next Generation of Public Administration.” Public Administration Review. 
Vol. 62, No. 5, 2002. 
 
15Hart, David. “Theories of Government Related to Decentralization and Citizen Participation.” Public 
Administration Review. Vol. 32, 1972; Brown-John, Lloyd C. Centralizing and Decentralizing Trends in 
Federal States. 1988. Lanham, MA: University Press of America; Kranz, Harry. The Participatory 
Bureaucracy. 1976. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co.; Schmidt, Vivian. Democratizing France: The 
Political and Administrative History of Decentralization. 1990. N.Y., N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
16Denhardt, Robert. The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public 
Organizations. 1993. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth; Garvey, Gerald. Facing the Bureaucracy: Living and 
Dying in a Public Agency. 1993. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass; Golembiewski, Robert T. Managing 
Diversity in Organizations. 1995. Tuscaloosa, AL: Alabama Press. 
  
17Box, Richard, et al. “New Public Management and Substantive Democracy.” Public Administration 
Review. Vol. 61, No. 5, 2001; Jones, Lawrence R. and Fred Thompson. Public Management: Institutional 
Renewal for the 21st Century. 1999. Stamford, CT: JAI Press. 
  
18For a nice discussion of the intersection of a host of theories of administrative reform and actual 
administrative change, see Peters, B. Guy. The Future of Governance: Four Emerging Models. 2001. 
Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.   
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perspective might offer, both in identifying and in addressing the problems bureaucratic 
administration poses for a democratic system. Put simply, many of these studies tend to 
more carefully analyze what “bureaucracy” is than what “democracy” is (both now and in 
the past), and thus the prescriptions offered often fall short.   
Taking this critique to heart, this dissertation begins with a detailed analysis of 
two historical-theoretical models of democracy – the representative and direct models –
locates the core set of relationships guiding them both, and seeks to understand how these 
models (or at least two prominent defenders of these models) reconcile administrative 
authority within a democratic system. When understood properly, the set of relationships 
defining democracy, mandating a connection between the people, the law and the rule of 
law, leads us to identify some potentially most-damaging bureaucratic practices and 
processes for our model of democracy, and to reject others as benign. And through this, 
one source of potential conflict between bureaucracy and democracy is located within 
processes of bureaucratic rulemaking, and the long-prescribed means intrinsic to our 
received models of democracy for resolving this tension – through democratic modes of 
control and accountability – are examined. Finally, maintaining a footing within the 
traditions of normative democratic theory, we proceed to seek more robust forms of 
democratic control and accountability of the bureaucracy, and locate one empirical 
example that provides hope for realizing a deliberative-democratic model of bureaucratic 
accountability.  
 
 
 
 9
III. Research Philosophy  
 Unlike most studies addressing the bureaucracy-democracy paradox, this 
dissertation emerges in large part from outside the scholarly traditions of public 
administration studies (although it obviously touches on this literature), and is instead 
guided by a broader focus on democratic theory, and more specifically normative 
democratic theory. Moreover, the ideas in these pages rely heavily on a type of social-
scientific inquiry termed critical theory, and more specifically the critical-theoretical 
method of an immanent critique. Approaching the bureaucracy-democracy paradox from 
within these traditions and relying on these modes of inquiry guides this dissertation 
significantly, impacting the assortment of questions asked and the nature of the solutions 
offered. Therefore, these traditions require a somewhat more detailed description. 
In the broadest sense, a normative theory of democracy values popular control of 
and participation in government and works to articulate the social and political conditions 
necessary for realizing this moral good. That is, normative democratic theorists 
understand the realization and defense of democracy as their principle moral objective 
(their “ought”), although the nature of this ought and the means for realizing it can vary 
substantially depending on what a particular scholar takes the ever-elusive term 
democracy to entail. Indeed, in part this dissertation will be focused on arriving at a 
useful and enduringly relevant model of democracy, one that has guided and continues to 
guide our understanding of this concept. 
Moreover, immanent critique, a mode of philosophical inquiry typically 
associated with the Hegelian tradition, begins in the critical analysis of extant social, 
philosophical and, most pertinent to this context, political relationships. The primary task 
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of an immanent critique is to identify the unrealized normative core of extant political 
relationships, and to strive towards realizing these ideals against the backdrop of an 
apparently inhospitable empirical reality. In the words of one scholar, an “immanent 
critique is first and foremost a critique of dogmatism and formalism, that is, a critique of 
the myth of the given and of the juxtaposition to the given of a formal principle to which 
the former must be subordinated. Both the content and the form, the given and the 
‘ought,’ are reflected to their ground…”19 A few examples of how these guiding 
paradigms impact the format, logic and content of this dissertation are necessary. 
 In the first instance, as Chapter Two will evidence most clearly, this dissertation 
does not assume the tension between bureaucracy and democracy to be exclusively the 
product of the emergence of modern forms of public administration over (roughly) the 
last century. Rather, this dissertation is guided by the idea that most contemporary 
political problems – and even some seemingly inescapable paradoxes – can be best 
understood by examining essential foundations and guiding theoretical frameworks. 
Further, and following the logic of an immanent mode of critique, we must first identify 
the normative ideals and the political principles underlying our model of democracy – a 
model with roots stretching back well beyond our contemporary context – before 
understanding how these normative ideals have been interrupted, gone unrealized or been 
overwhelmed by the ideology and reified norms of the inescapable “is.” In this spirit, this 
dissertation begins the search for answers to the bureaucracy-democracy paradox with an 
examination of historical democratic thought, looking specifically to the ideals 
                                                 
19Benhabib, Seyla. Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory. 1986. N.Y., 
N.Y.: Columbia University Press. [P. 42]. 
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underpinning contemporary democracy and the mechanisms suggested therein for 
reconciling popular government and administrative authority.   
 Moreover, as Chapters Three and Four will show clearly, both the method of 
immanent critique and a normative democratic theory demand that we look closely at 
existing political relationships to discover how well our normative ideals have been 
realized in practice. That is, within any sound work of normative democratic theory, and 
especially one guided by the logic of an immanent critique, the normative “ought” must 
be related carefully to the empirical “is.” In these chapters, therefore, both bureaucratic 
rulemaking and the democratic strategies designed to reconcile this practice with our 
model of democracy will be closely examined. And because found to be at least partially 
lacking, this examination justifies a search for alternative democratic modes of 
accountability and control.  
 Finally, as we will see in Chapters Five and Six, as a work of normative 
democratic theory this dissertation takes seriously the possibility of resolving 
“democratic problems” through robust forms of democratic participation. That is, by 
adopting a deliberative model of democracy as one means for resolving the lingering 
tension between bureaucracy and democracy, this dissertation indicates its commitment 
to broad and deep democratic public participation. Nevertheless, this commitment does 
not allow us to ignore the empirical plausibility of our prescriptions, to focus on our 
support of normative ideals to the exclusion of how we might realize these ideals in 
practice. Thus, we will seek an empirical example of deliberative democracy at work in 
the context of interest, an example that might evidence both the normative desirability 
and empirical plausibility of our prescriptions.  
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IV. Chapter Outline 
 This dissertation is segmented into two parts and seven chapters, including the 
introductory chapter and the conclusion. While these chapters cover considerable ground 
and address an array of topics, each in its own way contributes to our understanding of 
the tension between bureaucracy and democracy, and each brings us closer to reconciling 
these two values within contemporary democratic systems.  
 Focusing on the tension between bureaucracy and democracy in the United States, 
Chapter Two begins with an effort to understand the essential foundations of popular 
government and democracy through an examination of two important and representative 
theorists. Contemporary democracies (which often combine elements of both the 
representative and direct-democratic models) are founded on a model of popular 
government and law that demands a connection and identity between the people and the 
laws which govern them, the rules which infringe on their rights and liberties. 
Understanding the fortitude and persistence of this relationship is, in large part, to 
understand the vibrancy of democracy. Furthermore, an analysis of this model also allows 
us to best identify locations where democracy may have weakened or come under attack.  
On the other hand, these models (or at least two preeminent theorists advocating 
these models) also defend the integration of executive and administrative discretion and 
prerogative as an essential means for realizing the public good, with elites not connected 
to the people in the same manner as elected representatives (or the people acting on their 
own behalf) delegated the authority to implement, interpret and even counteract the law. 
These practices are reconciled within these models of democracy, however, through 
democratic forms of control, accountability and oversight, strategies for reasserting the 
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connection between the people and the law. So long as these strategies prove effective, 
the tension between democracy and instances of administrative power remains resolved.  
With this model of democracy and the lessons derived from it in hand, Chapter 
Three proceeds to move from essential foundations to the current context by examining 
modern bureaucratic administration, and in particular one form of bureaucratic power 
which, at least superficially, would seem to most directly interfere with our model of 
democracy: processes of bureaucratic rulemaking. Congressional delegations of authority 
to executive and administrative institutions to makes rules and regulations having the 
force of law have been a feature of the American political system since the beginning of 
the republic. However, beginning in the twentieth century these grants of authority 
became more frequent and less circumscribed in the power delegated, leading ultimately 
to a “positive administrative state” capable of making policy concerning normatively 
contestable social and political values. Given their contemporary nature and increased 
prevalence, it would seem that bureaucratic rulemaking might challenge the basic 
relationships central to our model of democracy. Nevertheless, and contrary to some 
critical analyses, bureaucratic rulemaking is here argued to be unproblematic for our 
model of democracy so long as means for reasserting the connection between the people 
and these rules through democratic modes of administrative control are functioning and 
effective. But this, of course, begs a critical question: how effective are extant democratic 
modes of control and accountability, and particularly in relation to processes of 
bureaucratic rulemaking?  
Chapter Four seeks to answer the critical question left unanswered in Chapter 
Three, and does so by examining the effectiveness of existing democratic modes of 
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control and accountability of bureaucratic rulemaking. As remnants of two institutional 
forms of democracy remain in the U.S. system – the direct and representative models – 
two democratic modes of bureaucratic control exist as well, one centered in legislative 
oversight, the other in public accountability. Nevertheless, in Chapter Four both forms 
are argued to be at least partially ineffective in protecting Congressional goals and 
intentions from bureaucratic discretion, a fact which provides grounds for challenging the 
compatibility of bureaucratic rulemaking with our model of democracy, and justifying a 
search for an alternative form of democratic control and accountability better supporting 
democracy.  
 Seeking a more effective means for controlling and holding bureaucracy (and 
particularly its rulemaking processes) democratically accountable, and thus better 
supporting our model of democracy in the face of these practices, Chapter Five looks to 
one normative model of democracy, deliberative democracy. Deliberative democratic 
theory, founded on a set of principles suggesting that mutually binding decisions receive 
greater legitimacy when rendered through processes of public deliberation and 
justification, has garnered considerable attention over the last two decades. What is more, 
this theory provides what would appear to be one ideal perspective for envisioning an 
alternative type of democratic control and accountability. Yet this theory has only rarely 
been applied to the bureaucratic context, and this is the case, I argue, because of a 
reflexive hesitancy (borne of modern limitations, such as social scale) to prescribe broad 
public participation to the expert-technocratic processes of the bureaucratic system. 
Chapter Five concludes by providing a more concrete understanding of deliberative-
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democratic practice and suggests that, when properly understood, deliberative democracy 
is perfectly compatible with elite, expert-driven bureaucratic processes and institutions.  
 Suggesting that bureaucratic rulemaking better conform to the principles and 
values of a deliberative-democratic model of bureaucratic accountability requires, 
however, evidencing the empirical plausibility of such a suggestion. To this end, Chapter 
Six examines empirically a recent and innovative approach to bureaucratic rulemaking – 
labeled electronic or “e-rulemaking” – as a type of rulemaking process replete with 
potential for realizing a deliberative-democratic model of bureaucratic accountability. 
While a very recent innovation, arising only over the last five years with advances in 
information technology and the development of the Internet, e-rulemaking has the 
potential for integrating both deliberative and democratic public participation in 
promising ways. Utilizing a case study approach to provide evidence of e-rulemaking’s 
potential, I examine the rulemaking processes surrounding the Department of 
Agriculture’s National Organic Program. Lastly, I examine some possible impediments to 
realizing deliberative democracy through e-rulemaking, and make some suggestions for 
avoiding these potential pitfalls.  
 Finally, in Chapter Seven, and in conclusion, I begin by summarizing the primary 
arguments of this dissertation, both the novel and the mundane. Furthermore, Chapter 
Seven reiterates the primary contributions of this dissertation to both the democratic 
theory and public administration literatures. Lastly, a broader research agenda based on 
some of the ideas presented in this dissertation is offered.  
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V. Contributions of this Dissertation 
 This dissertation strives to make significant contributions to two distinct bodies of 
scholarship within the discipline of political science, the democratic theory and public 
administration literatures. In the first instance, and as mentioned above, by beginning 
with an historical-theoretical investigation of influential normative models of democracy 
and the intersection of these models with administrative practice, this dissertation adopts 
a more historical and theoretical perspective than most scholarship in this genre, and 
gleans significant and valuable lessons from this exercise. That is, while many working in 
public administration take democracy to be a concept, practice and system-type detached 
from historical roots, this dissertation takes the opposite approach, and works to learn 
from what our democratic forebears have to teach. As these models have guided and 
continue to guide our democratic norms and democratic practices, as well as our 
understanding of how democracy and administration ought to intersect, this approach is 
argued to be a valuable and necessary one. 
 Moreover, this dissertation contributes significantly to our understanding of 
deliberative democratic theory and the range of political processes and institutions to 
which the principles and practices of this theory might be applied. That is, throughout the 
life of deliberative democratic theory scholars have tended to focus first and foremost on 
legislative or traditionally deliberative institutions and processes, suspiciously neglecting 
– or intentionally rejecting – a discussion of the many problems bureaucratic governance 
poses to a democracy, and the ways in which the deliberative model might help us 
overcome these difficulties. But in this dissertation, I provide ample reasons – again, both 
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normative and empirical – for taking seriously the possibility of a deliberative-democratic 
model of bureaucratic accountability. 
 Lastly, by providing a case study offering empirical evidence of the possibility of 
a deliberative-democratic model of bureaucratic accountability in practice, this 
dissertation bridges norm and reality and evidences the empirical plausibility of its 
normative prescriptions. While studies examining “empowered” deliberative democracy 
(i.e. deliberative democracy in practice) have become somewhat more common over the 
last few years, too often this theory is presented only as an ideal, a normative model of 
democratic politics useful for understanding the deficiencies of existing democratic 
processes, but far too overwhelmed by empirical realities to be applied in modern mass 
societies. By showing this not to be the case, this dissertation takes us one step closer to 
the application of deliberative democracy to a range of democratic practices – including 
the processes of elite, expert bureaucratic institutions.  
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Chapter Two: Two Models of Popular Government, Law and Administrative 
Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Modern political systems were not created in a vacuum. On the contrary, these 
systems were deeply influenced by, among other forces, prominent political thinkers and 
the ideas they espoused. For instance, the arguments presented by American founding 
fathers James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in defending the Constitution 
of 1787 (and especially Madison), collected today in The Federalist, are replete with 
evidence of the intersection of thought and practice; in defending the Constitution’s 
distribution of particular powers or the relationship between institutions, it was not 
uncommon for these three to reference a “celebrated” thinker of the past.20 Similarly, 
most modern democracies are patterned to some varying degree – often through direct 
contact with these ideas, but also through the diffusion of these ideas across thinkers, 
over time and between socio-cultural contexts – on influential theoretical models of 
government. 
 With this simple proposition in mind, in this chapter two models of popular 
government and law will be described, and traces of these two models in the 
                                                 
20Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay and James Madison. The Federalist. 1787. N.Y., N.Y.: McGraw Hill. [P. 
313].  
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constitutional foundations and current practices of the American political system will be 
examined. More particularly, in this chapter, relying on John Locke and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau as exemplars and proxies for larger traditions, both the representative-
republican and the direct-participatory models of popular government will be outlined, 
models which, while differing in their institutional prescriptions, project a core and 
consistent set of relationships defining popular government that has come to underpin our 
modern understanding of democracy. Furthermore, the justifications and strategies these 
two prescribe for both integrating and democratically controlling executive and 
administrative discretion and prerogative will be examined, as these too continue to 
inform our understanding of administration within a democratic system.  
 While this chapter might appear to take us away from the narrower subject of 
modern bureaucracy and the problems this institution poses for a democracy, these 
investigations are in fact essential. In this chapter we will look to both the foundations of 
popular government – now providing the basis for what we understand as democracy – 
and the means these models suggest towards checking and controlling executive and 
administrative power. In this sense, this chapter will allow us to get a firm grasp on the 
nature of the tensions between bureaucracy and democracy, and the sufficiency (or 
insufficiency) of the tools available for resolving this tension in practice. In the end, some 
lessons will be drawn from this exercise that will inform much of what follows.  
 
I. Two Models of Popular Government and Law: Representative Republicanism 
and Direct Participation 
 
 In the most basic sense, a popular government is one which guarantees a 
connection or identity between the citizenry and the rules and laws that govern their 
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actions. These laws, infringements on the rights and liberties individuals might exercise 
(or do naturally hold) outside of government, often impose burdens on the citizenry, and 
thus a government is popular so long as a connection between the people and the law 
persists. Further, these laws, openly enacted, stable across time and superior to any 
arbitrary decree through the principle of the rule of law, allow the individual citizen to 
determine the extent to which the government either serves or rejects their particular 
interests, and the public good as a whole.  
This is not to say, however, that diverse models of popular government have not 
been posited; indeed, the procedural, institutional and constitutional arrangements 
suggested towards realizing popular government have diverged across different thinkers, 
even while maintaining a central emphasis on the connection between the people, the law 
and the rule of law. Two such models, those provided by John Locke and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, present both generic images of the most prominent normative models of 
popular government, and highlight the different arrangements that have been suggested 
(and adopted) towards this end. 
 
I.1. John Locke and the Representative-Republican Model 
 Like many Enlightenment thinkers, when constructing his theory of popular 
government John Locke places the legislative power at the center of the political system. 
For Locke, it is the legislative power that is to be the “supreme power” within 
government, with all other powers “derived from and subordinate to it,” and with this 
authority reflecting the “first and fundamental positive law” of popular government.21 
                                                 
21Locke, John. John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government. MacPherson, C.B. (Ed). 1980. Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett Publishing. [P. 69]. (Hereafter, STG) 
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The legislative power is awarded this preeminence in the first instance, we shall see, 
because this institution is to be most directly linked to the community, the citizenry being 
tied to the legislative authority through an act of express consent – and ultimately through 
elected representatives. These elected representatives, in turn, are empowered with the 
most basic task of government, and the most essential means for affecting this task: 
framing and delimiting the rights of the people through the enactment of positive law.  
And finally, it is through its supremacy over the law that the legislative authority will 
come to embody (or abuse) a central tenet of popular government, the rule of law.  
 In discussing the foundations of a popular government centered in a legislative 
authority, Locke claims that the particular form this power takes is (at least superficially) 
inessential. Locke considers the notion of “democracy” (where the people make the laws 
directly), “elective monarchy” (where a single individual is popularly elected to exercise 
the lawmaking power) and “hereditary monarchy” (where the lawmaking power is 
controlled by a single individual and transferred through family lineage) as all valid 
institutional alternatives that the people might select in vesting their legislative 
authority.22 But what is sacred, essential and constant for Locke is that this legislative 
power must be “derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution” 
and the legislative power vested in legislators “whom they have chosen, and authorized to 
make laws for them.”23 And it is because of this emphasis on the popular source of the 
                                                 
22STG, P. 68-69.  
 
23STG, P. 75. Yet there is some debate on this topic, with dissenters claiming Locke only intended to allow 
the people to choose the form of government, but not necessarily the individual legislators. For this 
perspective, see Wood, Ellen Meikins. “Locke against Democracy.” History of Political Thought. Vol. 
XIII, 1992. 
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legislative authority (among other, similarly-intended comments) that Locke is typically 
perceived to be a defender of a representative legislature.24
 Locke gives particular attention, it is clear, to the idea of a representative 
legislature. Locke closely considers, for instance, two important – indeed, defining – 
characteristics of a representative system: the questions of equal representation and of 
fair electoral processes. Locke criticizes those systems which, through the “gross 
absurdities” of custom, have allowed representation to become “very unequal and 
disproportionate.”25 Instead, Locke insists, the people ought “to have a fair and equal 
representative” with representation for “all places that have a right to be distinctly 
represented.”26 Similarly, the process of selecting representatives ought to be fair, with 
the people choosing their representatives “upon just and undeniably equal measures.”27 It 
thus seems clear that Locke has in mind, or at least finds most attractive, a legislative 
body elected by the people, and the legislative authority is granted preeminence at least in 
part because of its connection to the people through the electoral process.28
 Additionally, the nature of the most fundamental task delegated to the legislature, 
and the means through which it fulfills this task, also justify its status as the supreme 
institution in government. For Locke, the legislative power is the institution tasked with 
                                                 
24For this interpretation of Locke, see Huyler, Jerome. Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the 
Founding Era. 1995. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas; Pangle, Thomas. The Spirit of Modern 
Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke. 1988. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press.   
 
25STG, P. 82. 
 
26STG, P. 82-83.  
 
27STG, P. 83. 
 
28While it seems beyond dispute that Locke preferred a representative legislature, it is less clear that he 
supported a wide franchise.  For some examples, see Hughes, Martin. “Locke on Taxation and Suffrage.” 
History of Political Thought. Vol. XI, 1990; Ashcraft, Richard. Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two 
Treatise of Government. 1986. Pinceton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
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framing and delimiting the rights of the people under government, ultimately infringing 
on the rights of the people in guaranteeing the public good. That is, as the sole institution 
delegated the power to create and enact positive law – to make rules designed to govern 
the actions of all – the legislature acts as an interpreter of the immutable laws of nature. 
As the interpreter of the natural law, the rights of all will be impacted most directly by the 
legislature, and these rights will be made either less or more secure by the actions of the 
legislative power. The degree to which and the manner in which these rights are 
circumscribed will, in turn, impact the people’s interests, and reflect the legislative 
authority’s sympathy with and deference to the public good. The legislative power is, in 
short, most closely attached to and immersed in the rights, interests and good of the 
people through its exercise of the most essential type of political power, the making of 
law.  
 While the centrality and supremacy of the legislative authority is grounded in the 
first instance upon this institution’s representative nature and thus its connection to the 
people, and the legislature’s relationship to individual rights and the public good through 
its power to create and enact positive law, the salience of this institution also stems from 
its connection to the rule of law through its dominance over the lawmaking power.29 For 
Locke, man leaves the otherwise peaceful natural state because of the “inconveniences” 
of this state, where the natural law is unwritten and unclear, and thus more likely to be 
abused. Within civil government a “known law,” openly enacted, codified in statute and 
dominant over arbitrary decree, prevents the government from arbitrarily or excessively 
                                                 
29For a nice review of both contemporary and historical works on the rule of law concept, see Scheuerman, 
William. “The Rule of Law at Century’s End.” Political Theory. Vol. 25, No. 5, 1997. See also, 
Scheuerman, William. Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law. 
1994. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
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infringing on the people’s rights. And thus within any popular government, Locke argues, 
the rule of law is central. In other words, it is essential that a popular government have 
 
 promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and 
 secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, 
 and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such 
 purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, and own not 
 willingly.30
 
The importance of the rule of law for Locke is clear. The people understand their rights 
and duties through clear, stable and openly enacted law, and are able to monitor their 
representatives and the government as a whole, and pass informed judgment on both, in 
relation to the content of these laws. Therefore, other types of decisions, for instance 
executive discretion or prerogative exercised outside the legislature, are not identical to 
law.  
 In sum, it is the set of relationships between the people, legislative 
representatives, the law and the rule of law that serve as the foundation of Locke’s model 
of popular government. Most basically, a government is a popular government so long as 
it affects an identity between the people and the laws governing them (through expressly 
chosen representatives), the stable and transparent laws which restrict their rights and 
mandate duties. Locke reinforces the importance of each of these features of popular 
government when discussing the reasons a people might employ in seeking the 
dissolution of a corrupt or unjust government. The alteration of the legislative authority 
without popular consent, ignorance of the public good in enacted laws, or government by 
                                                 
30STG, P. 80. 
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arbitrary decree are all indicators that the government should no longer be deemed a 
popular government, and thus might be dissolved by the people.31  
 But more fundamentally, what can be gleaned from this very brief reconstruction 
of Locke’s thought is, I think, an archetypical normative model of popular government 
which we might term representative republicanism, a system of government centered in a 
popularly elected legislature (i.e. representative) and founded upon law and the rule of 
law (i.e. republican). And as we shall see shortly, this model of representative 
republicanism adequately reflects the institutional foundations and normative ideals of 
the modern representative democracy, and particularly this model as it has been 
developed in the United States.  
 
I.2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Direct-Participatory Model 
 Another important normative model of popular government comes from a 
somewhat unlikely source, or can at least be adequately represented by this source: Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau defends a type of popular government founded in a 
relationship between the people, the law and the rule of law – a model of popular 
government quite similar in its core features to that proposed by Locke, although 
differing substantially in the procedural and institutional arrangements that underpin it. 
 The Social Contract, Rousseau’s most comprehensive and complete political tract 
begins by posing a problem and positing a solution to this problem.32 The problem is: 
 
                                                 
31See STG, Chapter XIX, “Of the Dissolution of Government.”  
 
32Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. 1967. N.Y., N.Y.: Pocket Books. (Hereafter SC).  
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 To find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole 
 common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while 
 uniting himself with all, may still obey only himself, and remain as free as 
 before.33
 
Rousseau thus identifies his primary objective as directed at unraveling a fundamental 
metaphysical and moral problem, a problem perennially plaguing political thought and 
practice: reconciling the equal pre-social freedom of the individual with the practical 
necessity of government. Like Locke, then, Rousseau is concerned with how individuals 
can enter into government but still maintain as large a portion of their individual right as 
possible. It is this difficult dilemma that any political system must confront, and 
Rousseau argues that his prescribed political system, defining a particular type of 
relationship between the people, the law and the rule of law, proves essential in resolving 
this dilemma.  
Rousseau’s political thought is built upon the foundation of the “general will.” 
Functioning as the framework of a social compact against which all institutions, laws, 
and political decisions are measured, the general will provides a society with principles of 
justice balancing the interests of the individual with those of the political association, 
essentially defending both by demanding extensive political equality and preventing 
domination at the hands of particular interests.34 It is at this juncture, in discussing the 
source of a society’s general will, that Rousseau introduces and defends his principle of 
                                                 
33SC, P. 17-18.  
 
34For more complete analyses of Rousseau’s general will, see Kateb, George. “Aspects of Rousseau’s 
Political Thought.” Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 76, No. 4, 1961; Barry, Brian. “The Public Interest.” 
In Political Philosophy. Anthony Quinton (Ed.). 1967. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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active sovereignty, the principle describing the role of the people in the most basic and 
essential act of government, the construction of law.35
 Rousseau is clear concerning the purpose and extent of his principle of active 
sovereignty. In the first instance, the people are to have the equal right to participate in 
the construction of the general will underlying the social compact. Indeed, the idea of the 
general will as a solution to the problems Rousseau confronts – reconciling equal 
individual liberty and political association – is a non sequitur if its very genesis 
undermines the equality of the individual contractor at the moment of political 
incorporation. Thus, and much like Locke, the people must in the first instance have the 
right to set the “basic law,” the power to choose the form of government, and to distribute 
their power to the political institutions of their choosing.  
What is more, as the people are responsible for creating the general will, the very 
foundation of the political system, so too is it the people that are responsible for creating 
the laws, the rules governing society. In describing the production of law and its 
application, Rousseau writes unequivocally that “the people, being subjected to the laws, 
should be the authors of them.”36 By way of further explanation, Rousseau writes that 
 
 On this view, we at once see that it can no longer be asked whose business  
 it is to make laws, since they are acts of the general will; nor whether the   
 prince is above the law, since he is a member of the State; nor whether the  
 law can be unjust, since no one is unjust to himself; nor how we can be   
 both free and subject to the laws, since they are but registers of our wills.37
 
                                                 
35 For more on this notion of active sovereignty, see Mazrui, Ali A. “Alienable Sovereignty in Rousseau: A 
Further Look.” Ethics. Vol. 77, No. 2, 1967. 
 
36SC, P. 40.  
 
37SC, P. 40.  
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We recognize through these words two important elements of Rousseau’s political 
thought. First, Rousseau is adamant about the people’s right to participate in the 
processes creating law. As the people must live by the laws, so too must the people be 
connected to the law by creating it, if they are to remain free. Second, Rousseau, much 
like Locke, defends the principle of the rule of law, a general, universal law applying to 
all citizens equally, and applying to and restricting the actions of the government and 
public officials wielding governmental authority. For Rousseau, the only legitimate 
government is a republic, and a republican government is, on his definition, one that is 
“governed by laws.”38  
Like Locke, therefore, Rousseau defines popular government as a system founded 
on a relationship between the people, the law, and the rule of law. How can the people be 
both free and subject to the laws? Or asked differently, how can both the law rule and the 
people rule? Rousseau’s answer to this question is arrived at by giving the people active 
sovereignty, by making the people solely responsible for the creation and enactment of 
law. And as long as the law rules, the law produced by the people, the people rule and the 
government is popular.  
 This brings us, of course, to the most significant difference between the political 
thought of Rousseau and Locke. For Locke, representation in the production of law, so 
long as the people are connected to their legislators by creating the form of government 
and appointing and removing these legislators, is not only acceptable, but also preferable. 
Rousseau, on the contrary, is firmly opposed to the notion of representation in the 
                                                 
38SC, P. 40.  
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production of law, and criticizes this practice forcefully when discussing the English 
political system: 
 
 Every law the people has not ratified in person is null and void – is, in fact, not a 
 law. The people of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is 
 free only during the election of members of parliament.39
 
Therefore, for Rousseau law must be ratified by the people, the people must voice their 
consent or dissent to law directly, must enact laws themselves, and any delegation of 
authority to representatives to affect this end is unacceptable.  
  In sum, Rousseau, much like Locke, defines popular government as a connection 
between the people, the law and the rule of law. Where Rousseau diverges from Locke is 
in his insistence on the people’s inalienable right to participate directly in the processes 
creating law. It is for this reason that Rousseau is regularly (and perhaps somewhat too 
simplistically, as we will see below) recognized as the greatest modern proponent of 
“pure participatory democracy.”40 But it is nonetheless for this reason that Rousseau 
might be adopted and used as a proxy towards understanding a direct-participatory 
model of popular government, a type of popular government defined primarily by the 
people’s active participation in the creation of law. And as we shall see shortly, this 
direct-participatory model adequately represents a model of direct democracy, traces of 
which can still be felt in modern systems like the United States.  
 
                                                 
39SC, P. 99. 
 
40For one example, see Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. 1970. Cambridge, U.K.: 
University of Cambridge Press.  
 
 30
I.3. A Note on Popular Government and Democracy 
 When discussing theorists like Locke and Rousseau, one must be careful in 
assigning to their political thought the label “democracy;” I have exercised care here by 
employing the less loaded term “popular government” to describe the thrust of their 
ideas. As mentioned above, Locke gives relatively short-shrift to the idea of democracy, 
saying little about this form beyond its logical status as one of many potential types of 
legislative institution, and proceeding to advocate representative government. Rousseau 
talks more about democracy, but is openly hostile to the idea, recognizing it as a form of 
government where the administrative and executive tasks rest in the hands of the 
people.41 This arrangement, Rousseau thinks, is as impractical as it is unwise. In short, 
neither Locke nor Rousseau identify themselves as “democrats” – at least as each would 
define the term – and thus we must pay due respect by not attaching this label to their 
thought haphazardly. 
 Be this as it may, the generic models of popular government that the political 
thought of Locke and Rousseau might be adopted to illustrate have come to be 
recognized as “democracy.” Indeed, the connection between the people, the law (whether 
generated by the people directly or by their representatives) and the rule of law has 
proven critical to the self-understanding of modern governments, and specifically to those 
governments that would declare themselves to be vibrant, well-functioning democracies. 
And while it wasn’t until later that systems like the United States would openly adopt the 
                                                 
41SC, P. 69-71.  
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label of democracy, the discourse of democracy has become inextricably intertwined with 
these models of popular government. 42
 This brief note on the relationship between the models we have investigated and 
democracy is necessary, for as we move forward these concepts will be used 
interchangeably. That is, the model of a representative-republican system generalized 
from Lockean political thought above has, for all intents and purposes, now taken the 
name “representative democracy.” Similarly, the direct, participatory model of 
government generalized from Rousseau’s political thought is now more typically thought 
of as “participatory” or “direct democracy.” It is sufficient to say, in sum, that while care 
must be taken in applying the label democracy to either Locke or Rousseau, we must also 
recognize that the models these two theorists have provided are now understood as 
precisely that.  
 Yet to be sure, this is more than an effort at semantic clarification. On the 
contrary, as we will see beginning below and continuing throughout the next few 
chapters, these models of popular government, the means these models have prescribed to 
connect the people to the law, and to provide for the popular control of decisions made 
outside legislative institutions, have influenced modern democratic systems and provided 
the framework within which these systems understand their own capacities, limitations, 
and normative aspirations, and thus prove critical to fully understanding modern 
democracy. 
 
                                                 
42For a discussion of the shift from popular government (whether called republicanism, popular 
government, popular sovereignty, etc) to democracy (focusing on the Anglo-American context), see 
Saxonhouse, Arlene. Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theorists. 1996. Notre Dame, 
IN: Notre Dame University Press.  
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II. Popular Government from Political Thought to Political Practice 
 Neither the representative-republican nor the direct-participatory model of 
popular government has wielded exclusive influence over contemporary democracies. To 
be sure, the representative-republican or representative-democratic model described 
above has come to dominate, but all democracies have taken portions of this model and 
combined it with indigenous traditions or disparate ideals in founding their political 
systems, including features we might identify as more closely associated with a model of 
direct democracy. As we shall see below in relation to the United States, even a cursory 
analysis provides ample evidence of the impact these models have wielded in 
contemporary democratic systems.  
 
II.1. Representative Republicanism in the United States 
 It seems beyond argument, and almost unnecessary to mention, that many if not 
most contemporary democratic governments have in fact implemented, and understand 
themselves through the lens of, the representative-republican model of popular 
government, the model of representative democracy. Furthermore, many of these systems 
have openly and proudly proclaimed their connection to the political thought of Locke in 
defending their constitutional traditions (particularly the Anglo-American countries). For 
instance, while these systems intentionally implemented and have over time developed 
distinct features, the model of parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom (i.e. the 
Westminster model) and the Congressional-republican system outlined in the 
Constitution of the United States provide different but not dissimilarly structured 
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interpretations of the representative model, and both have been directly impacted by the 
political thought of Locke.43
 Paying particular attention to the American case, it is clear that the Founders were 
heavily influenced by a model of representative republicanism. The arguments employed 
to defend the Constitution of 1787 by the most prominent founders make this clear. 
Recall, for instance, the words of Federalist 51 regarding the supremacy of the legislature 
in the new federal government: “It is not possible to give each department an equal power 
of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily 
predominates.”44 Recall also that Article Four, Section Four of the Constitution extends 
this argument to apply to the states, demanding that every state in the new union was to 
adopt “a republican form of government,” and by this was meant a representative 
government based in law and the rule of law.45
Further advocating this model of popular government, the legislative authority 
was to dominate because, as Federalist 39 instructs, republican government is defined as 
one “which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the 
people.”46 Of course, the institution that was to be most closely linked to the people 
through direct election was Congress (and more specifically, until 1913 the House of 
Representatives). Because of its size, mode of election and more “populist” requirements 
                                                 
43For some works emphasizing the importance of Locke’s political philosophy to American political 
thought, see: Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America. 1955. N.Y., N.Y.: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich; Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism. But for the best direct evidence of this, see 
Madison’s defense of a republican system outlined in “Federalist #10,” and compare the system of 
government highlighted therein with the Lockean model. Yet debate surely remains. Gibson, Alan. 
“Ancients, Moderns and Americans: The Republicanism-Liberalism Debate Revisited.” History of Political 
Thought. Vol. 21, No. 2, 2000.  
  
44Hamilton et. al, “Federalist #51,” P. 338. 
 
45The Constitution of the United States of America. 1787. N.Y., N.Y.: McGraw Hill. [P. 595]. 
 
46Hamilton, et. al. “Federalist #39,” P. 243.  
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for eligibility, the House of Representatives was to have “an immediate dependence on, 
and an intimate sympathy with, the people.”47 In short, the representative legislature is 
supreme in order to ensure popular government, as it is this institution that is most closely 
connected to the people. 
 Moreover, the primary means through which Congress was authorized to utilize 
its power, and thus to function as the predominant institution in the new federal system, 
was through the enactment of law. It is certainly not coincidental then, given the 
centrality of law and the rule of law within the guiding model, that the Constitution 
literally begins in Article One, Section One with the assignment of this most essential 
power to Congress: “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States,” including the power to “make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.”48 Congress’ exclusive power to 
make law, and the rule of law’s precedence over all other modes of power, cements this 
institution as the centerpiece of the federal government in the United States. 
 It is easy to recognize, even through this very brief analysis, that representative 
republicanism has played a prominent role in the creation of the system of representative 
democracy in the U.S., at the local, state and federal levels of government.49 Yet as is the 
case with most all representative democracies, the grip of this model has not been 
                                                 
47Hamilton, et. al. “Federalist #52,” P. 343.  
 
48The Constitution of the United States of America. Pp. 587-588.   
 
49It is important to note here that if one questions the Founders’ reliance on Locke, another important 
influence on their thought – Montesquieu – defended a similar interpretation of republicanism, as well as a 
similar understanding of how this system intersected with administration (which we will discuss below). 
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. The Spirit of the Laws. 1989. N.Y., N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. 
[Book II, Chapter II].  
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absolute, and in the U.S. diverse traditions – including features of direct democracy – 
have also exercised considerable influence.  
 
II.2. Elements of the Direct-Participatory Model 
 If evidence of the impact of the representative-democratic model on the political 
system in the United States is unequivocal, it is equally fair to say that similar evidence 
of the impact of a direct-democratic model of popular government, at least at the moment 
of founding, is unavailable. If anything, there is direct evidence that this type of political 
practice was not received favorably. James Madison, for instance, is clear in his objection 
to systems of “pure democracy;” this type of system, history evidenced to Madison, was 
least able to deal with the “deleterious” effects of faction, the tendency of particular 
groups to seek their own interests and abuse the rights of others in the process.50 Yet both 
before and after Madison, direct democracy has had some traction in the U.S., and 
Madison would surely be distraught to discover that elements of direct democracy have 
found an enduring place within the system.  
 If representative democracy is and has been the dominate force in the United 
States, elements of a more direct form of democracy have always been a secondary one. 
In early colonial America, going back to the first settlements in New England, primitive 
conditions, real equality and mutual need resulted in a system of direct-participatory 
decision making, a system that has endured to the present day. The town hall meeting 
system at the local level of government in the northeastern part of the United States 
                                                 
50Hamilton, et. al. “Federalist #10,” P. 58. 
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provides some of the most often cited evidence of a type of direct democracy in action.51 
In these town hall meetings, a range of issues, including local initiatives, major 
infrastructure projects and budgetary decisions are decided directly by the citizenry.  
Additionally, at both the state and local levels of government across the United 
States processes that can only be described as derivative of a model of direct democracy 
continue to exert influence. Some of these include the processes of legislative initiative, 
referendum and the recall of elected officials.52 The process of legislative initiative, 
where citizens vote to propose a new statute to be formally adopted either directly or by 
an elected legislature later, remains a ubiquitous form of direct democracy in the United 
States. The process of referendum, with citizens voting directly to adopt a new statute or 
to amend their constitution, is another example. Furthermore, in many states elected 
public officials accused of wrong-doing, or simply deemed unfit to maintain their 
positions, are subject to a recall vote of the people, as opposed to the impeachment 
procedures of an elected legislative body. In all of these matters, the direct voice of the 
citizens, and not the judgment of their elected representatives, is deemed necessary, and 
thus a type of direct democracy endures in these instances. 
It is clear, then, that direct democracy, while not the dominant force in the U.S., 
still wields considerable influence, and informs part of our understanding of democracy 
generally.53  
                                                 
51For a classic example, see Mansbridge, Jane. Beyond Adversary Democracy. 1983. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. See also, Zimmerman, Joseph. The New England Town Meeting: Democracy 
in Action. 1999. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing.  
 
52Cronin, Thomas. Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall. 1989. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.   
 
53And as we shall see shortly, there are also practices informed by a direct model of democracy guiding 
some of the bureaucratic rulemaking processes in the U.S. See Chapter Four.  
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III. Popular Government and the Control of Administrative and Executive 
Discretion 
 
Above, we investigated the political thought of John Locke and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, two theorists advocating models of popular government that have wielded 
considerable influence over contemporary democratic systems, models that might be 
usefully adopted as proxies for the representative and direct models of democracy. For 
both Locke and Rousseau, popular government is defined as an identity and connection 
between the people and the laws, the rules that infringe on the people’s rights and 
liberties. And while Locke and Rousseau differ on the institutional arrangements 
prescribed for realizing popular government, these models offer a consistent image of the 
relationships essential to such a system.  
Yet while committed to the idea of popular government as a connection between 
the people, the law and the rule of law, both Locke and Rousseau also recognize the need 
for institutions to compliment the legislative authority, and at times to interfere with or 
even transform this relationship – executive and administrative institutions. These 
institutions, both thinkers recognize, are essential for several reasons: to execute and 
enforce the law, to supplement the law when it “stands silent” (i.e. discretionary 
authority), and to circumvent the law through “emergency powers” when the good of the 
community demands it (i.e. prerogative). Nevertheless, while both understand the 
importance and even the necessity of these institutions, both also recognize the problems 
inherent in delegating authority to these institutions within a popular system, and both 
thus introduce controls against the abuse of executive and administrative power, 
democratic modes of control, accountability and oversight capable of reasserting the link 
between the people and the law essential to popular government.  
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Just as Locke and Rousseau’s models of popular government were shown to 
inform ideas about and usefully reflect the foundation of modern democracies, so too 
should these models be recognized to inform contemporary ideas about democratically 
controlling decisions and rules made by executive and administrative institutions. In this 
section, we will investigate the means both the representative-republican and the direct-
participatory models integrate for controlling the potentially detrimental effects of 
executive and administrative institutions.  
 
III.1. Representative-Republicanism and Administrative Control through 
Legislative Oversight 
 
 Above, we examined John Locke’s model of popular government. Founded on a 
connection between the people, elected representatives, the law and the rule of law, the 
realization and integrity of these relationships was argued to be essential to realizing and 
maintaining popular government. Yet like any modern political theorist worth our while, 
Locke recognizes that alone a legislative authority may be insufficient to guarantee the 
safety, security and good of the community and the individuals within it. Because these 
values are what individuals turn to civil government to acquire, a system which 
insufficiently protects these goods is a non sequitur. For this reason, within Locke’s 
political thought there is recognized the need for executive and administrative institutions 
to administer, enforce and realize the laws of the community – and at times exercise 
discretion and prerogative to interpret or contravene these laws.  
For Locke, the basic purposes of executive and administrative institutions are 
straightforward, and, in an at least superficial paradox, are argued to provide important 
reinforcement and support for a popular government by helping to ensure the public 
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good. In the first instance, the executive power is needed to carry the positive laws of the 
legislature into effect, to act as, simply enough, the “executor” of the laws and the 
guarantor of their enforcement. Because Locke insists that the legislative authority need 
not – and practically speaking, cannot – “be always in being” (because of its plural nature 
and other practical considerations), it is an executive authority that should be charged 
with the administration and enforcement of the laws.54 While lawmaking is not a constant 
task, the laws do need “perpetual execution,” and this necessitates and justifies a distinct 
power of this kind.55
Furthermore, beyond responsibility for the administration of the laws, Locke 
concedes that several things should “be left to the discretion of him that has the executive 
power in his hands,” because of the likely emergence of circumstances that the legislature 
has not or could not have foreseen.56 For instance, in cases where “the municipal law has 
given no direction,” the executive should have the authority to utilize discretion in 
applying the law to a particular case.57 In short, the executive authority, seeking the good 
of the community, can exercise independent judgment to apply the law to a particular 
circumstance the legislative authority has not recognized, and in that way realize the 
legislature’s goals and intent – or even expand upon this intent – in applying the law.  
Finally, in times of crisis or emergency, where the public good is at stake and the 
legislature has not acted previously or has acted in a way that (under these unforeseen 
                                                 
54STG, P. 76. While Locke has little to say about a broader administrative system, it is clear that he 
envisions one. It is a shame, however, that Locke did not go into greater depth about what he terms 
“ministerial and subordinate powers” within the executive branch. 
 
55STG, P. 76.  
 
56STG, P. 84.  
 
57STG, P. 84. 
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circumstances) now actually undermines the public good, the executive power should in 
fact be empowered to act contrary to the law. In these special circumstances, an executive 
authority not empowered to exercise prerogative – to act unhampered by rules or create 
new rules nullifying others – would contradict the good of the community, and thus in 
these situations, Locke instructs, “it is fit that the laws themselves should…give way to 
the executive power.”58 It is for all of these reasons that Locke finds executive and 
administrative institutions necessary, and finds them to be both commensurate with and 
complimentary to popular government.  
 Yet as a defender of popular government, Locke understands the validity of the 
arguments presented against the legislature delegating discretionary authority and 
prerogative to an executive power. In the hands of “good princes,” this power cannot be 
too expansive, and it often grows during these periods. Yet in the hands of a bad prince, 
one who would “make or promote an interest distinct from that of the public” by abusing 
discretion and prerogative and undermining the law, this power must be checked and 
controlled.  It is for this reason that, both in administering the law and in utilizing 
discretion and prerogative through delegated authority, the executive authority will 
always remain a limited institution, an institution subservient particularly to the 
legislative authority and subject to strict legislative accountability and oversight.  
In the first instance, Locke proposes a system where the executive relies on the 
legislative authority for her tenure in office, and where the executive “may be at pleasure 
                                                 
58STG, P. 84. For some works examining Locke’s principle of executive prerogative, see Pasquino, 
Pasquale. “Locke on King’s Prerogative.” Political Theory. Vol. 26, No. 2, 1998; Fatovic, Clement. 
“Constitutionalism and Contingency: Locke’s Theory of Prerogative.” History of Political Thought. Vol. 
25, No. 2, 2004. 
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changed and displaced” by the legislature.59 Anticipating the modern parliamentary 
system, Locke thinks that so long as an executive power is selected by and therefore 
accountable to the legislative authority, executive prerogative and discretion can be 
preemptively controlled. Further, any breaches of the trust placed in the hands of the 
executive can be righted by the legislative authority through the removal of this executive 
from office (through impeachment, or a “vote of no confidence”), and the transfer of this 
trust to a new official.  
Additionally, Locke differentiates the decisions of the executive and 
administrative authorities from positive laws created in the legislature. That is, these 
decisions, whether rendered to implement law to a previously unforeseen situation or to 
counteract it, do not assume the status of law within Locke’s scheme, and are effective 
only until “the legislative can conveniently be assembled” to either approve or reject this 
act of independent authority.60 In this sense, Locke is clear that discretion and prerogative 
are not replacements for law, but only temporary measures serving the public good. But 
once rendered, these decisions must pass the scrutiny of the legislative authority, which is 
empowered to render a final determination. If accepted, the act of discretion or 
prerogative becomes law, and a process more agreeable to the connection between the 
people, the legislative authority and the law underpinning popular government has 
occurred. And through all of these mechanisms, all of which together render the 
executive and administrative authorities “visibly subordinate and accountable to” the 
                                                 
59STG, P. 79.  
  
60STG, P. 90.  
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legislative authority, Locke thinks, instances of executive and administrative power can 
be controlled and rendered acceptable within his popular system.61
 In the end, the flow of authority in Locke’s political thought, represented 
graphically below in Figure One, provides for mechanisms to guarantee popular 
government in the face of executive and administrative authority, and instances of 
discretion and prerogative. Given the centrality of the law and the people’s connection to 
the law through elected representatives in Locke’s model of popular government, it is 
essential that any interruption of this relationship be controlled specifically by the 
legislative authority. That is, by giving the power to control executive and administrative 
institutions primarily to the legislature, the connection between the people and the law 
underpinning popular government is reasserted.  
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Given the influence of this model of popular government on modern 
representative democracies, it is not surprising that both the relationships Locke suggests 
towards realizing popular government and the means for controlling executive and 
administrative discretion within such a system have been highly influential. Indeed, in 
many ways this basic Lockean scheme for controlling executive and administrative 
discretion – making the executive and administrative accountable to the legislature, 
granting the legislature primary oversight power, and ultimately making these decisions 
distinct from and subsidiary to laws passed within the legislature – continues to define 
strategies for legislative control over executive and administrative institutions. And while 
we will expand on this theme over the next few chapters, suffice it to say that modern 
representative democracies rely heavily on this model to control acts of administrative 
discretion, and render this practice commensurate with popular government.  
 
III.2. Direct Control through Public Participation and Accountability 
 As we discussed above, and much like Locke, Rousseau’s model of popular 
government emphasizes the relationship between the people, the law and the rule of law. 
Going a step beyond Locke, Rousseau finds the intensity of this relationship so essential 
that he advocates direct citizen participation in the construction of law as an 
indispensable element of popular government, rejecting any form of representation in this 
process. It is for this reason that Rousseau is typically understood as one of the more 
radical modern proponents of direct or participatory democracy.  
Be this as it may, while the significance of active sovereignty in creating the 
general will and the law in Rousseau’s political thought cannot be overstated, it would be 
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inaccurate to understand this procedure as representative of the universe of decision-
making within his political system. For Rousseau, the production of both the general will 
and the laws represent situations where generality must reign, where the rights and good 
of the public as a whole must take precedence over particular interests. Yet not all 
political decisions must – nor in practice can – attain this level of generality, as 
Rousseau’s discussion of forms of government, and particularly his examination of 
democracy and administration, makes clear. 
 In Book Three, Chapter Four of The Social Contract, Rousseau proclaims his 
opposition to “real democracy” as a system that has never existed and “never will 
exist.”62 For Rousseau, democracy is defined as a political system where the people 
themselves govern – that is, act as the administrative and executive – and the many rule 
the few. Rousseau is clear that some form of government other than democracy, charged 
with putting motion behind the general will and the laws and rendering particular 
decisions, is both necessary and desirable. Rousseau examines several possible 
governmental forms – democracy, aristocracy and monarchy – and several possible 
deviations from these broader categories, and ultimately sides with “elective aristocracy” 
as the most desirable form.63 For Rousseau, elective aristocracy as a brand of elite 
administration fulfills both a logical and a practical purpose within his system. 
 Practically speaking, elite administration is desirable both because of the 
condition of man (a condition of general debasement), and because of the benefits of a 
meritorious, full-time administrative corps governing in the interests of society. The day-
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to-day operations of government are best undertaken by a group of elite administrators, 
Rousseau argues, as this group is best able to accomplish these tasks with “probity, 
intelligence and experience,” and because of these qualities “assemblies are more easily 
convoked, affairs are better discussed and are dispersed with greater order and 
diligence.”64 For these reasons, Rousseau flatly rejects the inflation of active sovereignty 
to imply active sovereignty in governance: “We should not uselessly multiply means, nor 
do with twenty thousand men what a hundred chosen men will do still better.”65
 What is more, elite administration is logically necessary to the extent that the 
people as the sovereign cannot produce the particular acts necessary for governmental 
action without jeopardizing the universality of the general will.66 Rousseau makes a 
distinction between laws as general conventions generated by the people in conformance 
with the general will and “decrees” as public policies with a particular object (and thus 
beyond the scope of the sovereign people) created by the administrative elites. In short, 
because laws must be immune to all sources of particularity so as to remain uninfluenced 
by the corrosive force of interest group preference, decrees must remain out of the hands 
of the people. And given that most issues involving the “day-to-day” tasks of governance 
will require particular judgment, such as the application of general laws to specific cases 
or extraordinary situations where the law stands silent and executive discretion is 
required, much authority will be wielded by the government through the issuance of 
decrees.  
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 It is clear, then, that Rousseau has in mind a system of government based on – if 
not dominated by – the independent prerogative and discretion of administrative elites, 
elites assigned the task of deriving particular decrees from the general laws of the 
community. Yet if advocating extensive administrative power and regular acts of 
discretion through decree with little popular authority within these processes, it is fair to 
ask: Is there popular government within Rousseau’s political system, or for that matter, 
does the law truly rule?67  
 There is something more to Rousseau’s political thought, however, that requires 
attention before dismissing its fidelity to popular government. Beyond his insistence that 
active sovereignty determines the general will and the law, and remains largely passive 
otherwise, Rousseau intends it to be a negative power preventing excess within the 
executive and administrative.68 That is, Rousseau understands active sovereignty as a 
check on executive authority, a means for controlling the potential excesses of these elites 
born of usurpation or disregard for the law or the public good. Rousseau’s discussion of 
the “periodical assemblies” he deems essential to his popular system makes this purpose 
of active sovereignty clear. 
Having gathered together and exercised active sovereignty in the construction of 
the general will and the law, Rousseau contends that it is “not sufficient that the 
assembled people should have once fixed the constitution of the State by giving their 
sanction to a body of laws;” on the contrary, the people should also be periodically 
                                                 
67This interpretation of Rousseau is consistent with Shklar’s, who recognizes in Rousseau’s system that in 
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assembled at “regular intervals.”69 During these assemblies, Rousseau argues, active 
sovereignty in the people is reestablished, and the “whole jurisdiction of the government 
ceases, the executive power is suspended, and the person of the meanest citizen is as 
sacred as the first magistrate.”70 These periodical assemblies, Rousseau insists, are “the 
shield of the body politic and the curb of government.”71  
 The purpose of these assemblies is to allow the people-as-legislators to hold the 
administrative and executive accountable, to determine whether its actions have 
counteracted the laws of the people or the public good. In other words, these assemblies 
provide an opportunity for the people to render judgment on the independent decisions of 
the executive, and perhaps reverse these decisions.72 Decrees and legislative 
implementation are always temporary, Rousseau insists, and do not attain the status of 
law; in the words of Rousseau, they are “an act, not of sovereignty, but of magistracy.”73 
Furthermore, the people have the power to either change the form of government or 
remove the administrators and replace them with new officials. Like Locke, then, 
Rousseau elevates the legislative power – in this instance, the people acting directly – as 
the last defense against executive authority, preserving the preeminence of this power and 
the people over the executive and administrative.  
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 In the end, the flow of authority in Rousseau’s political system, represented 
graphically below in Figure Two, gives preeminence to the legislative power of the 
people in framing popular government. Rousseau is a strong advocate of elite 
administration, however, both as a practical and a logical necessity within his political 
system, and he goes to considerable lengths to reconcile the tension between these two 
centers of power. This reconciliation is achieved in several ways, but ultimately reduces 
to the supremacy of the people to make the laws, and the power of the people – as the 
lawmakers – to critically examine and potentially reverse the decisions of the executive 
and administrative systems. The legislative authority has the right to examine 
administrative decrees for their fidelity to the law, remove and replace administrators if 
they so choose, and even change the form of government itself; all acts of the elite 
administrators are temporary before the citizen-legislators. In this way, the authors of the 
law become its defenders, the connection between the people and the law is reasserted, 
and popular government is preserved. 
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IV. Drawing Enduring Lessons from Historical Foundations  
  
 Why should we begin an investigation of the problems contemporary bureaucratic 
systems pose for contemporary democratic systems with a (lengthy) examination of these 
historical-theoretical models of popular government? Such an exercise, to be sure, has 
inherent limitations; Locke and Rousseau could not have imagined, or at least did not 
clearly illustrate, a massive, complex bureaucratic system, the type that now occupies a 
prominent place within contemporary democracies, and thus they could not have 
adequately accounted for the effect these institutions might have had on popular 
government. These theories, it would therefore seem, have only limited applicability to 
the problem at hand. Yet these very limitations, or so I will argue below, justify a return 
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to these fundamental models of popular government and democracy, particularly since 
these models continue to help guide both our understanding of democracy and our 
strategies for resolving the tensions between bureaucracy and democracy (the latter to be 
more carefully developed in Chapter Four).  
 But in a broader sense, there are several important lessons we might take away 
from this investigation, lessons that will serve us well as we proceed forward to address 
the tensions between bureaucracy and democracy.  
 
IV.1. Popular Government, Democracy and Law 
 Modern democratic systems are founded upon models of popular government and 
law, models that might differ in how they arrange institutions and affect connections 
between the people and the law, but which fundamentally agree on the essence of this 
form: for a government to be popular, the people must be connected – whether personally 
or through expressly chosen representatives – to the rules that infringe on their rights and 
liberties. Going back in history to the Athenian constitution under Solon (circa 594 
B.C.E.), when the ekklesia of demes (i.e. the assembled Athenian tribes) was first 
empowered to codify all statutes into law, an identity between the people and the law has 
persisted as a defining characteristic of democratic government.74
 This emphasis on lawmaking, law and the rule of law has certainly carried-over 
into modern democracies, and these concepts continue to provide essential standards (and 
perhaps the most essential standards) for measuring the “democraticness” of political 
                                                 
74For a nice sourcebook on the political history of Greece, see Dillon, Matthew and Lynda Garland. Ancient 
Greece: Social and Historical Documents from Archaic Times to the Death of Socrates. 2000. N.Y., N.Y.: 
Routledge.  
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systems today. In short, these two models, features of both being visible in modern 
democratic systems like the United States, define both the empirical reality and the 
normative ideal of the modern democratic system; these models guide both what 
democracy is thought to be and what, all other things being equal, democracy ought to be. 
And it is from this, I think, that we might draw our first important lesson in addressing 
the nature of the relationship between contemporary bureaucracy and democracy.  
An investigation of the historical-theoretical models of popular government 
underpinning modern democracies helps us get a firm grasp on the essence of democracy, 
and through this a more precise understanding of the type of tensions that might exist 
between it and bureaucracy. However, as one scholar has correctly noted, it is not 
uncommon within analyses of the tensions between bureaucracy and democracy to find 
democracy either undefined, or defined so broadly as to be meaningless.75 What is more, 
studies of this kind rarely return to essential foundations, instead relying on one of the 
many diverse contemporary understandings of democracy to guide them. Thus these 
models, in that they inform both the norm and the reality of contemporary democracies to 
a large extent, and thus present a clearer understanding of the well-springs of democratic 
norms, provide us with a reasonably stable place to begin. 
What is more, by having this concrete understanding of democracy at our disposal 
we might better identify the particular type of bureaucratic practice that may prove most 
damaging or contradictory to our democratic norms. Indeed, the relationships central to 
democracy defined above (although rarely stated explicitly) have led some to recognize 
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one particular form of bureaucratic power as most in tension with democracy: if 
democracy is defined as a connection between the people and the rules that govern them, 
does not the existence of bureaucratic agents authorized to exercise discretion in 
interpreting the law and creating universally binding rules undermine democracy, given 
that these bureaucrats (and the rules they render) cannot claim the same kind of 
connectedness with the people as elected representatives, or the people acting on their 
own behalf? With this in mind, beginning in the next chapter, and guided by this now-
settled understanding of democracy, we shall investigate bureaucratic rulemaking as one 
bureaucratic function that would indeed seem to most directly challenge any model of 
democracy centered in a connection between the people and the law.  
 
IV.2. Administration and Popular Government 
 The second point we might glean from this examination of historical models of 
popular government involves a basic idea not to be forgotten, but one often overlooked 
nevertheless: for theorists like Locke and Rousseau, a popular government and robust 
executive and administrative institutions were not deemed to be inherently contradictory 
or paradoxical. In fact, for these theorists delegating some authority to executive and 
administrative institutions – even if this means weakening the law or the rule of law – is 
essential towards guaranteeing a basic goal of any just government, popular or otherwise: 
realizing the public good. It was for precisely this reason that Locke employed, as have 
other defenders of popular government centered in law and the rule of law, the principle 
of salus populi suprema lex in defending executive and administrative discretion and 
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prerogative – a phrase meaning, “the good of the public is the highest law.”76 In other 
words, if at times an executive or administrative institution is better suited to realizing the 
public good than the people or a popularly elected legislature, it should be given the 
power to do so, even if this power contradicts in principle the connection between the 
people, the law and the rule of law. 
For Locke and Rousseau both, then, popular government and the public good 
were thought to both be served by a robust administrative system. The same is true today, 
and this lesson should not be forgotten. Democracy and bureaucracy are not inherently 
antithetical or paradoxical, at least to the extent that these institutions are both justified as 
instrumental in realizing the “public good” (admittedly a notoriously difficult concept to 
define). Yet this only holds true so long as these institutions and the decisions they render 
remain dependent upon and accountable to the popular controls instituted to check their 
authority. And this brings us to another important consideration.  
 
IV.3. Popular Government and Administrative Control 
There can be little argument that, given the emphasis on legislatively-made law 
and the rule of law, the models of popular government examined above tolerate 
administrative and executive discretion only with a caveat: executive and administrative 
institutions must be strictly checked and controlled, and must be accountable first and 
foremost to those institutions responsible for the creation of law. The modes of control 
differ between the two models we have examined, of course, just as these two models 
                                                 
76STG, P. 82. For a discussion of this principle as used by Locke and the impact this principle had 
especially on the American Founders, see Fatovic, Clement. “Constitutionalism and Presidential 
Prerogative: Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian Perspectives.” American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 48, 
No. 3, 2004.   
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advocate alternative methods for connecting the people and the law. But the basic 
principle remains the same: as executive and administrative institutions present the 
danger of ignoring the intent of the law or the goals of the legislature in enacting the law, 
or even contravening the law to the detriment of the people, so too should the lawmakers 
be primarily responsible for standing over and controlling these institutions. And only if 
these particular actors are responsible for exercising this power can the connection 
between the people and the law be safeguarded and reaffirmed in the face of this kind of 
authority. In short, while executive and administrative institutions might at times better 
serve the public good through the delegation of authority, the law and the lawmakers are 
paramount, and must remain paramount if the connection between the people and the law 
defining democracy is to persist. 
Following from this lesson, over the next two chapters we will look carefully at 
the means modern democracies have implemented to control delegated administrative 
power, and particularly the controls designed to reassert the link between the people and 
the law essential to democracy. And just as the two models examined above have and 
continue to exert influence over our contemporary understanding of democracy, so too do 
we find that the strategies these models prescribe for democratically controlling and 
holding accountable administrative power continue to prove relevant (see Chapter Four). 
In the end, the effectiveness of these strategies – wherein either the people directly or 
elected legislators check administrative discretion – is fundamental to understanding the 
ability of modern democratic systems to maintain the essence of democracy in the face of 
administration, and to resolve the apparent tension between these two values.  
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IV.4. Lessons and Lingering Questions 
“Of the ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth, we need not speak, for 
they being so multiplied with infinite variety, in the different customs and constitutions of 
distinct commonwealths, that it is impossible to give a particular account of them all. 
Only thus much, which is necessary to our present purpose, we may take notice of 
concerning them, that they have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by 
positive grant and commission delegated to them…” Locke, STG, P. 79.  
   
I began this section by asking a simple question: why return to the political 
thought of Locke and Rousseau, and the normative models of democracy these theorists 
might be adopted to represent, in addressing the problems of modern bureaucracy within 
a democratic system? In the first instance, I have answered this query by showing some 
of the ways these models can guide an investigation of the tensions between bureaucracy 
and democracy. Above, I have highlighted some important lessons gleaned from this 
examination, lessons that will guide much of the rest of this dissertation.  
But nonetheless, as the above quote suggests, Locke paid only scant attention to 
the particularities of an administrative system within his political thought, instead relying 
on a general outline of “ministerial and subordinate powers” and broad strategies for how 
these were to be controlled and held accountable (Rousseau is similar in this way). It 
would seem, then, that the relevance of either of these theorists in addressing the tensions 
between contemporary bureaucracy and democracy is limited. Yet this fact does not belie 
this exercise, but instead makes it necessary.  
If these chapters have shown us anything it is that, first, we have relied and 
continue to rely on normative models of democracy connecting the people and the law 
handed-down from theorists like Locke and Rousseau; and second, as will be shown 
more clearly over the next two chapters, we have relied and continue to rely on the 
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general strategies prescribed by these models for democratically controlling 
administrative systems. Our understanding of democracy demands that these forms of 
administrative control – with the people or their legislators primarily responsible for 
checking delegated administrative authority – take precedence, as the reassertion of a link 
between the people and the law depends on it.  
 But we are nonetheless left with some important questions, questions which bear 
directly on our understanding of democracy and the ability of our models to confront 
bureaucratic discretion through delegated administrative authority. To be sure, Locke and 
Rousseau advocated delegation to these institutions only so long as popular controls were 
in place; these popular controls resolved any internal tension between bureaucracy and 
democracy. But given that these two theorists did not fully recognize or confront a 
bureaucratic system as expansive as our own, would Locke and Rousseau continue to 
support so completely the notion of delegating authority to these institutions? Or would 
they, instead, find necessary more expansive or alternative popular controls? Moreover, 
have these models, given the relatively scant attention paid to the potential growth of 
administrative authority, adequately prepared us to maintain popular government in the 
face of these institutions through the means prescribed? It is these questions that will, at 
least in part, inform the remainder of this dissertation.  
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Chapter Three: Bureaucracy and Bureaucratic Rulemaking: Definition, Processes-
and Problems for Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, we transition from a focus on historical-theoretical models of 
democracy to a discussion of the modern public bureaucracy. There are a variety of 
vehicles through which public bureaucracies exercise power and authority. In this 
chapter, bureaucratic rulemaking is examined as one particularly important example of an 
exercise of administrative discretion through delegated authority, a type of power that has 
been seen to interfere with the basic relationships underpinning a democratic system – the 
relationship between the people, the law and the rule of law. 
Towards fully understanding the significance of bureaucratic rulemaking, this 
chapter will begin with a brief outline of the nature and purpose of contemporary 
bureaucratic administration. While similar to the more generic idea of administration 
defended by earlier theorists, the modern bureaucracy is distinct in both its scope and 
organization, and thus some expanding and clarifying comments are needed. The chapter 
proceeds by defining bureaucratic rules, provides a broad outline of the rulemaking 
process, and examines rulemaking’s historical growth in the United States. Bureaucratic 
rulemaking, as this analysis will evidence, is an essential form of bureaucratic discretion, 
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one that has grown in both scope and scale over the last century, and one that might and 
has been seen to significantly challenge authorized legislative bodies as the lawmaking 
authority in modern democracies – and in the process challenge our understanding of 
democracy.  
This chapter concludes with some comments on the tension between the core set 
of relationships defining democracy outlined in the last chapter and processes of 
bureaucratic rulemaking. While processes of bureaucratic rulemaking are perhaps greater 
in scope and scale than anything our models of democracy were designed to bear, and 
while some have seen bureaucratic discretion through rulemaking as fundamentally 
changing our form of government or signaling the death of law and the rule of law, I will 
argue that in fact these processes do not fundamentally undermine or conflict with our 
understanding of democracy as defined in the connections between the people, the law 
and the rule of law. However, this claim is predicated on the idea that strategies for 
reasserting the link between the people and the law through democratic modes of 
bureaucratic control are present and effective, a claim which necessitates an analysis of 
these modes of control (Chapter Four). 
 
I. Bureaucracy 
 In a democratic system, law is the most essential mode of political power. As 
discussed earlier, it is the law that infringes on the rights and liberties of the people, limits 
and delimits what the people can and cannot do, and thus the nature of law – who makes 
the law, what is the status of law within the political system, and so forth – is central to 
defining a government as democratic. A connection between the people and the law – 
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whether affected through elected representatives or by direct-democratic means – and the 
rule of law over all other modes of power has proven to be an enduring standard of 
democracy.  
Yet as we learned in the last chapter, even Locke and Rousseau, two theorists 
concerned first and foremost with the security of the people and the maintenance of right 
realized through popular government and the preeminence of the law, recognize the need 
for robust executive and administrative authority. In a popular system centered in a 
supreme legislature, executive and administrative authority provide active and energetic 
forces ideally suited for implementing and enforcing law, institutions authorized to at 
times more clearly define, build upon or even contravene the law when the public good 
demands it – salus populi suprema lex. In short, Locke and Rousseau recognize and 
emphasize the importance of the effective administration of the laws, and also envision 
instances when executive or administrative discretion and prerogative might be necessary 
to realize the public good. And these age-old justifications for executive and 
administrative authority continue to largely define the rationale and purpose of the 
modern bureaucratic system. 
Bureaucratic administration, realized with the creation of the administrative or 
“executive agency,” sometimes referred to as the bureaucracy or public bureaucracy, is a 
central feature of modern politics and government.77 Similar to the Weberian definition 
of bureaucracy discussed in Chapter One, the goal of these complex, merit-based, 
centralized, internally differentiated and hierarchical administrative agencies within 
                                                 
77For an excellent and comprehensive overview of the purposes, processes and functions of the modern 
bureaucracy, see Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. 
1989. N.Y., N.Y.: Basic Books, Inc.  
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contemporary democracies is to put motion behind the laws enacted by the legislative 
branch of government, to implement these laws. While legislative bodies are deliberative 
and reflective in their activities, the bureaucracy – much like the broader executive 
branch of government – is active, instrumental and purposeful. If legislative institutions 
are the brains of a government, bureaucracies are its eyes, ears, hands and feet, the 
perceptive faculties and the body that carry the brain to its objective.78
To be certain, the significance of bureaucratic administration to modern 
governance cannot be overstated. While small, comparatively primitive societies might 
have succeeded with very little administration, and while the Founders in the United 
States might have failed to envision the type of vast administrative system that has 
developed (for instance), modern mass societies would be appreciably worse-off without 
the benefits of public bureaucracies.79 For instance, Congress might pass a law designed 
to protect America’s environment and keep our natural resources free of toxins and 
pollutants (or untreated human waste sludge), but without the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the regulatory agency responsible for protecting America’s natural 
environment, these objectives would (and did, prior to 1970 and the creation of the EPA) 
                                                 
78Some variations on this essential definition of bureaucracy: “Public administration is the action part of 
government, the means by which the purposes and goals of government are realized;” “Public 
administration as a field is mainly concerned with the means for implementing political values;” “Public 
administration can be best defined with the executive branch of government.” For these and other 
definitions, see Rosenbloom, David H. Public Administration: Understanding Management, Politics and 
Law in the Public Sector. 1998. N.Y., N.Y.: McGraw Hill.  
 
79For two works examining the Founders’ thought on administration, see: Richardson, William. 
Democracy, Bureaucracy and Character: Founding Thought. 1997. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas 
Press; Rohr, John. To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State. 1986. Lawrence, KS: 
University of Kansas Press.  
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go unfulfilled, as the EPA is responsible for a variety of tasks critical to realizing 
Congressionally-enacted environmental legislation.80  
Without the EPA, who would develop and adopt specific standards and 
regulations delineating acceptable and unacceptable levels of toxic emission, basing 
these decisions on scientific expertise and experience? Who would investigate possible 
infringements in enforcing these standards, utilizing trained experts and established 
techniques to determine whether these standards had in fact been breached – a 
particularly demanding task in a society of nearly 300 million people with territory 
covering millions of square miles? Who would impose fines and sanctions on those 
believed to be guilty of having disregarded these standards? Who would effectively 
present the case to the courts if challenged, thereby both guaranteeing punishment for 
those infringing on the regulations and deterring others from committing the same crime? 
And finally, who would monitor and research the evolving state of the natural 
environment, examining it to guarantee that the broader goal of a clean environment is 
being realized with existing statutes and regulations? In short, without bureaucracies like 
the EPA law is only words, and good legislative intentions are merely that. 
 It is beyond argument that administrative agencies like the EPA are an essential 
element of good, effective government in the United States of today, and all modern 
political systems for that matter. While bureaucracies are often accused of being 
excessively large and infuriatingly complex organizations with massive budgets and huge 
                                                 
80For a solid introduction to the history and purpose of the EPA, see Landy, Marc K. et. al. The 
Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions: From Nixon to Clinton. 1994. N.Y., N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press.   
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cohorts of employees (bureaucrats),81 they are nevertheless the backbone of the law, 
carrying the law into effect – and regularly advancing the public good in the process. And 
as shown above in reference to the EPA, the modern administrative agency undertakes a 
variety of different tasks and exercises a variety of different powers which may 
necessitate the exercise of discretionary authority. From setting standards to investigating 
and enforcing these standards, from bringing rule-breakers to the courts and continuously 
undertaking research, the impact of the modern bureaucracy can be felt in a range of 
different ways by an assortment of different actors and institutions – individuals, the 
public at large, and both private and corporate enterprises.  
Yet one particular power of the bureaucracy, its power to make rules and 
regulations defining the standards instrumental to implementing the legislative intent 
outlined in a statute – otherwise known as bureaucratic rulemaking or administrative 
lawmaking – has most often been identified as a critical area of inquiry, one that carries 
serious consequences for our understanding of law, the rule of law and democracy. To be 
sure, these processes, wherein bureaucratic agents and agencies make law defining rights 
and duties, and mandating punishments and rewards, must be seen as essential in relation 
to our understanding of democracy, given the centrality of legislature-made law on this 
model. But before going further, a more complete understanding of bureaucratic 
rulemaking is required.  
 
 
                                                 
81Indeed, there are so many federal employees or bureaucrats in the U.S. today that the government even 
has a “bureaucrats-bureaucracy” to manage federal employees, the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM). The OPM places the number of civilian bureaucrats employed by the federal government alone at 
approximately 2.7 million as of 2003.  
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II. Bureaucratic Rulemaking: Definition and History82
I.1. Rules Defined 
“A rule is the skin of a living policy. It hardens an inchoate normative judgment into the 
temporarily frozen form of words… Its issuance marks the transformation of policy from 
the private wish to public expectation.”83
 
In the most general sense, bureaucratic rulemaking in the United States begins 
where the legislative processes of Congress end – with the enactment of a public law or 
statute. However, burdened with a variety of tasks besides lawmaking – such as 
casework, budgeting, and reelection – limited in technical and scientific expertise, guided 
by a doctrinaire legal theory demanding the enactment of only general law, and often 
anxious to delegate controversial and politically sensitive decisions to other institutions, 
Congress typically passes laws pursuing only vague and general goals.84 Sometimes 
called “authorizing statutes,” “enabling statutes” or “framework legislation,” these laws 
require additional decision-making and action before achieving their objectives.85
Once enacted by Congress and signed into law, these general statutes are 
transferred to the part of the government explicitly intended to implement and enforce 
                                                 
82In what follows, I outline processes of bureaucratic rulemaking at the federal level of government in the 
United States. This choice does not mean to limit the importance or ignore the distinctness of rulemaking at 
the state level, but only to provide a reasonable starting point for discussing the problems rulemaking might 
pose to democracy writ large.  
 
83Diver, Colin. Administrative Law: Cases and Materials. 1987. N.Y., N.Y.: Little, Brown & Co. [P. 199].   
 
84For these and other reasons justifying the necessity of bureaucratic rulemaking, see Kerwin, Cornelius. 
Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy. 1994. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
[Chapter One]. 
 
85In Chapter Seven, we will examine one case of rulemaking more closely. That case, focused on the 
rulemaking processes of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s rulemaking for the Organic Food 
Production Act of 1990, illustrates nicely why rules and rulemaking are a necessary adjunct to the 
lawmaking process. Further, this case nicely illustrates how general Congressionally-enacted statutes can 
often be; the OFPA was a law focused on “organic foods,” but left open exactly what did and did not fall 
into this category. It thus became the job of the USDA to define what “organic” was.  
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law, the bureaucracy. A particular administrative agency, named (and sometimes created) 
in the legislation and given jurisdiction over the implementation and enforcement of the 
new statute is authorized by Congress to achieve these objectives. However, 
implementation requires discerning particular means for achieving ends, and often 
clarification, specification and operationalization of the ends themselves, while 
enforcement requires an understanding of what specifically falls within or outside the 
bounds of the statute, and general statutes typically fail to provide these particular 
details.86 Therefore, bureaucracies are delegated the authority from Congress to create 
rules – sometimes called pieces of “secondary legislation” – defining and framing these 
particularities through processes of bureaucratic rulemaking. Indeed, as one scholar has 
correctly described the matter, even in instances when Congress does spend considerable 
time and resources writing a law and carefully defining its particular objectives, it 
nevertheless requires “rulemaking to transform the promises of an ambitious new statute 
into the specific requirements and procedures of new programs.”87 Thus to some extent, 
bureaucratic rulemaking is a necessary adjunct to the legislative process. 
It is here, through Congressional delegation of authority to bureaucratic agencies 
to interpret, implement and enforce laws, and to prescribe rules and regulations towards 
these ends that the process of bureaucratic rulemaking begins.88 First statutorily 
recognized as a legally distinct practice in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 
                                                 
86See Bryner, Gary C. Bureaucratic Discretion: Law and Policy in Federal Regulatory Agencies. 1987. 
Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press. [Chapter One].  
 
87Kerwin, Rulemaking. P. 2.  
 
88Rules are often segmented into three types: substantive, interpretive and procedural. While all three are 
important, we are most interested in this context in interpretive and substantive rules – often called 
“legislative rules” – those that effectively prescribe law.   
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(APA), the APA defines rules and defines the scope and purpose of rulemaking in this 
way: “rule means the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or 
policy.”89 Therefore, processes of rulemaking as defined by the APA effectively 
transform bureaucratic agencies from a simplistic (and now thoroughly outmoded) image 
of a “lifeless mechanism” of policy implementation into political institutions with the 
power to interpret, implement, and very regularly to prescribe, policy and law. 
 
II.2. Understanding Processes of Bureaucratic Rulemaking 
  
It is impossible to define rulemaking in the United States as a single or universally 
consistent process. Processes of rulemaking differ extensively across agencies and rely 
considerably on the procedures mandated in the statute authorizing bureaucratic 
discretion.90 In a generic sense, however, one scholar has defined rulemaking as an 11-
stage process beginning with the enactment of a statute by Congress. Table One outlines 
(in abbreviated form) the steps in the rulemaking process according to this author.91
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89The Administrative Procedures Act.  5 U.S.C. 551. 
 
90Congress holds the authority, even outside the APA, to demand particular types of rulemaking processes 
to bureaucratic agencies. Therefore, rulemaking processes can differ considerably one from another based 
on the demands of Congress.  
 
91Kerwin, Rulemaking. P. 76-77. The same outline is also adopted by, O’Reilly, Administrative Lawmaking. 
P. 90. 
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Table One: An Outline of Rulemaking Activity
Stage One: Origin of Rulemaking Activity: Rules Mandated or Authorized by Law
Stage Two: Origin of Individual Rulemaking
Stage Three: Authorization to Proceed with Rulemaking
Stage Four: Planning the Rulemaking
Stage Five: Developing the Draft Rule
Stage Six: Internal Review of the Draft Rule
Stage Seven: External Review of the Draft Rule
Stage Eight: Revision and Publication of a Draft Rule
Stage Nine: Public Participation
Stage Ten: Action on the Draft Rule
Stage Eleven: Post-Rulemaking Activities
 
Once authorized by an act of Congress, bureaucratic agencies proceed with the 
rulemaking process by deciding to adopt a new rule (or revise an existing one), and are 
directed either by a new statute or by internal (agency heads or Senior Executives) or 
external (Congress or the White House) forces pressing for action on an existing statute 
(Stage Two). The time lag between the creation of a statute necessitating rulemaking and 
actual rulemaking activities varies; at times, the gap between the Congressional 
enactment of a statute and the creation of rules takes years. At other times, Congress will 
include a “hammer” in a statute demanding bureaucratic action by a particular date. 
Furthermore, rulemaking is often a cyclical process, with rules created only to be altered 
or discarded later, replaced by new rules better realizing the purpose of the law (or the 
“new” purpose, should the center of power in Congress or the White House shift).  
Stages Three through Seven all involve the creation of the proposed or “draft 
rule,” beginning with internal authorization to proceed with rulemaking, an outline of the 
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“flow” of the rulemaking process itself, the writing of the draft rule, review of the draft 
rule within the agency, and external review of the draft rule (by Congress, interest 
groups, the Office of Management and Budget and the White House). All of these 
processes involve heavy doses of both bureaucratic and legal expertise, as well as 
external influence. Once authorized to proceed and guided by a rulemaking framework 
(largely responsible for outlining the procedures to be followed), the rulemaking process 
is not entirely dissimilar from the legislative process. Those with particular competencies 
within an agency – certainly legal, and typically scientific as well – are tasked with the 
difficult job of discerning optimal means for realizing a broad normative goal defined in 
law, measures often involving the uncertain cooperation of governmental and non-
governmental actors at a variety of different levels.  
Stage Eight involves the APA-mandated publication of the draft rule in the 
Federal Register, and Stage Nine provides the first formal opportunity for public 
participation in the process (something we will examine carefully in Chapter Four), 
either through public comment or through official or informal hearings. Stage Ten 
represents formal action on the rule (which often includes integrating public comments or 
the results of formal hearings and starting again at Stage Five) and publishing the final 
rule in the Federal Register. Finally, Stage Eleven involves preparing to make the rule 
effective (typically 30 days after publication in the Federal Register), bracing for any 
legal challenges to the rule and preparing for publication of the rule in the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR).  
This set of activities illustrates, in brief, how a law becomes a proposed rule and 
then an adopted rule. Once made effective and published in the CFR, bureaucratic rules 
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have all of the force of law, and regulated industries, individuals and the government 
itself must, as with any law, spend considerable time and resources ensuring compliance. 
Further, these rules regularly limit and delimit the range of actions individuals and 
entities may undertake, with non-compliance being grounds for (sometimes severe) 
punishment. And as we will see below, the amount of rulemaking and the range of policy 
issues addressed through rulemaking has expanded considerably over the last few 
decades. In short, contrary to an antiquated understanding of the scale and scope of 
bureaucratic rulemaking, it is not only technical questions or matters of economic 
competition which are addressed through rulemaking, but often contestable normative 
issues with significant consequences for the rights and freedoms of ordinary Americans.  
 
II.3. A Short-Course History of Rulemaking 
Congressional delegations of authority to the executive branch of government to 
make rules and regulations are as old as American independence, dating back to the first 
days of the new republic. During the first Congressional session of 1790, legislators 
delegated to the president the power to make rules regulating trade with Native 
Americans; as early as 1813 Congress delegated similar authority to others within the 
executive branch of government – administrative agencies.92 The increased significance 
of Congressional delegations of authority to bureaucratic agencies as an important and 
distinct mode of policy, rule and lawmaking, however, can be traced to a few periods in 
American governmental history. During these periods, the quantity of rules, the type of 
                                                 
92Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion.  Pp. 10-11; see also, O’Reilly, James. Administrative Lawmaking. 1983. 
Colorado Springs, CO.: McGraw Hill.  
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authority delegated and the policy areas addressed through bureaucratic rulemaking 
would all change significantly. 
Scholars have previously examined in considerable detail the growth of 
bureaucratic discretion generally, and bureaucratic rulemaking specifically, in the United 
States, and thus fully reiterating the historical details surrounding these developments is 
unnecessary.93 Nevertheless, most scholars identify the critical turning point for the 
emergence of bureaucratic discretion and bureaucratic rulemaking as a significant and 
transformative moment in the political life of the Federal government at 1887, when 
Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).94 Given broad 
authority to regulate trade, commerce and competition in the United States through a 
delegation of Congressional authority, the ICC provided the definitive model of 
“administered public control.”95
From 1887 forward, perspectives on bureaucratic discretion would change 
dramatically, and Congressional delegations of authority to federal agencies would 
increasingly be recognized as “a virtue rather than a problem.”96 That is, after 1887 
Congressional grants of authority became more regular and opportunities for bureaucratic 
rulemaking more common, as this was now recognized to be, if not universally a virtue, 
then certainly a practical necessity with potentially positive implications for rational, 
                                                 
93For a more thorough analysis of rulemaking’s history in the United States, see Lowi, Theodore. The End 
of Liberalism. 1979. N.Y., N.Y.: W.W. Norton. [Chapter Five]; see also, Kerwin, Rulemaking. Chapter 
One.  
 
94Lowi, The End of Liberalism. P. 97.  It is also interesting to note that 1887 was the year Woodrow Wilson 
published his seminal essay on the inevitable growing importance and, in some sense, positive role of 
public administration in the American political system. Wilson, Woodrow. “The Study of Administration.” 
Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 2, No. 2, 1887. 
 
95Lowi, The End of Liberalism. P. 97. 
 
96Lowi, The End of Liberalism. P. 97.   
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effective and efficient policymaking. Based on this shift, and two significant explosions 
of Congressional delegation of authority in the 1930’s (necessitated by Franklin 
Roosevelt’s “New Deal” programs) and the 1960’s (necessitated by Lyndon Johnson’s 
“Great Society” programs), rulemaking has evolved from a fairly limited and rare activity 
to a ubiquitous aspect of the federal political process. It is now typical for several 
thousand new rules to be issued every single year, a far greater number than the 
comparable number of laws passed by Congress, with the Federal Register, the running 
“log” of new and proposed rules and rulemakings at the Federal level of government, 
currently numbering roughly 80,000 pages.97
What is more, the nature of the authority Congress has delegated to bureaucratic 
agencies has changed significantly since 1887. Theodore Lowi describes the changing 
nature of bureaucratic discretionary authority between 1887 and the 1930’s as a shift 
from regulatory enforcement activities proper – where Congressional grants of authority 
to bureaucracies were concrete, specific, proscriptive and designed to enforce the law as 
somewhat narrowly defined – to more general and broad grants of authority, with 
bureaucracies being delegated abstract, universal, novel and prescriptive power.98 It was 
here, and particularly during the 1930’s, that the “positive administrative state” began to 
take root, leading to a federal bureaucracy more open to and capable of addressing a wide 
range of issues through largely self-directing means.99 And it is through the rulemaking 
                                                 
97Kerwin, Rulemaking. Pp. 193, 225. Tracking the increased volume of rulemaking activity, Kerwin counts 
1,985 rules between January and June of 1991 alone, and makes the general claim that “the rules written 
each year number in the thousands.” Kerwin points out that the number of pages in the Federal Register 
increased from about 10,000 to about 70,000 between 1961 and 1983. 
 
98Lowi, The End of Liberalism. Pp. 98-99.  
 
99Harris, Richard A. and Sidney Milkis. The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies. 1996. 
N.Y., N.Y.: Oxford University Press. [See Chapter Two].  
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process and the power to issue binding rules and regulations that bureaucracies largely 
exercise this power. 
Finally, along with a slew of new regulatory agencies and programs, the 1960’s 
ushered in an important shift from largely economic regulation to broader and more 
expansive social regulation. Since at least this period, rules and rulemaking have 
addressed more than solely technical questions or matters of competition and trade, and 
instead are now utilized to prescribe policy and law over policy areas that concern 
essential and contestable political values and society-wide concerns, such as 
environmental protection, standards of consumer safety, civil rights, worker protections, 
pharmaceutical approval, and so forth.100 To be sure, it is now widely accepted that 
through regulation and rulemaking bureaucracies exercise extensive policymaking 
authority over policy areas with clear moral and political implications; bureaucracies are 
no longer limited to the role of technical experts mechanically implementing statutes 
within which contestable normative questions have already been exhaustively discussed 
and resolved through the legislative process. In short, bureaucratic rulemaking is now, 
undeniably, a political process.  
Bureaucratic rulemaking in the United States has expanded to the point that today 
“few aspects of American life have been left untouched by the regulations of federal 
administrative agencies.”101 While once quantitatively limited, narrowly proscribed in 
                                                 
100For some examples, see Tatalovich, Raymond and Byron Daynes (Eds). Moral Controversies in 
American Politics: Cases in Social Regulatory Policy. 1998. Armonk, N.Y.: ME Sharpe, Inc. The three 
most ubiquitous examples of social regulatory agencies created during the 1960’s and 1970’s are the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  
 
101Berry, Jeffrey M. Feeding Hungry People: Rulemaking in the Food Stamp Program. 1984. New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. [P. 1].  
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power and geared largely towards the regulation of technical-scientific issues, 
competition and trade, rules and rulemaking processes now run the gamut of political 
action and essentially “affect the quality of life of ordinary citizens.”102 In short, through 
delegations of authority and processes of rulemaking, bureaucratic agencies perform 
many – if not most – of the activities typically perceived to be and constitutionally 
recognized as the exclusive domain and jurisdiction of Congress.  
 
III. Bureaucratic Rulemaking: Critiques and Problems for Democracy 
 
 Having in the last chapter laid out an essential understanding of democracy, and 
now having examined bureaucracy and processes of bureaucratic rulemaking through 
delegated Congressional authority, some questions can be asked. Most importantly, with 
this much fuller understanding of modern bureaucracy and bureaucratic rulemaking in 
hand, what, if anything, can we proclaim to be problematic about these – and particularly 
bureaucratic rulemaking – guided in our thinking by the model of democracy outlined in 
the previous chapter? To be sure, I have certainly alluded to some problems with 
bureaucratic rulemaking simply by focusing on this process, identifying it prima facie as 
at least potentially troubling.  
Over the last several decades, as rulemaking and other form of bureaucratic 
discretion have grown by leaps and bounds through more frequent and more expansive 
delegations of Congressional authority, a few criticisms and perspectives have been 
raised most regularly, and while each relates to one element or another of the relationship 
intrinsic to our model of democracy, their various focal points lead us in quite different 
                                                 
102Berry, Feeding Hungry People. P. 2 
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directions. In what follows, I will examine a few of the more important perspectives on 
rulemaking, settling on one as the most significant challenge for our model of democracy, 
the challenge that deserves the greatest portion of our attention. 
We can begin by identifying one often-discussed problem with bureaucratic 
rulemaking, a problem stemming from this processes’ perceived violation of what is 
called the non-delegation principle. Guided in our thinking by the analyses from the last 
chapter, within our model of democracy the location of the lawmaking authority, in 
whose hands this power rests, is essential. As law limits the rights and liberties of 
individuals under government, it is the people’s connection to the law and those elected 
representatives making law (if it is not the people personally) that defines a government 
as popular. In the U.S., this tenet of popular government is reflected in Article One of the 
Constitution; by giving Congress – the most populist institution, even before passage of 
the 17th Amendment – the power to make “all laws necessary and proper,” the Founders 
identified this institution specifically as the institution responsible for policy and 
lawmaking, and the bulwark of popular government.  
However, and again taking Locke as an exemplar, while he was clear on the 
importance of the people’s connection to the legislature, and the dominance of this 
institution over the lawmaking function, he also recognized the public benefit derived 
from some level of legislative delegation to executive and administrative bodies. Yet it is 
equally clear that Locke did not envision these types of decisions becoming replacements 
for legislature-made law. That is, while Locke saw the benefit in the legislative 
delegation of authority to executive and administrative institutions, he was also adamant 
about the prohibition against the legislature “re-delegating” its power writ large to 
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another institution not expressly chosen by the people; within the Lockean model, this 
type of re-delegation is strictly forbidden.103
This brings us, of course, to the non-delegation principle as a critique of 
bureaucratic rulemaking: bureaucratic rulemaking, so the argument goes, represents a 
Congressional re-delegation of the lawmaking authority to another institution.104 On this 
argument, by delegating to bureaucratic agencies the authority to make rules and 
regulations Congress has undermined its own constitutionally defined role as the 
lawmaking authority.105 What is more, and most important for our purposes, this re-
delegation of the lawmaking authority, if this is what bureaucratic rulemaking represents, 
has dire consequences for our model of democracy, a model founded on a connection 
between the people, elected representatives and the laws which govern them.106
In the first half of the 20th century, the principle of non-delegation was regularly 
adopted – and often cited in the Federal courts, for instance – as an argument against 
Congressional delegation of its authority to other institutions. On this line of reasoning, 
almost any (or at least any expansive) type of re-delegation of the legislative authority 
                                                 
103Locke makes this most clear when he writes: “The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws 
to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over 
to others.  The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the 
legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, ‘We will submit to 
rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms,’ no body else can say other men 
shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom 
they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them.” 
 
104This is one of the earliest critiques of the rulemaking process. For a review of this and other “first-
generation” criticisms of bureaucratic rulemaking, see Sherwood, Foster. “The Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act.” Modern Law Review. Vol. 41, No. 2, 1947.  
 
105For some early examples, see Haines, Charles Grove. “Effects of the Growth of Administrative Law 
upon Traditional Anglo-American Legal Theories and Practices.” APSR. Vol. 26, No. 5. 1932; Haines, 
Charles Grove. “The Adaptation of Administrative Law and Procedure to Constitutional Theories and 
Principles.” APSR. Vol. 31, No. 1. 1940. 
 
106For a good argument along these lines, see Hamilton, Marcia. “Representation and Nondelegation: Back 
to Basics.” Cardoza Law Review. Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999. 
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was forbidden, because leading to a situation where the form of government had been 
changed.107 Even if this re-delegation to make rules and regulations was undertaken 
without malice or coercion, proceeding only from a good-faith desire by legislators to 
realize the public good, this transfer critically challenges the idea of lawmaking as it 
relates to and defines our system of government.108 Yet in time this principle waned, and, 
as we now see clearly, Congressional delegation to bureaucratic agencies became 
ubiquitous.109
The point of the non-delegation argument, as I see it, is not that power has been 
delegated at all to bureaucratic agencies to make rules and regulations; rather, the issue is 
one of scope and scale. That is, if the scope and scale of Congressional delegation to 
bureaucracies were to become too expansive, it might very well fundamentally alter the 
foundation and form of our political system. The enduring relevance of the non-
delegation argument would seem to be buttressed, then, by the increased scope and scale 
of bureaucratic rulemaking over the last few decades. If this re-delegation of power has 
over this period become so expansive as to alter the form of government, creating a new 
lawmaking body unburdened by a connection between the people and the law, than a 
shift destructive to our democratic system has occurred, one that occludes the arteries of 
our received (and Constitutionally grounded) legal theory. Finally, the solution proffered 
                                                 
107Showing the endurance of the non-delegation principle, in the 1950’s, dissenting in FTC vs. Ruberoid, 
Justice Robert H. Jackson famously noted that, “The rise of administrative bodies has probably been the 
most significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by their 
decisions than by those of all the courts... They have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, 
which has deranged our three-branch legal theories.” 
 
108For a more recent critique of delegation from the perspective of democracy, see Schoenbrod, David. 
“Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to my Critics.” Cardoza Law Review. Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999.  
 
109For a solid discussion of the “waves” of Federal interpretation of the Constitutionality of delegation, see 
Horwitz, Robert. “Judicial Review of Regulatory Decisions: The Changing Criteria.” Political Science 
Quarterly. Vol. 109, No. 1, 1994.  
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by defenders of non-delegation doctrine is simple: either Congressional delegations to 
bureaucracies should be limited and rare, or, failing this, delegation should cease 
altogether.  
Yet refutations of the non-delegation doctrine have come from many quarters. In 
reality, Congress has not entirely delegated its authority to the administrative system, and 
it would be difficult to argue that Congress has even “tweaked” the fundamental form of 
government by delegating rulemaking power to bureaucratic agencies. As the discussion 
of the rulemaking process above makes clear, rulemaking begins if and only if 
“triggered” by a Congressionally-enacted statute demanding that bureaucracies strive to 
realize the intent of a statute through rulemaking; there is little room for totally 
independent initiative within the rulemaking process. Additionally, Congress has passed 
statutes shaping and limiting the rulemaking process, such as the APA discussed briefly 
above, evidencing and asserting its dominion over this process. Furthermore, and perhaps 
most importantly, Congress has the power to hold accountable and oversee how 
bureaucracies are utilizing their delegated authority when making rules, and can at any 
time rescind or change the “ground rules” regarding delegated authority. In short, 
Congress still “rules” in the rulemaking process, “law” (in a strict sense) is enacted only 
by elected representatives expressly chosen by the people, and representatives must first 
enact law before any subsidiary rulemaking begins.110 And given our analyses in Chapter 
Two, this type of delegation is very much amenable to our model of democracy. 
From another perspective, bureaucratic rulemaking has been challenged for its 
lack of faithfulness to the principles of law and the rule of law. From this perspective, 
                                                 
110For this type of defense of rulemaking and delegation to bureaucracies generally, see Bryner, 
Bureaucratic Discretion; David, Kenneth Culp. Discretionary Authority.  
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rulemaking undermines the rule of law, an essential element of any non-arbitrary or 
popular government, because it grants considerable independent authority to bureaucratic 
agencies (and the executive branch as a whole) to render rules unencumbered by strict 
legal standards. In other words, by authoring broad statutes allowing bureaucratic 
agencies considerable room for interpretation and independent discretion in the first 
instance, Congress has made the rule of law impossible, given that the law itself gives 
very little guidance. With such extensive authority delegated to unelected bureaucrats 
with little guidance on how this power is to be used, the law simply cannot rule, and all of 
politics has become a system of arbitrary, elite-bureaucratic authority. 
It is this type of analysis that has led scholars like Theodore Lowi, when 
considering the expanded and growing significance of bureaucratic discretion (and 
especially processes of “informal rulemaking,” which we will discuss more in Chapter 
Four), to lament the “end of the rule of law” in the United States, and to seek alternatives 
towards making bureaucratic discretion more amenable to received legal and 
constitutional doctrine.111 This argument has found an enduring place as a criticism of 
bureaucratic discretion and rulemaking, with calls for Congress to author only much 
more specific, clearly defined legal statutes emerging occasionally.112 In short, instead of 
focusing on the problem of delegation in its entirety or the impact it might have on our 
form of government, this perspective addresses an intermediate cause (i.e. broad statutes 
                                                 
111Based on this analysis, Lowi focuses on the importance of more rigorous, legally framed rulemaking 
processes as the solution to bureaucratic discretion. In this way, the problem is identified as a problem not 
of democracy, but of law. See Lowi, The End of Liberalism. 
 
112See Lowi, The End of Liberalism. For more recent arguments in this tradition, see Scheuerman, William. 
Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law. 1994. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press; Roberts, Paul Craig. “How the Law was Lost.” Cardoza Law Review. Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999. 
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authorizing and requiring delegation) and demands that law much more strictly define 
and limit the terms of any delegation.  
Yet I would tend to disagree with this argument as well, at least to the extent that 
the proposed solution should not be the focus of our critical analysis. In the first instance, 
as many have pointed out, demanding very strict and specific legal statutes is to at least 
some extent an impractical suggestion for a political system governing over a modern 
mass society, one which risks creating a legislative process even slower and less 
responsive than the current system, and a proposal that potentially elevates one important 
value (the rule of law) over another (the public good).113 Moreover, bureaucratic 
rulemaking, as described above, remains tied to a set of procedures defined in law, 
procedures which frame all rulemaking processes, and this set of procedures delimits and 
frames bureaucratic discretion through rulemaking even if particular statutes do not. 
Finally, though at times bureaucrats are able to exercise considerable independent 
discretion, they are also beholden to legislative authority through control and oversight 
activities. In short, the law and the rule of law (and for that matter, the form of 
government, as discussed above) remain in the hands of the legislative authority through 
these mechanisms, and the faithfulness of bureaucrats to the law when employing 
discretion remains within the legislature’s control. And it is precisely at this point, I 
would argue, that both a defense of bureaucratic rulemaking and the potential problems 
posed by this practice to our democratic system emerge.  
Thinking back to the analyses in Chapter Two and again using these as a guide, 
legislative delegation of authority to executive and administrative institutions was 
deemed acceptable within a popular government, but only to the extent that these 
                                                 
113David, Kenneth Culp. Discretionary Authority.  
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decisions were dependent on the legislative authority through systems of accountability, 
oversight and control. Discretion begins with the delegation of authority to administrative 
institutions; the law and the rule of law are deemed essential, but are regarded as potential 
impediments to the public good if interpreted too strictly; while some authority is 
therefore to be delegated to the administrative system, this authority is to be guarded 
carefully by the legislative authority; and ultimately, the actions and decisions of the 
administrative system are to be scrutinized by the legislative, subjected to final approval 
or rejection, and thereby rendered commensurate with a notion of democracy centered in 
a popular legislative authority. Mechanisms of legislative control, oversight and 
accountability are, in short, the critical elements resolving the tension between 
administrative discretion and democracy.  
Reflecting on the two critiques of bureaucratic rulemaking discussed above, then, 
the scope and scale of rulemaking and the commensurability of practices of delegation to 
the principle of the rule of law, while certainly important in their own right and perhaps 
useful as symptoms and indicators of a larger dilemma, should not provide our focus. 
Rather, those processes designed to control the potential misuse and abuse of delegated 
discretionary authority should provide both our focus in discovering potential problems a 
process like bureaucratic rulemaking might pose to democracy, and the solution to any 
such problems. The final guarantor of the supremacy of the popularly authorized 
legislative authority, the law and the rule of law – and thus the foundations of our 
democracy – is to be found in the makers of the law, the people or their legislators, and 
these actors’ ability to control and oversee the authority they have delegated. We can 
conclude by stating the matter this way: bureaucratic rulemaking is not a problem for our 
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model of democracy so long as means for democratically controlling this process through 
the legislative power are in place and effective.  
But conversely, processes of bureaucratic rulemaking, particularly given (as was 
argued above) that these processes have become more prevalent, more expansive in the 
power delegated, and focused on even contestable moral and political values, do prove 
contrary to our model of democracy if it can be shown that the means for holding these 
processes accountable to control and oversight are lacking or ineffective. That is, if it is 
clear that the democratic forms of control and accountability are ineffective in 
guaranteeing the legislative authority’s dominion over the law – if bureaucratic agencies 
are able to render rules detached from the goals of the lawmakers, for instance, thus 
effectively becoming an independent legislative authority – then we can deem this 
process to be destructive to the foundations of our democratic system.  
This argument, of course, begs a critical question: How effective are extant modes 
for controlling bureaucratic rulemaking and guaranteeing the intent of the law – and 
particularly the “democratic” modes centered in legislative institutions, or in the hands of 
the people themselves – given the growth and expansion of rulemaking (and bureaucratic 
power generally) over the last few decades? The short answer to this question is: at best, 
only partially. But this certainly requires closer investigation, for such an investigation 
will allow us to judge the integrity and strength of our model of democracy given 
practices of bureaucratic rulemaking. That is, if bureaucratic rulemaking is not closely 
and effectively controlled by the legislative authority, and if bureaucratic agencies tend to 
disregard the intent of the law or the objectives of lawmakers in implementing the law, 
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then we can reasonably assert that this practice does present a problem for our model of 
democracy. This investigation will provide the focus of the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 Critiques of bureaucracy from the perspective of democracy tend to run the 
gamut, and typically differ depending on how one defines the ever-elusive term 
“democracy.” In this sense, this chapter referred to a model of democracy – defined in the 
last chapter – that perhaps most completely informs our basic contemporary 
understanding. Based on this model, practices of bureaucratic rulemaking have been 
argued to be in and of themselves unproblematic, contrary to some important critiques. 
Nevertheless, this practice should be deemed problematic for our model of democracy if 
we find insufficient means for democratically controlling these processes and 
guaranteeing the goals of the legislative authority and the intent of the law. The next 
chapter seeks to expand on this most important issue.  
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Chapter Four: Democratic Modes of Bureaucratic Control: An Analysis and 
Critique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 There are a variety of strategies employed in most democratic systems towards 
controlling and holding accountable bureaucratic agents and agencies, and protecting the 
law from excessive bureaucratic discretion. It would be an error, for instance, to fail to 
recognize the judiciary as a central actor in the effort to control bureaucratic discretion. In 
systems where administrative law is better developed (such as the United States), and 
where special administrative law courts have been appended onto the “normal” court 
structure, these forms of control are particularly important.114 Furthermore, in many 
Western democracies the executive branch of government has itself worked diligently 
(particularly over the last 30 years or so) to control “runaway bureaucracy.” In the U.S., 
for example, the Office of Management and Budget has become an essential instrument 
for controlling bureaucratic power.115
                                                 
114Craig, Paul P. Public Law and Democracy in the United States and the United Kingdom. 1990. N.Y., 
N.Y.: Oxford University Press; Edley, Christopher. Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of the 
Bureaucracy. 1990. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
 
115Tomkin, Shelley Lynne. Inside OMB: Politics and Process in the President’s Budget Office. 1998. 
Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.   
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 Yet as mentioned in Chapter Two, not all methods for controlling executive and 
administrative institutions are created equal, particularly when our central concern is the 
integrity of our democratic institutions and traditions. Our understanding of democracy 
mandates that the institutions and individuals responsible for making law are also the 
actors that should be primarily responsible for controlling administrative institutions 
which implement and enforce that law, and perhaps interpret or extend it beyond its 
intended purpose. As the group of legislative actors is most directly responsible for 
defining goals when enacting law (and of course in a democracy, ought to be), so too 
should this group be primarily responsible for ensuring the realization of these goals and 
intentions. Further, as the connection between the people and the law defines democracy, 
so too must the authors of the law be the final defenders of it, charged with protecting it 
from any manner of misinterpretation or abuse, and reasserting the link between the 
people and the law central to democracy in the process. 
 With this in mind, in this chapter we will investigate broadly extant means for 
democratically controlling, overseeing and holding accountable bureaucratic institutions 
in the U.S. (focusing again on the Federal level of government), and in particular 
methods for controlling practices of bureaucratic rulemaking, a practice which, if 
insufficiently controlled, presents a direct challenge to the relationships at the center of 
our model of democracy. In what follows, we will investigate two general democratic 
forms of bureaucratic control – one centered in the elected legislature and following the 
model of representative democracy (i.e. legislative oversight), another centered in public 
participation and derivative of a direct model of democracy (i.e. public accountability). 
Both of these modes of control will be examined generally for their success in controlling 
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bureaucratic rulemaking, and through this defending the goals and intentions of the law 
as defined by Congress.  
 The purpose of this chapter is straightforward, and brings us to one important 
though not entirely novel conclusion: while certainly not wholly ineffective or 
inadequate, there are serious questions to be raised about the efficacy of existing 
democratic controls of bureaucratic discretion to defend the purposes and intent of 
Congressionally-enacted law. Based on this conclusion, some comments will be made 
about the capacity of these democratic modes of bureaucratic control to reassert the link 
between the people and the law essential to democracy. As a result, we will leave this 
chapter in search of an alternative model of democratic control of bureaucratic discretion, 
one capable of better protecting the link between the people and the law central to 
democracy.  
 
I. Representative Democracy and Control by Legislative Oversight  
 Volumes could – and have – been written on the subject of oversight and control 
of the bureaucracy by elected representatives, and the effectiveness of oversight at 
protecting statutory intent from excessive bureaucratic discretion. Some studies have 
found existing forms of oversight to be relatively effective,116 while others have found 
little to no oversight at work in Congress (with a wide assortment of opinions falling 
somewhere in between).117 And there is little reason to believe that from this diversity 
                                                 
116For some examples of works generally optimistic about the effectiveness of Congressional oversight of 
bureaucratic discretion, see Aberbach, Joel. Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional 
Oversight. 1990. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution; McCubbins, Mathew, et. al. “Structure and 
Process as Solutions to the Politician’s Principal Agency Problem.” Virginia Law Review. Vol. 74, 1989. 
 
117For works dismayed about the lack of Congressional control of bureaucratic discretion, see Katzman, 
Robert. Regulatory Bureaucracy. 1980. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Lowi, Theodore. The End of 
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consensus is likely to emerge anytime soon – nor do I intend to resolve this lingering 
disagreement here.  
 Yet despite these differing conclusions, nearly every analyst agrees on at least one 
set of facts in relation to legislative oversight: elected representatives face significant 
impediments to effectively overseeing the bureaucracy, and in some ways are at a 
competitive disadvantage in relation to bureaucratic agents and institutions once authority 
has been delegated. Faced with limited time, lacking the “cognitive resources” needed to 
fully understand the technical aspects of bureaucratic decisions, confronted with 
“information asymmetries” in relation to bureaucrats, and forced to focus on 
electioneering – and focus on certain tasks instrumental to reelection, “high-profile” and 
“credit-taking” endeavors, while avoiding activities likely to create negative publicity – 
elected representatives are limited in their capacity to perform oversight functions. In 
other words, for some of the same reasons legislators have employed to justify the 
delegation of authority to bureaucracies in the first instance, legislators are impeded in 
monitoring the use of this power later along. And to be sure, these impediments to 
effective oversight hamper legislators’ ability to protect the law from excessive 
bureaucratic discretion.  
 The characteristics and limitations of elected representatives and the way these 
frame a representative’s oversight work have led to (or resulted from) a variety of 
explanatory theories concerning the relationship between legislatures and bureaucracies. 
For instance, drawing from economics, management, law, organizational psychology, and 
other disparate disciplines, political scientists have applied principal-agent theory to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Liberalism. 1979. N.Y., N.Y.: W.W. Norton; Niskanen, William. Bureaucracy and Representative 
Government. 1971. Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton; Ogul, Morris. Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy. 
1975. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
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explain the intricacies of the legislative delegation of authority to bureaucrats.118 From 
the perspective of a principal-agent framework – with the elected legislator representing 
the principal and the bureaucrat the agent – a variety of dynamics within the legislator-
bureaucrat relationship are hypothesized, and these hypotheses have been largely borne-
out by empirical testing.119
 In the first instance, within a principal-agent framework the act of delegating 
authority from the political principal to the bureaucratic agent is a rational (or “utility-
maximizing”) act, one designed to be advantageous to the principal through assorted 
benefits (such as decreased time expenditures and a lightened workload). But similarly, 
the principal’s subsequent monitoring of the use of this power must also be viewed from 
within this framework. That is, once authority is delegated to an agent, the principal is 
faced with a difficult dilemma: the principal can choose to carefully monitor the actions 
of the agent for their faithfulness to the law, but this is not a costless endeavor, and the 
principal is likely to pursue this strategy only if some “net return” can be expected.120 
And because appreciable returns from this sort of monitoring are not always apparent, 
piecemeal oversight often results in the “inevitability of control loss” of at least some 
authority once delegated, as one author has noted.121  
                                                 
118For a classic work in this genre, see Mitnick, Barry M. The Political Economy of Regulation. 1980. N.Y., 
N.Y.: Columbia University Press. For a good recent overview of principal-agent theory, see Waterman, 
Richard W. and Kenneth Meier. “Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?” J-PART. Vol. 8, No. 2, 1998.  
 
119For a largely critical assessment of oversight from a principal-agent perspective, see Wood, B. Dan. 
“Principals, Bureaucrats and Responsiveness in Clear Air Enforcements.” American Political Science 
Review. Vol. 82, No. 1, 1988.  
  
120Waterman and Meier, “Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?” P. 175.  
 
121Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation. P. 17.  
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 Further still, even when a political principal decides it is in her best interest to 
carefully monitor the actions of an agent, the principal is often at a disadvantage in 
knowing exactly how delegated authority is being exercised, and in most instances must 
rely (paradoxically) on the agent to convey this information. In other words, if a statute is 
being misapplied by a bureaucratic agency, this information may not be available to the 
political principal until the effects of the policy become clear, and at this point – perhaps 
years in the future – it may be too late. Conversely, while a bureaucratic agent may be 
aware that a policy choice will have effects contrary to legislative goals, she has little 
incentive (and often a disincentive) to transfer this information to the principal; such an 
admission might result in loss of authority or reprimand. This type of “information 
asymmetry” between agents and principals is in some sense unavoidable; when authority 
is delegated to an agent to become immersed in a policy problem the principal has 
decided not to address personally, it is reasonable to conclude that over time an 
information asymmetry will emerge. 
 Finally, assuming that the principal has decided to carefully monitor the agent, 
and has uncovered the information needed to determine that the agent is acting contrary 
to the terms of the delegation, another problem emerges. In short, once authority has been 
delegated to an agent, the agent (rationally) works to maintain that authority, to struggle 
against having the delegated authority rescinded by the principal. While the principal 
may have good reasons for trying to regain authority, and have statutory authority 
backing her up, the task can be a difficult one nonetheless; the principal is likely to 
confront structural-institutional and practical barriers to a reassertion of authority. And 
although incentives are often used to maintain ultimate authority with the principal, 
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mixed success through these strategies has been found.122 Thus even if a principal seeks 
to discover and in fact discovers that a law is being misapplied, regaining control 
sufficient to change course can be difficult.  
 From a related perspective, a conceptual framework derivative of the principal-
agent model has received considerable attention. Founded on the assumptions of the 
rational but limited elected representative, this framework divides oversight activities into 
two types: police patrol style oversight and fire alarm style oversight.123 According to 
this framework, elected representatives delegate authority to bureaucrats, but instead of 
closely monitoring these bureaucratic agents (i.e. policing them) for their faithfulness to 
legislative intent – a task which requires considerable time and expertise, often with little 
recognition waiting at the other end – representatives instead adopt a less intensive fire 
alarm style of oversight. Through this approach, representatives wait for loud signals of 
bureaucratic overreach (i.e. “fire alarms”) – signals that might come from interest groups, 
special constituents, or the public at large – before springing into action to control 
bureaucratic discretion. While a much “less intensive form of oversight” and admittedly 
only “somewhat effective,” as signals sometimes emerge slowly or not at all (particularly 
from some certain groups), the fire alarm strategy allows the legislator to exert some 
control over the bureaucracy’s use of delegated authority.124
 Given the limitations of legislators when performing oversight activities, and in 
fact driven by these limitations, a variety of strategies have been applied over the last two 
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123McCubbins, Mathew and Thomas Schwartz. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. 
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decades focused specifically on controlling bureaucratic discretion through rulemaking. 
While not adopted at the Federal level of government, many state governments have 
come to rely on special “rules committees” as means for controlling bureaucratic 
discretion through rulemaking. Often taking the form of joint committees involving both 
upper and lower state legislative houses, the purpose of these rules committees is to allow 
the legislative body that enacted a statute authorizing bureaucratic discretion to approve 
all rules before these rules become effective. In this way, a thorough check of 
bureaucratic faithfulness to the law has been undertaken, and bureaucratic discretion 
controlled. 
 While certainly a creative means for institutionalizing and maintaining control 
over rulemaking in the legislature, at least in principle, experience with these rules review 
committees has been mixed. One scholar has found that these committees and the 
rulemaking agencies under review often enter into adversarial relationships, making it 
difficult for these committees to function effectively (again, given unavoidable 
circumstances like information asymmetries).125 Additionally, these rules review 
committees were found to often fall under the sway of one prominent legislator, 
frustrating efforts to realize the intent of a statute now interpreted through the eyes of a 
particular member’s political agenda. Finally, and in a bit of an irony, these rules 
committees were found to often be dominated by the senior staff of the committee 
members, creating a “quasi-bureaucracy” that itself had to be regulated – resulting in an 
infinite regress problem. 
                                                 
125For this argument, see Bowers, James R. Regulating the Regulators: An Introduction to the Legislative 
Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking. 1990. N.Y., N.Y.: Praeger.  
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 Similarly, but focusing now on the Federal level of government, in the late 1990’s 
under the guidance of a Republican leadership bent on altering the oversight status quo 
(i.e. little oversight of the rulemaking process), Congress passed the Congressional 
Review Act, an addendum to the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act.126 
The Congressional Review Act gave Congress a 60-day window within which it could 
review any applicable regulations (determined by annual economic impact, number of 
consumers or businesses affected, etc.) and strike-down any rule deemed too costly, or 
contrary to the goals of Congress in passing the law authorizing rulemaking. Yet at least 
thus far, this legislation has had little impact on the quantity or quality of oversight of 
bureaucratic rulemaking.127
 Finally, it would seem that recent bureaucratic reform efforts might actually 
frustrate robust legislative oversight in the future, at least in the sense of oversight 
directed at guaranteeing faithfulness to statutory intent. Over the last decade or so, 
attitudes on bureaucratic reform have been focused more on “results” than on 
bureaucratic deference to the law.128 Generically identified by the label “new public 
management,” approaches emphasizing “quality,” “performance” and “service delivery” 
have in many ways eclipsed more traditional oversight concerns. Bureaucratic agencies 
are now as concerned with evidencing to Congress success in service delivery – through a 
variety of “performance metrics,” such as satisfaction surveys, average application 
processing times or compliance with other prescribed standards of service quality – as 
                                                 
126Congressional Review Act. 5 U.S.C. 801-808.  
 
127In fact, in the first 18 months after its passage only one new agency rule was brought for a vote of repeal 
in the House, and none in the Senate. See Schoenbrod, David. “Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to my 
Critics.” Cardoza Law Review. Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999. [P. 739]. 
 
128For this argument, see Aucoin, P. and R. Heintzman. “New Forms of Accountability.” In Revitalizing the 
Public Service. Peters, B.G. and D.J. Savoie (Eds.). 2000. Montreal, Canada: Queens University Press.  
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they are about proving their fidelity to the law.129 Indeed, bureaucracies are now forced 
by law to adopt this focus, with statutes such as the Government Performance and 
Results Act having mandated as much. Thus, it would seem that a focus on “better 
bureaucracy” through more efficient and higher quality service delivery to citizens has in 
some ways eclipsed traditional concerns with the issue of statutory goals and intentions. 
 In sum, formal models of legislative oversight, actual experience with oversight 
and recent bureaucratic reforms all lead to one conclusion: while certainly not entirely 
ineffective, oversight activities centered in Congress are and are likely to remain at best 
partially effective instruments towards monitoring bureaucratic discretion and rulemaking 
and guaranteeing the goals and intent of the law. As one scholar nicely summarizes the 
matter, “although scholars differ on how adequate is the amount of oversight done by 
Congress, it is rarely, if ever, asserted that it approximates the standard of systematic and 
comprehensive oversight.”130 And even as information costs decrease through new 
technologies and members of Congress become safer in their seats through redistricting 
(an entirely separate problem), there is little reason to believe that oversight work will 
become a primary concern, or that careful policing of the bureaucracy is forthcoming. 
Indeed, relying on elected representatives to oversee bureaucratic discretion can be 
identified as a questionable strategy because predicated on something of a paradox; 
unless monitored closely, bureaucratic agents tend to “shirk,” and it is unrealistic to 
                                                 
129A review of recent reports published by the renamed Government Accountability Office, Congress’ 
official research and oversight group, provides sufficient evidence of this change in focus.  
 
130Evans, Diana. “Congress, Oversight and the Diversity of Member Goals.” Political Science Quarterly. 
Vol. 109, No. 4, 1999.    
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expect elected representatives to closely monitor the use of delegated authority when the 
very act of delegation was undertaken to lessen the workload.131
 
II. Direct Democracy and Control through Public Accountability 
 The above critique of oversight performed by elected representatives may seem 
excessively pessimistic in its assessment of the possibilities of robust bureaucratic control 
through legislative oversight. Yet it would seem that, as bureaucratic discretion through 
rulemaking was rapidly expanding in the mid-20th century, Congress itself realized that 
oversight by elected representatives would always prove an at best partially effective 
device. In other words, Congress seems to have foreseen its own limitations, and as 
evidence of this, at the height of concern over the growth of bureaucracy and delegation 
to bureaucratic agencies Congress passed the Administrative Procedures Act.132 The APA 
was designed to contend with what was becoming widely regarded as a dangerous trend 
towards uncontrollable delegation to bureaucratic agencies, a trend which frustrated 
government by democracy and law, but which could not be resolved by Congressional 
oversight alone. In response, the APA mandates forms of direct public accountability of 
bureaucratic rulemaking as an additional form of control of bureaucratic discretion.  
 In what follows, I will briefly examine two varieties of direct public 
accountability and control of rulemaking. That is, as the APA identifies two different 
types of bureaucratic rulemaking (formal and informal rulemaking), two different modes 
                                                 
131Brehm, John. Working, Shirking and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public. 1997. 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.  
 
132The Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. For a discussion of the roots of the APA, see Spence, David 
B. “Agency Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling Away the Delegation Problem.” J-PART. Vol. 
7, No.2, 1997. 
 
 93
of public participation within these processes are also present.133 Thus to understand 
these modes of direct accountability requires that we first come to understand these two 
types of rulemaking processes a little better. But in the end, as was the case with our 
investigation of oversight by elected representatives, there are solid reasons for 
questioning the effectiveness of these strategies; these more direct forms of control, 
because regularly dominated by powerful organized interests, often fail to defend the 
goals and intentions of the law – and in fact sometimes have the opposite effect.  
 
II.1. Formal and Informal Rulemaking 
 The first type of rulemaking to note, sometimes called “formal rulemaking,” is 
outlined in Section 556 of the APA. Section 556 provides for a set of procedures to be 
adopted “when required by statute” (i.e. when mandated by Congress), a process to be 
undertaken “on the record.”134 While informal rulemaking (to be examined next) is 
perhaps the more important instantiation of bureaucratic rulemaking, if for no other 
reason than because it is the far more regularly adopted form, formal rulemaking still 
occupies an important place in the universe of regulatory policymaking, particularly 
among agencies that have a long history of adopting this procedure, those that deal with 
highly complex and contestable scientific evidence (such as the Food and Drug 
Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), and where litigation following 
rulemaking is likely.  
                                                 
133In what follows, I will examine only formal and informal rulemaking processes, leaving to one side a 
third type, negotiated rulemaking. But since our concern here is with forms of oversight and control, and 
because negotiated rulemaking proceeds similarly to formal rulemaking in how it incorporates public 
participation (although differing in procedure), this omission is not essential.  
 
134The Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 553. 
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Briefly, formal rulemaking is reflected in the 11-stage process outlined in the last 
chapter, but follows a particular set of procedures for including the public in this process. 
Once the decision to make a new rule has been taken (or revise an old one, etc), formal 
rulemaking begins and operates much like a judicial hearing, with either a member or 
members of the rulemaking agency or an administrative law judge selected to “preside” 
over the proceedings.135 In this hearing, “interests” and “witnesses” who have been 
deemed sufficiently affected to merit inclusion – often including representatives of 
interest groups or trade associations, scientific experts, bureaucrats and members of 
advisory committees – are allowed to participate in the rulemaking process. An agency 
hearing including these participants is undertaken, complete with rules of evidence, 
evidence derived through examination and cross-examination, individuals forced to 
participate (through subpoena, with council permitted), depositions taken, a transcript of 
the proceedings maintained to provide a record of the decision-making process producing 
the final rule, and so forth.136 The rules generated through formal rulemaking processes 
typically reflect the side presenting the preponderance of evidence in the hearing; that is, 
the rule is typically “formulated upon the basis of the evidentiary record made in the 
hearing.”137 Thus, the group or groups that are able to provide the most compelling 
argument “wins,” and the final rule typically reflects this successful position. 
 The process of formal rulemaking is, on all accounts, a highly structured and 
exclusive one. Participants from regulated industries, interest groups and advisory 
                                                 
135The Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 556. 
  
136The Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 556.  
 
137Clark, Tom C. “The Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act.” 1947.  
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committee members are included in these processes, and their participation, particularly 
as a form of expert testimony providing relevant evidence, is highly influential in 
determining the outcome as the final adopted rule.138 This being the case, in this process 
it is strategically rational for the witness-participants to provide the most compelling 
evidence for their favored outcome. Moreover, there is also a significant incentive to 
disprove the case of the opposition and their interpretation of the statute authorizing 
rulemaking, and often interest groups and regulated industries exert considerable effort to 
provide “defensive research,” evidence undermining the expected positions of their 
opponents.139  
 In short, formal rulemaking processes integrate “public” participation, but do so 
in a particular way, allowing for the most direct participation by a specific kind of 
participant. Formal rulemaking procedures allow considerable opportunity for interested 
groups to gain representation in the rulemaking process, granting these groups the power 
to directly impact (and occasionally even help author) adopted rules.140 As defined by a 
later statute, the primary participants in these processes, and therefore those that wield the 
greatest influence are the “interests…multiple parties which have a similar point of view 
or which are likely to be affected in a similar manner.”141
                                                 
138Advisory committees are important contributors to rulemaking in certain agencies. The Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA) prescribes (but does not require) Congress to mandate in authorizing statutes the 
use of “advisory committees” when these are “determined to be essential.” In Chapter Six, we will 
examined one rulemaking which did employ an advisory committee. Federal Advisory Committee Act. 5 
U.S.C. 1.  
 
139Harter, Phillip J. “Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise.” Georgetown Law Journal. Vol. 71, 
1982-1983. [P. 21] 
 
140This is not to say that these processes are exempt from the notice and comment requirements of the APA, 
as formal rulemakings still must publish notice and accept and consider all public comments on proposed 
rules. Yet it is also clear that here the participation of interest groups is given greater weight.  
 
141Negotiated Rulemaking Act. 5 U.S.C. 562. 
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 On the other hand, “informal rulemaking,” sometimes also called “notice-and-
comment rulemaking,” is far less structured than the formal rulemaking processes 
described above, but (and undoubtedly because of this) informal rulemaking is (when the 
option exists) the far more regularly adopted process. Generally speaking, and to reduce 
the process down from the 11-stages highlighted in the last chapter, an informal 
rulemaking is characterized by five basic steps. First, the rulemaking agency publishes a 
notice of the proposed rule in the Federal Register along with a framework of the 
rulemaking processes that will follow. Second, following the publication of the proposed 
rule the general public is given a “comment period,” a period of time (which varies, but is 
usually 30-60 days) to write and register a comment on the proposed rule. Third, the 
agency analyzes all of the comments on the proposed rule and prepares the final rule. 
Fourth, the agency creates the “preamble” to the final rule, the introduction to the rule 
that addresses and analyzes the comments received and the reasoning underpinning the 
adopted rule. Lastly, the final version of the rule is published in the Federal Register and 
integrated in the Code of Federal Regulations, and publication must by law occur at least 
30 days prior to the date the rule becomes effective.  
 With this background in mind, there are several vehicles of public participation 
included in an informal rulemaking. First and certainly most importantly, the primary 
means of participation in informal, notice-and-comment rulemaking is the receipt of 
public comments. Any individual, and for that matter any interest group or regulated 
industry has the legal right under the APA to author a written comment and send this 
comment to the agency for analysis concerning a proposed rule, a rule already written 
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and published (i.e. “notice”) in the Federal Register.142 Comments received by agencies 
often range from the highly researched and professionally authored (often by legal teams 
representing some interest group) to much less formal comments sent by ordinary citizens 
interested in the rule. These comments are added to the particular rule’s “docket” – the 
complete file containing all comments, evidence, drafts of the rule, and so forth – by the 
“docket manager,” the individual responsible for managing the information flow, and are 
typically stored in a “docket room” within the agency.  
While comments can come in any form, agencies often announce preferred styles 
and “comment formats,” requesting that individuals include specific evidence (such as 
scientific evidence or legal precedent), clearly indicate whether they favor or oppose the 
proposed rule, and suggesting that commenters limit the nature of their comments to 
“scientific evidence and logic.”143 Again, while following this format is not required, 
agencies are often clear that doing so will result in the greatest possible effect for a 
comment. Furthermore, interest groups typically intervene in this process as well, 
creating and distributing “docket cards” designed to allow interested citizens to easily 
check one of a few boxes indicating their position on a proposed rule. In this sense, the 
comment process is somewhat subject to the influence of the same actors dominant in the 
formal rulemaking process – interested groups.  
                                                 
142The Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 553. 
 
143For one example of a “preferred” comment format, see the FDA web page at: http://www.fda.gov/.  
Furthermore, under the APA individuals are allowed access to all information pertaining to an open 
rulemaking, all information included in the rule’s docket. An interested party can read the comments of 
other parties prior to preparing their own, can analyze all evidentiary material in the docket, and so forth. 
While the docket room is typically housed in Washington D.C., the APA also demands that agencies make 
copies for interested individuals with only “reasonable fees” attached. The Administrative Procedure Act. 5 
U.S.C. 552. What is more, and as we will discuss considerably in a later chapter, recent laws have 
mandated that agencies create “e-dockets,” online files of all information relevant to particular 
rulemakings. 
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 In addition, the federal government has enacted over the last few decades several 
statutes designed to open-up the rulemaking process – and all bureaucratic decision-
making processes, for that matter – to the public. These laws, the most important of 
which is the Government in the Sunshine Act, provide both increased public access to the 
information surrounding various processes and increased access to bureaucratic decision-
makers.144 More particularly, the Government in the Sunshine Act demands that no 
agency or agency decision-makers shall “dispose of any agency business,” and more 
specifically shall conduct no “deliberations [which] determine or result in the joint 
conduct or disposition of official agency business,” unless these meetings are “open to 
public observation.”145 Yet while this statute makes the rulemaking process and the 
information surrounding it more open and public, it does not demand any substantive 
interaction between the public and bureaucratic agents when creating rules.  
Nevertheless, in the end the right of public comment defines the primary vehicle 
of public participation in informal rulemaking. The practices of sending, receiving and 
analyzing comments is therefore taken very seriously, and it is not uncommon for the 
number of comments for some rulemakings to reach into the thousands (and occasionally 
more) and to emanate from citizens only casually interested in the outcome, all the way 
up to interest groups engaging professional lobbyists and law firms to write the most 
persuasive, well-researched comments. For all rulemakings, but most essentially for 
informal rulemakings, the right to participate in the rulemaking process through the 
                                                 
144Government in the Sunshine Act. 5 U.S.C. 552b. The Freedom of Information Act. (5 U.S.C. 552.) is 
another important and similarly intended piece of legislation.   
 
145Government in the Sunshine Act. 5 U.S.C. 552b.  
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contribution of a written comment provides the critical venue of public participation and 
accountability. 
 
II.2. Critiquing Control by Public Accountability: Who Participates? 
 
As discussed above, the forms of public accountability mandated by the APA are 
intended to provide an additional barrier to excessive bureaucratic discretion, an 
unusually direct means for reasserting the link between the people and the rules which 
govern them. At least in principle, these forms of accountability by public participation 
support popular government and democracy by guaranteeing a connection between the 
public and bureaucrats as they exercise discretion through rulemaking. But as was the 
case when we examined oversight by elected representatives, here too we must ask: how 
effective are these direct forms of control and accountability of bureaucratic rulemaking? 
Or in other words, are these strategies effective at protecting the intent of Congress as 
defined in law, and thus reasserting the link between the people and the law critical to 
democracy? 
One of the most common criticisms of public participation within bureaucratic 
rulemaking as mandated by the APA – and probably the single most important criticism – 
focuses on the inequalities of these modes of participation. These processes, it has often 
and long been noted, permit and privilege the participation of certain actors over others, 
and more specifically privilege powerful and influential interest groups and other 
organized actors over ordinary citizens and those without the basic resources needed to 
effectively participate.146 And to be sure, these inequalities borne of interest group 
                                                 
146For some examples, see Dahl, Robert. Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. 1982. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press; Lowi, The End of Liberalism; Lowi, Theodore. “Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, 
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domination in rulemaking are not without significant consequences for the general 
effectiveness of these forms of accountability. Some clarification is here required.  
There are a variety of reasons that interest groups, trade associations, elite policy 
networks, and so forth, tend to dominate public participation in bureaucratic rulemaking 
processes. In the first instance, formal rulemaking processes, as discussed above, 
statutorily guarantee the most direct access to representatives of various interested 
groups. Indeed, the APA defines participants in these formal processes as “interests” or 
“parties,” by which is meant representatives of groups that as closely as possible mirror 
the different relevant or affected parties within society. While these groups sometimes do 
represent broad segments of the public, their privileged access to rulemaking processes 
comes at the price of similar access for less powerful groups or those individuals not 
adequately represented. In fact, more powerful interest groups will often focus on the 
rulemaking process more than other political venues (including the legislature), and this 
is the case precisely because these processes tend to permit nearly unreserved access to 
“the most organized interests,”147 while attracting or permitting far less participation from 
the general public or less influential groups.148  
Additionally, thinking now about informal rulemaking processes and the mode of 
participation through public comment most significant within it, it is often claimed that 
there are a variety of knowledge and resource barriers standing between some segments 
of the public and participation as the contribution of a comment to a rulemaking, barriers 
                                                                                                                                                 
Conservatism and Administrative Power.” American University Law Review. Vol. 36, 1987; 
Schattschneider, E.E. The Semi-Sovereign People. 1960. N.Y., N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
 
147Lowi, The End of Liberalism. P. 60.  
 
148Kerwin, Rulemaking. P. 276.   
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which are more easily surmounted by powerful organized groups. Indeed, it is accepted 
as fact that meaningful and influential participation in rulemaking “requires at least a 
modicum of technical expertise,”149 and as the example of a comment “format” discussed 
above suggests, there are often built-in barriers for those who cannot or do not feel able 
to provide “good science and logic” in voicing their perspective on a proposed rule. 
Couple this with the necessary expenditure of time and other resources required to 
adequately research and author a comment likely to impact rulemakers, and even this 
seemingly more egalitarian process becomes less accessible.  
On the other hand, organized interests, and particularly the more powerful interest 
groups, have the time, resources and expertise to undertake the task of authoritatively 
authoring a comment (or to hire a legal team to do so for them), and thus stand a better 
chance of impacting final rules. Additionally, these groups often incur considerable 
expense to flood rulemaking agencies with docket cards produced by the group but sent 
in the name of ordinary citizens as an effort to increase the perception of broad public 
support for their position. Given all of this, it is not surprising that empirical studies have 
repeatedly evidenced the dominance of some interest groups in informal rulemaking 
through written comment, indicating that ordinary citizens are much less likely to 
participate via comment in rulemakings and have their voices heard than are organized 
interest groups, and that some interest groups are much more successful at gaining access 
and influence than others.150  
                                                 
149Kerwin, Rulemaking. P. 276. 
 
150For a validation of the claim that participation in rulemaking does not exhibit equality based on case 
studies of 11 different and objectively important rulemakings, see Golden, Marissa Martino. “Interest 
Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory. Vol. 8, No. 2, 1998. Golden finds for several important rulemakings 
that only business interest groups and trade associations issued comments, with literally zero comments 
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In the end, when examining the equality of modes of public participation in 
rulemaking, most have agreed that “the pressure system is tilted in favor of the well-off, 
especially business, at the expense of the representation of broad public interests and the 
interests of those with few political resources.”151 In other words, the system as it exists 
today tends to grant greater access and influence to some more dominant interest groups, 
groups which tend to represent already dominant social groups.152 Based on these 
characteristics of modes of public participation in bureaucratic rulemaking and the fact 
that powerful organized interests tend to dominate them, it should come as little surprise 
that these groups also tend to wield considerable influence over the final outcomes as 
adopted rules. In fact, some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that agencies created 
to seek and uphold the public good as defined in statute by regulating a particular 
industry or group of actors instead regularly become “captured” by the industries and 
interests they were tasked to regulate – to the detriment of the public at large.153
 Given that it is almost universally agreed that rulemaking processes favor the 
participation of organized interests – and the most effectively organized above all others 
– it would not be unreasonable to challenge these processes on the grounds that they 
                                                                                                                                                 
from citizen activist groups. For some countervailing evidence (with an n=1), see Nixon, David, et. al. 
“With Friends like These: Rule-Making Comment Submissions to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. Vol. 12, No. 1, 2002. 
 
151Schlozman, Kay. “What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality and the American Pressure 
System.” The Journal of Politics. Vol. 46, 1984 [P. 1028]. Schlozman gets the title of her article from a 
famous quote by Schattschneider, who noted that “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly 
chorus sings with an upper-class accent.” Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People. P. 35.  
 
152Golden, “Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process.”  
 
153For a classical outline of the “capture hypothesis,” see Bernstein, M.H. Regulating Business by 
Independent Commission. 1955. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; see also Lowi, The End of 
Liberalism. Later, many would challenge the validity of the capture hypothesis, at least in the sense that it 
was difficult to locate an agency that was “fully” captured. Hill, Larry B. “Who Governs the American 
Administrative State.” J-PART. Vol. 1, No. 3, 1991.  
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undermine a basic principle of democracy: democratic equality. Yet we need not adopt 
this normatively contestable and more difficult approach to effectively criticize direct 
public accountability as a form of oversight and control of rulemaking. Rather, by 
adopting the same standard employed above to investigate oversight by elected 
representatives – the effectiveness of these modes of control at protecting the law and the 
goals and intent of the legislative power enacting the law – we can also challenge these 
forms of control.  
 Given their direct access to rulemaking processes, certain dominant organized 
interests and actors tend to wield considerable influence over the content of adopted 
rules. Interest groups, trade associations and other powerful actors become interested in 
and work to influence rulemaking outcomes because they have some stake in the 
outcome, obviously enough. Yet these groups are committed to defending the intent of a 
statute as defined and pursued by Congress through statute only if this perspective suits 
their particular interests. If, on the other hand, these groups and actors have goals at 
cross-purposes with a statute as enacted, their purpose shifts and these groups work to 
water-down or undermine legislation as much as possible, often to the detriment of the 
public at large. In other words, instead of protecting law from excessive bureaucratic 
discretion, these groups often become dangerous and powerful opponents of the law; 
instead of reasserting a connection between the people and the law, these groups often 
strive to push the two farther apart.  
 In Chapter Seven, we will investigate one example of this type of “statutory 
distortion by public accountability.” This case illustrates how, precisely through interest 
group participation in the rulemaking process, a statute designed to more rigorously 
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monitor and enforce standards of organic farming actually had the opposite effect – once 
the interest groups and trade associations with a significant stake in the game entered the 
process. This case, one of many we could examine, provides evidence of a simple fact: 
instead of providing means for reconnecting the people and the law in the face of 
delegation to bureaucratic agencies by defending the law from bureaucratic abuse, the 
modes of public accountability mandated by the APA often further distances bureaucratic 
rules from the lawmakers, the law and the people.  
 
III. Conclusion: Democratic Control of the Bureaucracy – The Need for a New 
Model 
 
 The analysis undertaken above, in conjunction with what has been argued over 
the previous chapters, has shown us several things, and offers an opportunity for us to 
draw some conclusions relevant to all of what we have examined to this point. These 
investigations also force us, I think, to begin the process of moving beyond the 
limitations of existing democratic means for controlling and holding accountable 
bureaucratic institutions and actors as they exercise discretion – and particularly over the 
rulemaking function – as an essential task in better protecting and defending our model of 
democracy. 
 In the first instance, I think it is now fair to conclude that the models of 
democracy we examined in Chapter Two, both in the basic relationships connecting the 
people with the laws which govern them and the basic strategies for reconciling the 
tension between democracy and administration through democratic modes of control and 
accountability, have found expression in modern political systems such as the United 
States. To be sure, it was only general forms of control offered by thinkers like Locke and 
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Rousseau – overarching suggestions for ensuring that the administrative or executive 
power did not become an excessively dominant power overwhelming popular 
government, but instead remained subordinate – and not finite or particular methods. Yet 
from a general perspective, these strategies adequately describe how contemporary 
democracies have attempted to democratically control bureaucratic discretion.  
Borrowing from the representative-democratic model, certainly the dominant model in 
practice, oversight of bureaucratic discretion by elected representatives provides a central 
means for guaranteeing the intent of the law as enacted by the elected legislature. 
However, and evidencing the traces of direct democracy lingering within the U.S., the 
modes of direct public accountability mandated by the APA provide an alternative form 
of democratic control over bureaucratic discretion through processes like rulemaking. In 
short, it is through these forms of oversight and accountability that the link between the 
people and the rules which govern them is fortified in the face of bureaucratic power.  
 Yet these strategies have proven to be at best only partially effective in protecting 
the goals and intentions of Congress from bureaucratic discretion, and in fact in some 
instances tend to undermine these goals and intentions. Again, this is not to say that 
instances of robust oversight and control cannot be found, or that instances of perfectly 
deficient oversight and control are not available for scrutiny. But these strategies are the 
object of fair criticism and as currently structured are likely to remain troublesome. And 
from the perspective of democracy, they ought to be criticized for failing to perform their 
most essential, fundamental purpose: reasserting the link between the people and the law 
essential to a democratic system.  
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 At this point, it is appropriate to examine the landscape from a broad perspective 
and ask: Why have the existing and long-prescribed modes of democratic control of the 
bureaucracy failed to serve their basic purposes, to support democracy in the face of what 
was originally regarded as an instrument of the public good – the administrative system? 
Many reasons have been suggested to explain this reality – several were in fact examined 
above – but one overarching explanation has been largely overlooked. In short, we must 
recognize that the general strategies for reconciling the tensions between administration 
and popular government date back to a time before administration was as complex and 
expansive as it now is. To oversee a small administrative system, one including only a 
limited assortment of ministers capable of being almost constantly watched, might have 
been a relatively easy task (even this is questionable); Congressional oversight of literally 
millions of bureaucrats is a far different matter, and direct forms of public accountability 
under modern conditions are confronted with a variety of pitfalls that must be overcome. 
Perhaps, in short, to the extent that modern democracies are still informed by historical-
theoretical models of popular government and the long-prescribed means for integrating 
administration within such a system, these models have proven insufficient over time, as 
both society and administration have expanded and grown.  
 Perhaps it is time, then, to look beyond the long-suggested methods for 
democratically controlling and holding accountable bureaucratic agencies as they 
exercise discretion. To this end, we might look towards an alternative model of 
democracy, a complimentary model designed and situated within the contemporary 
context and more sensitive to the limitations of modern society and politics, for better 
controlling and holding accountable the bureaucracy. About this much, we can be sure: 
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processes like bureaucratic rulemaking, where unelected bureaucrats effectively make 
policy and law unencumbered by the same connections to the people as elected 
representatives, or the people legislating directly, certainly challenges our understanding 
of democracy if not vigorously controlled and held accountable. Finding means for better 
controlling bureaucratic institutions as they exercise discretion is thus essential to 
reasserting and solidifying democracy. It is this task that the next part of this dissertation 
will seek to accomplish.  
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Chapter Five: The Deliberative Theory of Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter begins the process of seeking a more effective model of democratic 
control of the bureaucracy, and does so by examining the deliberative theory of 
democracy. The chapter begins by somewhat briefly summarizing deliberative theory, as 
this theory has – over the last decade or so – received such a vast quantity of attention 
that a more detailed exploration is no longer necessary. In an effort at theoretical clarity 
and parsimony, however, we will examine how deliberative democrats understand and 
strive towards their two preeminent goals, and the difficulties surrounding this task – 
realizing political processes that are both deliberative and democratic. Moreover, towards 
addressing a noticeable gap in the existing literature, we will discuss why bureaucratic 
institutions have not been systematically examined from within a deliberative framework, 
and why this omission is unnecessarily limiting. Finally, we will examine two models of 
deliberative democracy in practice, settling on one model best able to realize both the 
deliberative and democratic goals of this theory in an empirically and sociologically 
realistic fashion, given the impediments presented by modern mass societies and the 
technical complexity of decision making within some institutional contexts.  
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 Ultimately, our goal in this chapter is to examine deliberative democracy, but to 
do so in a way that best illustrates this theory’s relevance and applicability to the 
problems analyzed in the first part of this dissertation. In this capacity, our analysis will 
be in places somewhat brief, yet sufficient to begin the process of envisioning a model of 
democracy capable of more effectively functioning as a mode of democratic 
accountability and control for processes of bureaucratic rulemaking, one capable of better 
connecting the people to the rules which govern them, and thus capable of better 
reasserting our model of democracy.  
 
I. The Deliberative Theory of Democracy 
 Over the course of the last two decades, an energetic discussion concerning 
“deliberative democracy” has been underway.154 Situated within the larger tradition of 
radical democratic thought advocating a close link between the people, political decision-
makers and the decisions they render, the debate over deliberative democracy has offered 
scholars the opportunity to examine anew the nature of robust public participation in 
governance. Deliberative democracy is typically presented as the core of an ideal 
procedure, an image of a political practice not yet realized and perhaps not fully 
                                                 
154A few of the noteworthy works introducing, considering and defending deliberative democracy are: 
Bessette, Joseph. “Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government.” In How 
Democratic is the Constitution? 1980. Goldwin, R. and W. Shambra (Eds.) Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute; Bohman, James. Public Deliberation. 1996. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Bohman, 
James. “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy.” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy. Vol. 6, No. 4, 1998; Cohen, Joshua. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In 
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Bohman, James and William Rehg (Eds.). 1997. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press; Dryzek, John S. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, 
Critics, Contestations. 2000. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; Fishkin, James S. Democracy and 
Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform. 1991. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press; Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson. Democracy and Disagreement. 1996. Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University; Habermas, Jurgen. Between Facts and Norms. 1996. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press; Manin, Bernard. “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation.” Political Theory. Vol. 15, 
No. 3, 1989; Young, Iris Marion. Inclusion and Democracy. 2000. N.Y., N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 
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realizable, at least against the backdrop of contemporary social scale, social heterogeneity 
and the technical complexity of many political decisions. In this sense, deliberative 
democracy represents a normative democratic theory, one that provides us a reference 
point from which we might critique existing but inadequate political processes. 
Increasingly, however, deliberative democracy has also provided a model of actual 
political reform, with both theorists and practitioners now envisioning and encouraging 
practices incorporating greater deliberative and democratic public participation. 
 In the broadest sense, deliberative democrats recognize public deliberation – that 
is, citizens and public officials communicatively reasoning together about problems and 
policies – as the essence of democratic participation. On this model, citizens and public 
officials within a democratic society exchange proposals identifying and addressing 
pertinent political problems, offering reasoned arguments for or against courses of action 
or policy alternatives. Policy choices, rules, laws and all manner of decisions are to be 
determined through this process of deliberation and communicative reasoning, with the 
power of reason – and not solely the number of supporters of a particular position, but 
ideally an eventual convergence between the two – operating as the most important 
determinant of political outcomes.  
 Theories of deliberative democracy are underpinned by the proposition – 
traceable back to Aristotle and reflected throughout the history of political thought in the 
works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, J.S. Mill, and more recently in the works of the 
“participatory democrats” – that only those policies, decisions and laws reflective of the 
free discussion of the people within a democratic society should or in fact tend to be 
considered legitimate. Contemporary theories of deliberative democracy are, at their core, 
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theories of democratic legitimacy, created in response to the perceived “legitimacy 
deficit” of existing democratic systems emerging, so it is argued, from their deficient 
political processes.155
 For the deliberative democrat, existing democratic processes have provided 
contemporary democratic systems with only limited capacities for generating legitimacy. 
Briefly, representative models of democracy often prove insufficient at connecting the 
people with elected representatives and thus the decisions they render, deliberative 
democrats argue, because this model of democracy often relies on a notion of 
representation predicated on the insulation of political elites from the intemperate or 
misguided opinions of the public – what is sometimes called a “trustee” model of 
representation. 156 Moreover, liberal models of democracy too simplistically and 
negatively define politics as an agonistic undertaking between essentially separate and 
competing citizens, citizens that when participating in politics should not be encouraged 
to publicly deliberate (for fear of destabilizing consequences), but rather whose political 
activity should be limited mostly to the aggregation of private, individual preferences.157 
Finally, direct models of democracy fail to creatively and adequately address the 
limitations of modern societies, and thus often rely – much like the liberal model – on 
                                                 
155For one recent example of a work examining the deficient legitimacy of contemporary democracies, see 
Pharr, Susan and Robert Putnam (Eds.). Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral 
Countries? 2000. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; for a now classic example explaining 
legitimacy problems in modern democracies, and one which early along recommends public discourse as a 
means for regaining legitimacy, see Habermas, Jurgen. Legitimation Crisis. 1973. Boston, MA: Beacon 
Press.  
 
156For this theory of representation, see Madison, James. “Federalist #10.” In The Federalist; for a fuller 
discussion of this model, see Manin, Bernard. The Principles of Representative Government. 1997. N.Y., 
N.Y.: Cambridge University Press; Pitkin, Hannah. The Concept of Representation. 1967. Los Angeles, 
CA: University of California Press. For the deliberative-democratic response, see Gutmann and Thompson, 
Democracy and Disagreement; Young, Inclusion and Democracy. 
 
157For this type of critique of liberal models of democracy and their tendency towards aggregation, see 
Young, Inclusion and Democracy.  
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thin (i.e. non-deliberative) processes, processes permitting only a limited number of 
participants, or processes located at only the most local levels.  
Towards addressing the legitimacy problems of contemporary democratic systems 
that rely on these models of democracy, the theory of deliberative democracy is presented 
as a model of politics designed to contend with the deep cleavages characterizing 
pluralistic societies and justifying these “thin” models of democracy, cleavages with 
which contemporary democracies (both in theory and in their institutions) are either 
unwilling or ill equipped to contend. Deliberative democrats suggest that without a means 
for dealing with these disagreements – when they are suppressed or left to distant experts 
or closed institutions to mediate – the support of the citizenry becomes more difficult to 
attain, and thus certain other goods (such as compliance with the laws, recognition of the 
laws as legitimate, or coordinated action between state and society) more difficult to 
elicit. While a deliberative democracy does not and cannot guarantee consensus as an 
outcome, it does insist (following a theory of discourse ethics) that only through public 
deliberation will those who disagree with political outcomes have an opportunity to offer 
their reasons, hear the reasons of others, and thus have the resultant outcome receive 
adequate moral justification, increasing the possibility of public acceptance across both 
the “winning” and “losing” sides. 
Additionally, for deliberative democrats the notion that legitimate decisions, 
policies, rules or laws can emanate only from the freely formed opinion and will of the 
citizenry entails the understanding and implementation of some basic normative 
principles, principles thought capable of conferring legitimacy on decisions even under 
conditions of deep disagreement and heterogeneity. That is, as a central feature of the 
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deliberative model and its claims of legitimacy, and again borrowing from discourse 
ethics, deliberative democrats have suggested sets of procedural norms governing this 
practice. A wide variety of principles have been offered, emanating from a diverse group 
of theorists and thus occasionally conflicting in their content. But borrowing selectively 
from several theorists, the normative principles of deliberative democracy might be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Reciprocity: In the broadest sense, the word reciprocity refers to a condition of 
mutual interchange and exchange. For deliberative democrats, a principle of 
reciprocity demands that we “respect one another as moral agents, not merely as 
abstract objects.”158 Central to this assumption in regards to political practice is 
the duty to give and the right to receive “justifications for mutually binding laws 
and public policies.”159 Thus reciprocity in the first instance demands an 
assumption of universal moral agency in conceptualizing a theory of political and 
ethical justification.160
 
2. Reason: While a principle of reciprocity demands processes of intersubjective 
justification between moral agents, reason defines the mode through which this 
justification occurs. That is, deliberative democrats recognize reason as the only 
legitimate means for arriving at collectively binding political outcomes.161 
Decisions should be the product of the “force of the better argument,” and 
                                                 
158Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement. P. 14.  
 
159Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson. “Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process.” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy. Vol. 10, No. 2, 2002.  
 
160For a larger discussion of reciprocity, see Habermas, Jurgen. “Remarks on Discourse Ethics.” In 
Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. 1990. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. For a 
critique of a pure theory of reciprocity, see Young, Iris. “Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, 
Wonder, and Enlarged Thought.” Constellations. Vol. 3, 1997. 
 
161There has been some debate amongst deliberative democrats on this point. Suspicious of the potentially 
discriminatory effects of Western modes of rationality and reason, alternative forms of communication, 
relying on such vehicles as “storytelling” and “testimony,” and alternative conceptions of “communicative 
democracy” suspicious of an argumentative, juridical form of reason have been proposed to overcome the 
potentially discriminatory tendencies of reason. For example, see Sanders, Lynn. “Against Deliberation.” 
Political Theory. Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997; Young, Iris Marion. “Communication and the Other: Beyond 
Deliberative Democracy.” In Democracy and Difference. Benhabib, Seyla (Ed). 1996. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
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therefore decision-making processes guided by power, coercion, traditional 
domination or economic advantage should not be deemed normatively valid.162
 
3. Publicity: In discussing reciprocity and reason as central values of deliberative 
democracy, assumed is the essential substance or fodder of deliberation. That is, 
in explicating a process of reciprocal reason giving and justification as the basis 
of deliberative democracy, we assume that the subject matter of discussion, the 
information, positions and reasons of all actors, is universally accessible – 
something that is not often the case. Publicity demands that all information be 
made available to all actors, and this principle is proposed by deliberative 
democrats not necessarily to provide for a set of dispositions necessary to 
deliberative practice (in the way reciprocity does), but rather to make deliberation 
more meaningful and complete. 
 
4. Accountability: A principle of accountability demands that we all must be 
responsible and answerable to others for our decisions and actions. For 
deliberative democrats, the accountability principle begins with the principles of 
reason and reciprocity, and clarifies the agents to whom we owe reasons, to whom 
we are responsible.163 Deliberative democrats typically demand that, in justifying 
norms or laws, we all must be responsible and answerable to all those possibly 
affected by an outcome, that this is the group which most directly deserves ethical 
justification, and that must therefore be included in a deliberative process. 
 
5. Inclusion: A principle of inclusion demands “that a deliberative procedure is 
legitimate only if all interests, opinions and perspectives present in the polity are 
included in the deliberations.”164 Inclusion as a principle expands the scope of 
deliberative theory by demanding heterogeneity of reasons and reason-givers in a 
deliberative process. An inclusion principle is similar in intent to accountability, 
but instead of guaranteeing fair participation by delimiting the group of 
individuals deserving reasons and thus deserving the right to participate in a 
deliberation, it demands that regardless of the composition of the group of all 
those potentially affected by a particular outcome deliberative processes must 
strive towards a diverse group of participants.165
 
                                                 
162See Habermas, Jurgen. “On the Pragmatic, the Ethical and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason.” 
In Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. 1990. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
163Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement. P. 128. 
 
164Young, Iris Marion. “Justice, Inclusion and Deliberative Democracy.”  In Deliberative Politics: Essays 
on Democracy and Disagreement. 1999. Macedo, Stephen. (Ed). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. [P. 
155]. 
  
165See Young, Iris Marion. “Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication.” In Deliberative 
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics; Bohman, James and William Rehg (Eds.). 1997. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
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6. Equality: The principles of accountability and inclusion demand that all those 
potentially affected by a political decision, and more generally a heterogeneous 
public, are included in a deliberative process; a principle of equality demands that 
all of these participants are granted fair opportunities within deliberative 
processes. Certainly fair and equal opportunities to influence outcomes – fair 
opportunity to offer reasons and arguments, or to challenge the reasons of others, 
for instance – are demanded within a deliberative process (and for some, more 
extensive and substantive forms of equality166).  
 
 In the end, the deliberative theory of democracy offers a principled, normative 
model of democratic politics, one argued to be more capable of creating legitimate 
outcomes by better connecting the people – guided by principled procedures – with the 
decisions, policies, rules and laws which govern them. Deliberative democracy emerged 
precisely in opposition to the perceived deficiencies of existing democratic processes, and 
thus is often argued to provide one ideal model for moving past these deficiencies. In the 
next section, a simplifying discussion of how deliberative democrats combine their two 
normative ideals – deliberation and democracy – into a practical means for both judging 
and recommending political processes is offered.  
 
I.1. Deliberation + Democracy 
 Reflecting on the above discussion of deliberative democratic theory and its core 
principles, a few final comments, and a final effort at theoretical clarity and parsimony, 
are necessary. These last comments will allow us to better understand and confront two 
issues critical to conceiving and pursuing a practical model of deliberative democracy: 
                                                 
166The idea of equality within deliberative processes has generated considerable debate, and both the extent 
of equality and its very attainability in actual deliberative processes has been called into question. For some 
debate about the importance of substantive equality in a deliberative democracy, see Gutmann, Amy and 
Dennis Thompson. “Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process.” The Journal of Political Philosophy. Vol. 
10, No. 2, 2002; Knight, Jack and James Johnson. “What Sort of Equality does Deliberative Democracy 
Require?” In Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. 1997. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press; Young, “Justice, Inclusion and Deliberative Democracy.”   
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first, identifying which types of political processes are and which are not indicative of 
deliberative democracy; and second, identifying the difficulties involved in realizing 
deliberative democracy in practice, given the limiting circumstances presented by 
modernity.  
The theory of deliberative democracy is, obviously enough, constructed of two 
distinct but equally important concepts. These two concepts, “deliberation” and 
“democracy,” are what we might call cluster concepts, each comprised of a somewhat 
amorphous and overlapping set of underlying categories and characteristics; the 
characteristics of these two cluster concepts are found in the principles discussed above. 
While both deliberation and democracy as cluster concepts are complex and without rigid 
boundaries, each containing features that in some instances overlap, inhabit both clusters 
or enter into mutually reinforcing relationships, the principles central to deliberative 
democratic theory can be assigned generally to one of these two preeminent goals. In 
short, for deliberative democrats “democracy” defines the normative who, and 
“deliberation” the normative how, of political processes. 
In the first instance, then, the ideal of democracy defines the scope and breadth of 
public participation in political decision-making processes. The principles of 
accountability, inclusion and equality define largely – but not exclusively – the 
composition of this “who.” In this sense, a process is democratic to the extent that it 
extends opportunities to a diverse group of participants for fair and roughly equal 
participation in a political process, the opportunity to offer reasons and criticize the 
reasons of others. Certainly, any truly democratic process should include all those 
potentially affected by an outcome, those deserving of reasons and of opportunities to 
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offer reasons, and ideally an inclusive, broad cross-section of the public should be 
included. Meeting these conditions, or at minimum striving to best approximate them in 
practice, provides the normative democratic goal of a deliberative democracy. 
Deliberation, on the other hand, refers to a mode of political interaction, a means 
through which citizens engage one another and public officials in working to arrive at 
mutually binding outcomes. The principles of reciprocity, reason and publicity discussed 
above define largely – but again, not exclusively – the ideal of a deliberative political 
process. In rendering decisions, citizens and public officials ought to engage one another 
as extensively as possible, offer one another justifying reasons for defending a particular 
outcome as a basic assumption of universal moral agency, and have access to all relevant 
information and the reasons of others before attempting to render a decision agreeable to 
all participants. It is these conditions which provide the standard for judging processes as 
adequately deliberative. 
 So with this understanding of the twin purposes of deliberative democracy in 
mind, we might now ask: which existing political processes do and which do not qualify 
as deliberative-democratic? Recently, two authors have provided a useful analytical tool 
for critically examining existing political processes and striving towards alternative 
(deliberative-democratic) processes guided by the two distinct but interconnected goals of 
this theory. This heuristic allows us to think about and judge political processes on the 
basis of both their “deliberativeness” (the political processes undertaken towards arriving 
at political decisions) and their “democraticness” (reflecting the scope of public 
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participation in these processes), and for this reason I will reproduce and adopt this 
heuristic as a useful one.167
  
 Figure 3
deliberative public opinion
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raw public opinion
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 By way of brief explanation, Figure 3 allows us to think about existing political 
processes, or processes we might hope to institute, and locate them along the continua (or 
within the numbered “quadrants”). The location of political processes within these 
quadrants reflects their adherence to the principles of deliberativeness and 
democraticness. The ultimate goal for the deliberative democrat is to reach as far 
“northwest” as possible (i.e. Quadrant I), maximizing both deliberation and democracy.  
                                                 
167Ackerman, Bruce and James Fishkin. “Deliberation Day.” The Journal of Political Philosophy. 
Ackerman and Fishkin contrast “deliberative public opinion” and “raw public opinion” because they are 
most interested in the type of information emanating from political processes, the “who” and the “what” as 
opposed to the “who” and the “how.” Nevertheless, as Ackerman and Fishkin indicate, the “how” of 
participation, the type of political process undertaken, is directly responsible for the creation of these two 
types of opinions (their “what”), and identifying political processes amenable to deliberative public opinion 
is their ultimate goal. Even with these differences, I will keep their original graphic intact.  
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 Thinking about some existing political processes, one can envision where we 
might locate these processes within these quadrants. By way of example, it is reasonable 
to locate most processes of referenda somewhere in Quadrant III. Processes of referenda 
tend towards democracy by (at least formally) opening-up decision-making to mass 
democratic participation through plebiscite – a direct vote by all qualified citizens. 
However, these processes often fail to be marked by meaningful public deliberation (i.e. 
lack reason-giving and reciprocity, in this instance), and thus tend towards a type of 
“raw” (i.e. aggregative and non-deliberative) public opinion. Thus only one-half of the 
“deliberation + democracy” equation is achieved through this particular type of process.  
Similarly, we might locate the decision-making processes of the Supreme Court 
somewhere in Quadrant II. The processes of the Supreme Court are often lauded as 
exemplars of deliberative decision-making, but fail to reflect any kind of democratic 
process (i.e. lack accountability, inclusion and equality), given the very limited number of 
participants and the relative insulation of the Justices from broader public participation.168  
 Finally, there are a few noteworthy examples of political processes that tend to 
fall into Quadrant I. Ackerman and Fishkin, for instance, identify those rare moments of 
broad and vibrant discourse concerning essential and fundamental national political 
issues – “constitutional moments,” they call these – when politics is both deliberative and 
democratic.169 Further, some local governments engage in processes which incorporate 
                                                 
168It is difficult to think of a process that falls in Quadrant IV. In most democratic societies processes which 
are limited in participation tend to emphasize intensive deliberation as the justification for not including a 
larger number of participants. Conversely, processes that are democratic often use this mass participation as 
grounds for limiting or eschewing deliberation. That is, either deliberation or democracy tends to be 
emphasized in most political processes. One example might be the Electoral College in the United States, a 
process that (while less significant than it once was) is neither particularly deliberative nor democratic.  
 
169Ackerman and Fishkin, “Deliberation Day.” P. 149.  
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both deliberative and democratic elements through council meetings, participatory 
advisory committees, and so forth. Nevertheless, both practices are rare and difficult to 
replicate on a broader scale.  
In sum, when thinking about various political processes operative in many 
modern democratic systems, it is easy to recognize that the tendency over the years has 
been to strive towards one of these two values over the other – to make processes more 
deliberative, but limit eligibility for participation; or to make processes open to all, but 
focus less on deliberation than the aggregation of particular preferences.170 That is, the 
“deliberation + democracy” equation is often perceived as an either/or situation; if mass 
participation (i.e. democracy) is prized, opportunities for deliberation must be limited, 
and vice versa. This choice is often justified from practical necessity, based in the 
limitations presented by modern societies with large populations and complex decision 
making processes. Finding and designing processes which incorporate both deliberation 
and democracy at all levels of politics is thus the key challenge for deliberative 
democrats. 
As we proceed, therefore, we will refer to this simplified and useful heuristic 
device in both criticizing existing political processes and striving towards deliberative 
democratic processes. What is more, below we will investigate in a more detailed fashion 
two competing models of deliberative practice, seeking a model which adequately 
incorporates both the deliberative and democratic principles, and at the same time proves 
applicable to the limiting conditions of modern mass societies.  
  
 
                                                 
170Ackerman and Fishkin, “Deliberation Day.” P. 149. 
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II. Deliberative Democracy and Bureaucracy 
 Given the virus-like spread of deliberative democratic theory over the last few 
years, one might reasonably conclude that as deliberative theory has grown more popular 
and attracted greater interest, even winning the interest of politicians, practitioners, 
journalists and other public commentators, the full range of political processes – and 
particularly those thought to result in a “democratic deficit,” or that are less able to garner 
recognition for decisions rendered – had been analyzed from within a deliberative 
perspective. One might assume that, for instance, given the long-recognized tension 
between bureaucracy and democracy, either scholars of public administration or 
deliberative theorists would have looked closely at integrating deliberative-democratic 
and bureaucratic processes. Yet surprisingly this is not the case, and only a very small 
handful of works have investigated the possibility of deliberative democracy within a 
bureaucratic context.171 Why this has been the case, and why we are justified in moving 
past this limiting tendency, requires analysis.  
 To begin with but one example, in Democracy and Disagreement, Amy Gutmann 
and Dennis Thompson’s influential work on deliberative democracy, the authors provide 
preliminary but interesting and valuable insight into the institutional locations they think 
deliberative practices might and should be applied. Gutmann and Thompson rightly point 
out that, “in contrast to some other conceptions of democracy, deliberative democracy 
does not divide institutions into those in which deliberation is important and those in 
                                                 
171For a few recent counter-examples, see Forrester, John. The Deliberative Practitioner. 1999. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press; Fung, Archon. “Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago 
Schools and Policing.” Politics and Society. Vol. 29, No. 1, 2001; Fung, Archon. “Deliberative Democracy 
and International Labor Standards.” Governance. Vol. 16, No. 1, 2003; Hunold, Christian. Public 
Deliberation and Democracy: Low-Level Waster Disposal Facility Siting Policy in Germany, Canada and 
the United States. 1998. Ph.D. Dissertation.  Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh. 
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which it is not.”172 In other words, they see deliberative democracy as being applicable 
across all institutions (and one would also assume, both public and private institutions), 
even those typically considered exclusively the domain of political elites.  
Nevertheless, Gutmann and Thompson argue that some processes render 
decisions more clearly lacking in legitimacy or broad public support because of the 
particular issues under consideration, the institutional forms or political processes 
employed, and that these should be the focus of deliberative theorists. That is, Gutmann 
and Thompson suggest a “search for the most suitable institutional expression” for 
deliberative practices, and recognizing this they consider some specific criteria that 
should be considered in discerning an institutional focus for deliberative democracy. And 
although rejecting the notion that some institutions remain “arenas of power” as opposed 
to “forums for reason,” Gutmann and Thompson conclude that 
 
In a democracy in which citizens are governed on the basis of values adopted and 
refined through collective deliberations, all makers of public policy – legislators 
as well as judges – should give reasons based on principles that reflect these 
values. Legislatures as well as courts, then, should be designed to encourage these 
reason-giving practices.173
 
Of course, the institutional nexus omitted from this statement is at least somewhat curious 
– there is no mention of one of the more important and certainly one of the more 
                                                 
172Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement. P. 358.  
 
173Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement. P. 358. 
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troubling public policymaking institutions from a democratic perspective, the 
bureaucracy.174  
 The tendency that Gutmann and Thompson reveal in this passage is not isolated to 
their deliberative theory of democracy, nor do I intend to single-out in a damning fashion 
their otherwise useful theory through this critique. Rather, the tendency that these two 
exhibit is relatively pervasive; with all of the work focused on deliberative democracy 
over the last few years, comparatively few scholars have selected the bureaucratic system 
as an institutional focus. On the contrary, most look to deliberative theory as a means for 
reconsidering already somewhat deliberative processes, such as juries, legislatures, town-
hall meetings, and so forth. But the idea that deliberative democracy ought to be focused 
in the first instance – and for some, perhaps only – on these legislative institutions or a 
few applicable judicial processes leaves open important questions for and presents 
potential limitations to a deliberative theory of democracy. And perhaps, this tendency 
challenges prima facie any effort – including our own – to apply the principles of 
deliberative democracy to a bureaucratic context. 
The tendency of deliberative theorists to reflexively assume the applicability of 
this theory first and foremost to traditionally deliberative institutions emanates from 
several sources, I would suggest. In the first instance, the word “deliberation” is typically 
invoked to describe political situations already and unequivocally governed by discussion 
and debate – what one scholar has colorfully called “government by discussion,” i.e. 
parliamentary government – and thus it is natural to assume that deliberative democracy 
                                                 
174In fairness to Gutmann and Thompson, they state early along that many institutions (including some 
bureaucratic processes) should be transformed to fit deliberative theory’s principles. By the end of the 
work, however, they seem to argue that deliberative democracy should be focused on these traditional 
deliberative institutions, perhaps to the exclusion of other institutions.  
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must mean extending the scope of these particular (i.e. legislative) arenas to include a 
broader range of deliberators (or perhaps creating mechanisms for better integrating 
public deliberation, etc.).175 What is more, a standard normative model of democracy in 
the Western tradition – drawn from an idealized image of the Athenian polis – views 
democracy in its purest, most participatory and deliberative form as a process within 
which the citizens themselves make the laws through free-wheeling deliberation, driving 
the reflex to think of legislative processes and institutions as a natural focus for any 
process of deliberation. For many, a “deliberative politics” directs the mind to the Pnyx 
and the ekklesia, with the Athenian people legislating for themselves or sitting on a jury. 
Finally, and for our purposes most importantly, the tendency to bypass 
bureaucratic institutions as a potential institutional location for the application of a 
deliberative model democracy masks a deep and persistent intellectual distinction 
between popular and elite competencies plaguing Western thought, or so I would argue. 
That is, this focus on traditionally deliberative institutions implicitly suggests a political 
division of labor between those institutions more conducive to inclusive discussion – i.e. 
“political” processes – and those requiring exclusivity and elite authority – i.e. 
“administrative” processes. It reflects, in other words, the ubiquitous 
“politics/administration dichotomy”: means for considering public participation in 
legislative-political processes may be acceptable, but extending similar opportunities to 
the expert-administrative system is ill-advised. Indeed, any suggestion that the expert, 
technocratic processes of the bureaucracy be infused with the participation of the 
                                                 
175The notion of legislative-parliamentary institutions as centers of “government by discussion” is found in 
Carl Scmitt’s The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. 1994. Trans. Ellen Kennedy. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.   
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“ordinary masses” frightens many in its potential consequences, and this has perhaps 
steered deliberative theorists away from this set of political institutions. 
 Yet the reflex to think of deliberative democracy as a process geared towards the 
reform or expansion of only traditionally legislative or already-deliberative processes 
neglects, I think, the many venues where this practice might prove both applicable and 
useful. But to move past these assumptions we must also move past the narrow (and 
unfortunately, still common) image of deliberative democracy as citizens directly 
participating in the decision making process – perhaps standing in some huge town hall, 
200 million strong – with the people directly responsible, through a “one man, one vote” 
rule, for the issuance of binding laws, rules and policies. Once we have laid this 
misrepresentation to rest, we come to recognize the applicability of this model to a wider 
range of venues – including as a means for holding accountable the bureaucratic system 
to the democratic public. In the next section, we will get a better feel for the empirical 
plausibility of deliberation in practice by examining two competing models, and settling 
on one as the most attractive.  
 
III. Deliberative Democracy from Theory to Practice  
 
 In what follows, I will examine two models of deliberative democracy in practice, 
settling on and adopting one in particular, as this model maintains the norms of 
deliberative democracy but does so in an empirically and sociologically realistic fashion. 
This model will be defended, when all is said and done, because it addresses and 
confronts two of the most pertinent and difficult questions for a deliberative model of 
democracy: First, how can we realize both deliberative and democratic public 
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participation, given the size and scale of modern political systems? Second, how can we 
support the application of deliberative democracy to an institutional context such as the 
administrative system, given the technical complexity of the decisions rendered? Because 
the model we will adopt answers both of these questions adequately, it provides the best 
means for conceiving of deliberative democracy within the institutional context of 
greatest interest to this work – the bureaucratic system.  
  
III.1 Two Models of Deliberative Practice 
In his now well-known essay on deliberative democracy, “Deliberation and 
Democratic Legitimacy,” Joshua Cohen defines an ideal deliberative procedure as a 
model of legitimate and legitimating democratic practice.176 Similar in both substance 
and purpose to the principles of deliberative democracy outlined above, Cohen provides a 
set of primary principles that characterize “the conditions that should obtain if the social 
order is to be manifestly regulated by deliberative forms of collective choice.”177 Cohen’s 
purposes in outlining a deliberative-democratic procedure are several, but primary among 
these is the goal of creating a “distinctive structure for addressing institutional 
questions.”178 That is, Cohen’s discussion of deliberative democracy is focused in the 
first instance on providing an image of deliberative political practice that is “rooted in the 
intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and 
conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal 
                                                 
176Cohen, Joshua. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In Deliberative Democracy: Essays on 
Reason and Politics. Bohman, James and William Rehg (eds.). 1997. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press. [P. 67]. 
 
177Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” P. 73. 
 
178Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” P. 68. 
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citizens.”179 In this way, Cohen’s conception of deliberative democracy is largely focused 
on the conditions for realizing this normative theory, on conceiving a model of 
deliberative democracy useful for transforming actual political practice. 
In outlining his understanding of deliberative democracy, Cohen is admittedly 
guided by a Rawlsian notion of public reason and a similar emphasis on political 
institutions as the primary location for seeking social justice, and from this perspective he 
presents deliberative democracy as a set of principles most applicable to formal political 
decision-making processes.180 That is, Cohen characterizes deliberative democracy as a 
centered process of political decision-making, where the citizenry writ large is to come 
together to engage one another in a process of public justification. “Agreement among all 
who are committed to free deliberation among equals” is the fundamental purpose of this 
centered deliberative process, and the cooperative popular enactment of mutually binding 
decisions, public policies and laws the ultimate product.181  
Cohen admits to finding inspiration for his “ideal deliberative procedure” in 
earlier “republican conceptions of self-government.”182 That is, Cohen’s vision of 
deliberative democracy finds its roots in the classical republican tradition theorizing 
political participation in small, homogeneous communities where universal physical 
presence in political deliberation is the normative ideal, and popular authority to render 
binding decisions the decision-making rule. And it is this grounding in classical 
                                                 
179Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” P. 72. 
  
180Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. 1993. N.Y., N.Y.: Columbia University Press; see also, Rawl, John. A 
Theory of Justice. 1971. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press.  
 
181Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” P. 73.   
 
182Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” P. 67.  
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republicanism that has given rise both to critics of this perspective on deliberative 
practice, and to alternative models. 
One noteworthy proponent of a deliberative theory of democracy (or what he calls 
a “discourse theory of democracy and law”), Jürgen Habermas, has criticized Cohen’s 
and similar models that support a centered democratic practice, models that reduce all 
deliberation to formal, face-to-face decision-making processes aimed at rendering 
binding decisions.183 Habermas rejects such republican conceptions of deliberative 
democracy, doing so primarily because these models ignore the “inescapable conditions 
of modernity,” the sociological reality of complex, mass societies where technically 
complex issues are at stake. According to this critique, a centered model posits a myopic, 
univocal and ultimately utopian understanding of deliberative practice that either rejects 
the need to conceive a role for informal public deliberation in the public sphere, or 
implausibly inflates the logic of formal institutions to guide both formal and informal 
deliberations.184 In response, Habermas defends a two-leveled model of deliberative 
politics that “can find a place in the life of a complex society,”185 one that differentiates 
analytically but incorporates both formal decision-making processes and informal 
                                                 
183Habermas, Jurgen. Between Facts and Norms: A Contribution to the Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy. 1996. Trans. William Rehg. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. [P. 304-308.] 
 
184For a similar critique of Cohen’s understanding of deliberative democracy, see Habermas, Jurgen. “Three 
Normative Models of Democracy.” In The Inclusion of the Other. 1998. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
185Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. P. 315. Habermas’s attempt to build a normative democratic 
theory sensitive to the sociological reality of complex societies drives his defense of the two-leveled model. 
For Habermas, complexity is a multi-purpose concept, but applies most essentially to the “specialization of 
the technical steering knowledge used in policymaking and administration. Such specialization keeps 
citizens from taking advantage of politically necessary expertise in forming their own opinions.” [P. 317].  
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opinion formation in “weak publics.”186 And because of its emphasis on conceiving a 
sociologically realistic model of deliberative practice designed against the backdrop of 
modern mass societies, this two-leveled model deserves greater attention. 
The formal-institutional level of deliberative practice on the two-leveled model 
mirrors existing democratic institutions in logic and purpose. The purpose of these 
deliberative institutions is, in the words of Habermas, to “convene for a sitting in which 
an agenda is negotiated and resolutions are passed if necessary.”187 The ultimate goal of 
these institutions is straightforward: to render binding political decisions, “with a view to 
the cooperative solution of practical questions.”188 Where deliberative institutions differ 
significantly from existing democratic institutions is precisely in the nature of their 
guiding principles and procedures. It is through a critical examination of existing 
institutions and their non-deliberative practices, and not their fundamental purpose or the 
sources of their constitutional authority, that this two-leveled model demands the 
reconstruction of public institutions. 
The second level of deliberative democracy refers not to formal decision-making 
processes within institutions, but rather to informal venues of deliberation and opinion 
formation, and it is this level that is most important to understanding this model as 
commensurate with deliberative and democratic public participation. The locus of this 
level of deliberative practice is the public sphere, an arena centered in civil society and 
                                                 
186This idea of “weak publics” can be found in Fraser, Nancy. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A 
Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy.” In Habermas and the Public Sphere. 1992. 
Calhoun, Craig (Ed). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
187Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. P. 307. 
 
188Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. P. 307. 
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devoted to discourse concerning pressing matters requiring political solutions.189 As 
Habermas writes in defining the nature of discourse in the public sphere: 
  
This “weak” public is the vehicle of “public opinion.” The opinion-  
 formation uncoupled from decisions is effected in an open and inclusive  
 network of overlapping, sub-cultural publics having fluid temporal, social,  
 and substantive boundaries.190 [my italics]  
 
 
As informal realms of deliberative political practice, the importance of these weak 
publics, these unregulated and “anarchic” public spheres, lies in their ability to provide 
informal but freely-formed public opinion to constitutionally grounded institutions, and 
to serve as the locus for a type of democratic popular sovereignty commensurate with the 
sociological reality of complex, populous modern societies.191
 For Habermas, an idealized model of the public sphere begins in the historical 
emergence of the “bourgeois public sphere,” an entity developed outside the grasp of the 
absolutist state.192 Unfettered by political regulation or formal procedural constraints, and 
with no authoritative political power, these weak publics, Habermas claims, “specialize 
in discovering issues relevant for all of society, contributing possible solutions to 
problems, interpreting values, producing good reasons, and invalidating others.”193 
However, these public discourses do not bind the government to act in the same manner 
                                                 
189For a variety of comments and criticisms of the public sphere concept, see Calhoun, Craig (ed). 
Habermas and the Public Sphere. 1992. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
190Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. P. 307. 
 
191Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. P. 307-309. 
  
192See Habermas, Jurgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry in a Category of 
Bourgeois Society. 1989. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
193See Habermas, Jurgen. “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure.” In Between Facts and Norms. 1996. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [P. 485]. 
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as the formal decisions of a constitutionally empowered institution – a “strong public.” In 
fact, Habermas concedes, “not every legitimate object of public discussion will in fact be 
politically regulated.” Instead, discourse in the public sphere represents a type of popular 
sovereignty detached from the notion of the people as a homogeneous and physically 
present body.194
Adopting the language of the policy sciences, one way to better understand the 
importance of this informal level of deliberative practice within the public sphere is 
through its diverse roles as: an agenda-setter for political institutions, an arena for 
informal policy formulation, a vehicle of public opinion, a means for compelling public 
officials towards a particular decision or outcome, and an arena for the critical evaluation 
of policies enacted by formal institutions. 
The public sphere is essential in the first instance in its capacity – through public 
discourse and reason giving between citizens – to detect problems confronting particular 
individuals, social groups or society as a whole. On this not uncommon argument, 
individuals and social groups are claimed to be best situated to detect their own most 
pressing problems. Furthermore, these same “sensors” of problems are often ideally 
situated to propose solutions, given that public officials are often poorly positioned to 
understand either the gravity or the appropriate means for contending with these 
problems.  
                                                 
194Much of this relies on Habermas’s reconstruction of popular sovereignty under modern conditions. In 
this sense, Habermas writes that, “if one can still speak of “embodiment” at all, then sovereignty is found in 
those subjectless forms of communication that regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-
formation….Subjectless and anonymous, an  intersubjectively dissolved popular sovereignty withdraws into 
democratic procedures and the demanding communicative presuppositions of their implementation.” 
Habermas, “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure.” P. 486.  
  
 133
Additionally, the public sphere represents the primary vehicle through which the 
popular will impacts formal decision-making processes. It is from this perspective that 
the public sphere is defined as “the primary connector between people and power.”195 
However, the power of the public sphere to detect and address problems is only relevant 
to the extent that these opinions are transmitted – through the mass media, through 
established associations constructed to effect this transmission (i.e. interest groups), 
through street protests and letter-writing campaigns, etc. – to public officials. What is 
more, when the opinions emanating from the public sphere or diverse public spheres 
reach a critical mass and “trickle-up” into the realm of formal political decision-making, 
or result in what has been termed a “deliberative majority,” considerable social pressure 
is exerted on the democratic state to pursue actions commensurate with these opinions, or 
explain why it will not.196
Finally, these two levels of deliberative practice – the institutions of the 
democratic state and the public sphere – should not be understood as always-amenable 
partners in the construction of public policy, with society offering agenda items and 
possible solutions, and then passively submitting to the decisions of the state. On the 
contrary, should the state refuse to act guided by the opinions of these weak publics, the 
public sphere is redirected as a vehicle for a critical appeal of decisions in opposition to 
the state, an entity within which a groundswell of negative sentiment can emerge and 
challenge the reasons guiding or the legitimacy of a political decision. 
                                                 
195Young, Iris. Inclusion and Democracy. 2000. N.Y., N.Y.: Oxford University Press. [P. 173]. 
 
196Bohman, James. Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy. 1996. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. [P. 151-196].  
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In sum, Habermas’s two-leveled model of deliberative democracy makes a 
distinction between formal-institutional decision making and informal deliberation in the 
public sphere, and this distinction is driven by the inescapable conditions of modernity, 
the complexity and scale of modern politics and society. For Habermas, these facts 
permit only a more limited type of public deliberation in the public sphere as a 
“countersteering measure,” juxtaposed with the “steering” powers controlled by public 
officials.197 Suggestions for a thicker version of public deliberation, marked by broad 
citizen access to formal decision-making processes – and thus participation in actual 
“steering” – have for Habermas an “abstract and somewhat utopian tenor.”198 For 
Habermas, the public sphere as the locus of deliberation is intended to “influence the 
premises of judgment and decision making in the political system without intending to 
conquer the system itself,” and these limitations are set precisely because the technical 
complexity of decision-making processes and the scale of modern societies prevent a 
more direct exercise of popular sovereignty.199
Through this brief introduction to both the centered (Cohen) and the two-leveled 
(Habermas) models of deliberative political practice, the distinctness of these models 
becomes clear. Cohen’s centered model of deliberation remains firmly rooted in the 
classical republican tradition, reintroducing a normative image of politics first posited in 
reference to the small, homogeneous polis. It is precisely and explicitly this republican 
simplicity – rooted in the “Athenian dream” – that Habermas rejects in defending his 
                                                 
197Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. P. 327. Habermas also calls his version of popular sovereignty 
“popular sovereignty set communicatively aflow.” P. 371. 
 
198Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. P. 317. 
 
199Habermas, “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure.” P. 487. 
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two-leveled model. On this two-leveled model, formal institutions and public spheres 
enter into a symbiotic relationship of mutual need, with the public sphere sensing and 
addressing problems and evaluating policy choices, and formal institutions integrating 
this knowledge into their decision-making processes and codifying these decisions into 
policy and law.  
Unlike Cohen’s centered model, the two-leveled model of deliberative democracy 
provides in many ways both a normatively appealing and an empirically plausible model 
of deliberative political practice, explicitly situating the principles of deliberative theory 
within the “inescapable” conditions of modernity. That is, this model works to define the 
conditions and possibilities for a more expansive deliberative and democratic practice 
within complex mass societies (“problem one,” from above). It does so by taking 
seriously the capabilities of a critical public acting outside formal structures of power 
within civil society and the public sphere to critically redirect formal institutional 
deliberations and the democratic state, a source of real political power that has been 
examined extensively and positively by a variety of scholars.200 In this way, this model 
provides a “thin but permeable wall” between the public and those actors with 
authoritative power to render decisions, recognizing that some decisions – such as those 
within bureaucratic institutions – require a considerable level of expert authority 
(“problem two,” from above).201 For these reasons, this model of deliberative practice has 
                                                 
200For one example, see Cohen, Jean and Andrew Arato. Civil Society and Political Theory. 1994. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
  
201In fact, Habermas specifically considers the advantages of his model from the perspective of the 
administrative state, where decisions rendered must reflect certain technical competencies and scientific 
expertise. Habermas, “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure.” P. 487. 
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been appropriated by a variety of deliberative theorists, guides many in their thinking 
about deliberative democracy in practice, and will largely guide us from here forward.202
  Yet to be sure, Habermas’s two-leveled model, particularly given its reliance on 
the public sphere concept, has not been immune to criticism. Indeed, some have 
challenged the usefulness and even the mere potential of the public sphere to realize the 
principles of deliberative democracy in practice. Some have challenged the inherent 
fairness of the public sphere as it is currently structured, for instance, suggesting that this 
construct tends to provide unequal opportunities across various individuals and social 
groups. The mass media, a critical vehicle for carrying ideas from the public sphere into 
formal institutions, is often argued to function unevenly in relation to diverse social 
groups.203 Under these circumstances, can these marginalized social groups really achieve 
any of the principles critical to deliberative democracy? Can these marginalized groups 
have their reasons and positions heard by other citizens and public officials, and if not, 
have the principles of inclusion, accountability, equality, reciprocity, or publicity truly 
been realized? 
These criticisms notwithstanding, Habermas’s two-leveled model provides a 
model of deliberative democracy in practice that both strives toward the principles of 
deliberative democracy, but at the same time avoids the traps set by a normative 
democratic theory desensitized to the constraints of modernity. In this sense, Habermas’s 
model provides, perhaps, the greatest hope for realizing deliberative democracy within 
                                                 
202Several of the theorists already considered above adopt Habermas’s model to some extent. For examples, 
see Young, Inclusion and Democracy; Dryzek, John S. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, 
Critics, Contestations. 2000. Oxford, United Kingdom; Bohman, Public Deliberation.  
 
203Garnham, Nicholas. “The Media and the Public Sphere.” In Habermas and the Public Sphere. 1992. 
Calhoun, Craig (Ed). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; for a more concrete example, see Gillett, James. “The 
Challenges of Institutionalization for AIDS Media Activism.” Media, Culture & Society. Vol. 25, No. 5, 
2003.  
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modern mass societies marked by technically complex decision making processes. 
Nonetheless, it is incumbent on the proponent of this model to evidence how it can in fact 
effectively guarantee the principles of deliberative democracy while relying on the public 
sphere concept.  
In the next chapter, we will look to an emerging form of bureaucratic rulemaking 
which, I will argue, approximates the ideal of a deliberative model of bureaucratic 
accountability undertaken in the public sphere, a model that shows the plausibility and 
desirability of Habermas’s formulation. As we examine this form of rulemaking, both 
generally and through a particular case study, it will be one important task to evidence the 
ways this process both approximates the two-leveled model of deliberative democracy 
while at the same time proving sufficient for realizing the principles of deliberative 
democracy.  
 
Conclusion 
 Deliberative democratic theory provides one alternative normative model of 
democracy useful for addressing the problems faced by existing models of democracy, 
and particularly the problems these models face when striving to enact legitimate, 
publicly accepted outcomes, or so I have argued. Moreover, and contrary to the 
noticeable gap in the literature, deliberative democracy can and should be deemed 
applicable to a wide range of institutions and decision making contexts, including the 
bureaucratic system. When conceived properly, deliberative democracy is a model of 
politics commensurable with the conditions of modern mass societies marked by large 
populations and often technically complex decision making processes. Finally, this model 
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would appear almost ideally suited for conceiving an alternative model of democratic 
control and accountability of the bureaucracy, given the deficiencies of existing forms 
discussed earlier.  
 However, this two-leveled model of deliberative practice has been criticized from 
several angles, including its ability to create the conditions for an equal and fair 
deliberation within the public sphere. Therefore, in the next chapter we will seek a model 
of deliberation in practice, one applied specifically to the bureaucratic context and 
processes of bureaucratic rulemaking which both solves the problems of existing modes 
of democratic accountability and control, and does so in a manner that approximates the 
principles of deliberative theory examined above.  
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Chapter Six: Discovering a Deliberative-Democratic Model of Bureaucratic 
Accountability Empirically: The Emergence of E-Rulemaking in Federal Agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter works to tie together much of what has been argued in the preceding 
chapters. In the first instance, this chapter, through a case study of the rulemaking 
processes surrounding the Department of Agriculture’s National Organic Program, 
provides one useful example of a bureaucratic rulemaking resulting in a set of proposed 
rules largely contrary to Congressional intent. In fact, through a rulemaking process 
marked by little oversight from elected representatives and considerable public 
participation (but participation dominated by powerful and influential interest groups), 
the rules as first proposed were in many ways opposed to the intent of the legislatively-
enacted statute delegating rulemaking authority. Following from our earlier analyses, 
therefore, these rules were conceived through a set of processes contrary to our 
established and received model of democracy, as democratic modes of accountability and 
control proved ineffective in safeguarding and reaffirming this model.  
However, because this particular rulemaking proceeded through a unique 
emerging process, one more amenable to deliberative and democratic public participation 
and accountability, the rules as first proposed were rescinded, and a new set of rules, 
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better keeping with the intent of Congress, were eventually passed. For this reason, the 
“unique process” utilized to integrate public participation into this rulemaking process – 
an emerging form that has been labeled electronic or “e-rulemaking” – will be examined 
for its potential as a model of deliberative-democratic bureaucratic accountability. 
Towards critically investigating this idea, both the potential of e-rulemaking to realize the 
principles of deliberative democracy, and some possible sources of weakness, will be 
examined. But in the end, e-rulemaking will be looked at favorably because of its 
potential for realizing a deliberative-democratic model of bureaucratic accountability, a 
model that better controls and holds accountable bureaucratic rulemaking, and thus better 
supports our model of democracy.  
In the end, the purpose of this chapter is straightforward. This chapter seeks to 
evidence the desirability and empirical plausibility of deliberative democracy in relation 
to processes of bureaucratic rulemaking. It does not, however, hope to discover a “silver 
bullet,” a form of rulemaking which might “once and for all” resolve the tension between 
processes of rulemaking and democracy by discovering a universally applicable and 
infallible alternative model of control and accountability. Nevertheless, through the case 
study pursued below, we can begin to envision a model of deliberative-democratic 
bureaucratic accountability as a desirable and viable alternative to existing forms of 
control, one that better holds bureaucrats accountable, and thus better reinforces our 
democratic institutions and traditions.  
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I. E-Rulemaking 
I.1. The Emergence of E-Rulemaking in Federal Agencies 
 Americans use the Internet now more than ever to seek information, purchase 
goods and services, pursue favorite recreation activities, and stay in contact with friends 
and relatives.204 It is therefore understandable that this medium would also effectively 
transform the means through which citizens interact with public officials and their 
government at all levels. According to a report by the Pew Foundation’s “Internet & 
American Life Project,” by 2002 68 million Americans had accessed government 
websites.205 42 million of these citizens used the Internet to research public policy issues, 
and another 23 million used the Internet to send comments to public officials.206 Indeed, 
electronic access to and interface with government institutions and public officials is now 
extensive.  
For example, the government agency most recognizable to the average American, 
and the one agency nearly every American has at least some contact with on an annual 
basis – the Internal Revenue Service – has transitioned a large portion of its citizen-
clients onto the Internet. Millions of Americans now file their taxes electronically, 
through a process called “e-filing,” and the convenience and simplicity of this process is 
causing this number to increase dramatically each year; in 2005, it is expected that more 
                                                 
204Indeed, the reach and potential applications of the Internet as a communications medium would seem to 
know no bounds. Importantly and sadly, even international terrorism has adopted IT in spreading their 
message to a broader audience; the year 2004 was witness to several acts of “e-terrorism,” with beheadings 
captured on digital video, uploaded to the Internet and displayed for the world to see. Yet technology has 
always been both a blessing and a source of horror. For a classic discussion of this, see Adorno, Theodor 
and Max Horkheimer. The Dialectic of Enlightenment. 1944. N.Y., N.Y.: Continuum Press.  
  
205Larsen, Elena and Lee Rainie. “The Rise of the E-Citizen: How People Use Government Agencies’ 
Websites.” 2002. Located on-line at: http://www.pewinternet.org. [P. 2].  
 
206Larsen and Rainie, “The Rise of the E-Citizen: How People Use Government Agencies’ Websites.” P. 2.  
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than half of all taxpayers will file their taxes electronically.207 Moreover, the age-old 
practice of “writing one’s Congressman” has been effectively replaced by the much faster 
and simplified process of “e-mailing one’s Congressman.”208 Most Congress men and 
women receive tens of thousands of e-mails annually from constituents and generally 
concerned citizens alike. Indeed, this large and growing population using the Internet to 
interact with government at a variety of levels – local, state and federal – has led some to 
herald (probably prematurely) the rise of a new kind of citizenship, “e-citizenship.”209
 Recognizing the growing importance of the Internet as a link between the public 
and government, in 2002 Congress passed and the president signed into law the E-
Government Act.210 Founded on the idea that “the use of computers and the Internet is 
rapidly transforming societal interactions and the relationships among citizens, private 
businesses, and Government,” the E-Government Act put into motion a unified Federal 
initiative to enhance (and in some instances, create) an electronic infrastructure capable 
of integrating information technology into virtually all of the activities of the federal 
government.211 In short, through the E-Government Act the Federal government has 
recognized and embraced the Internet as a primary medium for contact between citizens 
and public officials, a medium likely to grow more significant in the future.  
                                                 
207“IRS Expands Free Electronic Filing Program.” Associated Press. Located at: www.cnn.com.  
 
208For one example, see Adler, E. Scott et. al. “The Home Style Homepage: Legislator Use of the World 
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209Larsen and Rainie, “The Rise of the E-Citizen: How People Use Government Agencies’ Websites.” 
 
210E-Government Act. 44 U.S.C. Ch 36.   
 
211E-Government Act. 44 U.S.C. Ch 36.    
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Furthermore, although the Act is multifarious in outlook and intention, one of the 
essential purposes of this initiative is to “promote use of the internet and other 
information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen participation in 
government.”212 [my italics] Toward this end, one critical element of the Act mandates 
the creation of “a publicly accessible Federal Government website [that] contains 
electronic dockets for rulemakings” as part of an effort to move bureaucratic rulemaking 
onto the Internet.213 [my italics] With the E-Government Act, Congress has recognized, 
authorized and set in motion a now rapidly growing trend towards e-rulemaking in 
federal bureaucratic agencies. 
 As defined by both the Act and existing practices, the process of e-rulemaking is 
largely similar to the processes of standard informal, notice-and-comment rulemaking. It 
follows the five basic steps of informal rulemaking discussed earlier: notice of a proposed 
rulemaking, a comment period, agency response, preamble to the final rule, and 
publication of the rule in the CFR. What differs significantly, however, is the vehicle 
through which this informal rulemaking process occurs, and how this vehicle is 
permitting and inspiring a growing number of Americans to learn about, discuss and 
comment on proposed rules and regulations.  
 In essence, as defined in the Act e-rulemaking requires Federal agencies to 
transition rulemaking processes onto the Internet as rapidly and extensively as possible. It 
calls for the creation of a central “warehouse” of all proposed rules and regulations under 
consideration for adoption by agencies. This portion of the E-Government Act has already 
been realized with the creation of Regulations.gov. Regulations.gov, a central Federal 
                                                 
212E-Government Act. P. 3.  
 
213E-Government Act. P. 18.  
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government website (created and maintained by a consortium of technologically savvy 
Federal agencies), gives interested citizens the ability to easily search for all rules under 
consideration, find a rule of interest, review various materials in relation to the rule 
(including the comments of others) and comment on this rule through electronic mail. A 
wealth of additional information regarding rules and regulations is also available at 
Regulations.gov, including a daily update of the Federal Register, the complete Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR), access to the dockets for rules, access to relevant information 
regarding rules and rulemakings, and so forth.  
The importance of the E-Government Act and the creation of Regulations.gov in 
bringing the rulemaking process closer to the American citizen cannot be overstated. 
While once citizens outside the “inner circle” of Washington politics desperately relied 
on the media, interest groups and other organizations to keep them abreast of proposed 
rules and rulemakings, now any citizen with a computer and a modem can insert 
themselves into the regulatory process. The times of public hearings, the names of 
members of advisory committees, the content of proposed rules, even the comments of 
other participants are available on-line, and while once information was stored securely 
away from the prying eyes of ordinary citizens in docket rooms in D.C., now locating and 
accessing these dockets requires only a computer and the ability to use an electronic 
search engine. 
 While e-rulemaking finds its statutory basis in the E-Government Act and takes a 
huge step forward with the creation of Regulations.gov, this law is not solely responsible 
for the creation of this process. Certain government agencies, such as the Department of 
Transportation, the Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency and 
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the Department of Interior had already integrated information technologies into their 
rulemaking processes in the fashion mandated by the Act prior to its passage, and in fact 
must be seen as partially responsible for the creation of the Act itself.214 While several 
examples of early instantiations of e-rulemaking exist, one case perhaps best illustrates 
the potential of e-rulemaking, and particularly its potential as an innovation in 
deliberative democracy as a model of bureaucratic accountability.  
 
I.2. Case Study: E-Rulemaking in the USDA for the Organic Food Production Act 
 Created in 1862 by President Abraham Lincoln, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) is primarily responsible for monitoring and regulating farming and 
ranching activities in the United States, primarily responsible, that is, for America’s food 
supply. The USDA has been tasked by Congress with a variety of objectives, including 
setting standards for agricultural consumer goods, protecting national forests, monitoring 
food nutrition and safety, combating hunger through programs like Women, Infants, and 
Children (WIC), protecting natural resources and agricultural lands, and regulating the 
marketing of agricultural products to U.S. consumers.215  
As an element of its larger mission to monitor and regulate America’s food 
supply, and faced with a rapidly growing organic foods industry, in 1990 Congress 
enacted the Organic Food Production Act (OFPA) and delegated to the USDA the 
authority to “establish national standards governing the marketing of certain agricultural 
                                                 
214These agencies, and a few others, are credited as “partner agencies” in the federal project creating and 
maintaining Regulations.gov.  
 
215For a comprehensive list of USDA activities, see the agency’s website at: http://www.usda.gov/. 
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products as organically produced products.”216 And to be sure, the rulemaking process 
undertaken to set these regulations would, it is fair to say, prove at first highly 
controversial, but also revolutionary in setting the federal government on a path towards 
e-rulemaking. 
 Pursuant to the terms of the delegation and the demands of Congress through the 
OFPA, in 1992 the USDA selected an advisory committee of 15 individuals – the 
National Organic Standards Board (NOSB) – made up of organic farmers, handlers, 
processors, certifiers, scientists and other experts in the field. This advisory committee 
was authorized to come together and propose a set of national standards for the 
classification of organic foods, based on their experience and expert understanding of the 
definition of this term. Having completed its lengthy task, creating a list of products and 
processes acceptable under organic agriculture as understood by organic farmers and as 
previously delineated in various state regulations, the NOSB sent its recommendations to 
the USDA. On December 16, 1997 the agency handling the marketing requirements 
under the OFPA (the Agricultural Marketing Service) issued a proposed set of regulations 
setting the standards required of farmers and ranchers prior to labeling their products as 
“organic.” 
 Almost immediately upon publication of the draft rule, the proposed National 
Organic Program (NOP) and the regulations created therein caused a stir within the 
organic agriculture community.217 Much to the surprise of these individuals, and more 
surprising still to the members of the NOSB, the NOP program and the regulations 
                                                 
216Organic Food Production Act. 7 U.S.C. 6501 et. seq. 
 
217Skrzycki, Cindy. “Organic Proposal Leave a Bad Taste in Some Mouths.”  The Washington Post. 
December 26, 1997.  
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proposed by the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service classified as organic a range of 
farm products and processes explicitly excluded by the proposals submitted through the 
NOSB. Indeed, included in the proposed rule were a distasteful set of processes (pun 
intended) and ingredients deemed acceptable prior to labeling a product organic, 
including the use of municipal sewer system sludge, irradiated feed for livestock and 
genetically engineered products.218  
 Initially, organic farmers were saddened by this result but unconcerned by the 
proposed rules, believing that they would simply have to market their products (as they 
had done in the past) as “true organics,” and rely on an educated consumer to recognize 
real from false organics. Indeed, the industry had grown-up with little unified regulation, 
and a savvy group of consumers of organic products had learned to differentiate real from 
nominal organics. Yet much to their chagrin, organic farmers soon realized that under 
these rules not only were the use of sludge, irradiation and genetic engineering allowed, 
but true organic farmers were forbidden from differentiating their organics from those 
that were produced using the methods defined in the NOP regulations when marketing 
their products.  
What happened after the NOSB issued its recommendations was unknown, as the 
actual drafting of the rule following the NOSB’s issuance of its recommendations was 
done “behind closed-doors,” but it was obvious that the proposed rules differed 
considerably from the NOSB’s proposals.219 Indeed, the NOSB’s proposals had expressly 
and explicitly excluded sewer system sludge, irradiation and genetic engineering as 
                                                 
218Skrzycki, “Organic Proposal Leave a Bad Taste in Some Mouths.” 
 
219At the very least, it was widely perceived that the rules had been written behind closed-doors. Julian, 
“An Organic Roar over USDA Labeling.” 
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outside the bounds of truly organic farming. How these methods had been included as 
acceptable within the proposed rules classifying organics was, therefore, unknown, but 
some interested observers had their suspicions.  
 The organic farming community, comprised largely of 1960’s-generation hippies 
who had abandoned mainstream society and moved to communes where naturally grown 
foods were prized, had its suspicions about the machinations behind closed-doors at 
USDA. Knowing that “agribusiness” is one of the leading lobbying groups in 
Washington D.C., and a massive and lucrative industry unto itself, organic farmers like 
Stephen Gilman suspected that the USDA “caved in to pressure from large-scale 
agribusiness seeking to capture the good will associated with a generation of hard-
working organic farmers.”220 Agribusiness, which regularly used waste products like 
municipal sludge as fertilizer and irradiated foods as feed for livestock had a vested 
interest in being able to declare its products organic, even though these production 
methods flew in the face of widely-understood organic techniques. While never regulated 
nationally, informal organic standards had grown up with the industry, were supported by 
state regulations and were widely accepted among organic farmers, a tight-knit group. 
 What is more, it is clear that the rules as proposed by the USDA flew in the face 
of the intent of Congress in writing the OFPA. Indeed, the leader in getting the legislation 
passed through Congress, the author and key sponsor of the legislation, Senator Patrick 
Leahy of Vermont, was distressed enough by the rules as proposed that he was forced to 
again become involved in the process and publicly address these rules. He criticized the 
rules as proposed, declaring them to be contrary to the purpose and substance of the 
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OFPA, and ultimately harmful to consumers and the organics industry, a considerable 
portion of which is located in Leahy’s state of Vermont.221
 The broader public outcry over the proposed NOP regulations was immediate and 
massive, and did not emanate simply from within the group of organic farmers or through 
their interest groups, groups such as Organic Watch. The USDA, part of a new generation 
of government agencies conducting a significant portion of their business over the 
Internet, had posted the proposed rule on their website on the Internet and had allowed 
for public comment on the proposed rule through electronic mail, along with the more 
traditional modes of public comment. In fact, this USDA rulemaking marked the first 
“fully electronic” rulemaking process.222 As a result, by the end of April of 1998, the end 
of an extended public comment period allowed by the USDA concerning the NOP 
regulations, more than 275,000 comments had been sent by a wide swath of the public 
concerned with these proposed rules, with a vast majority of these comments opposing 
the loopholes inserted to favor agribusiness. The unusual and “unprecedented” 
outpouring of public comment on this rule was credited to its wider-than-usual audience 
through the Internet, and the subsequent increased public and media attention.223
 Furthermore, and uniquely, during the comment period for the revised rule the 
USDA had set up its website not only to post the proposed rule and to allow for comment 
through e-mail, but the agency also allowed individuals to access the comments of others 
                                                 
221Leahy, Patrick. “Letter to the Honorable Dan Glickman.” April 30, 2004. Interestingly, Leahy got 
involved again in this process not through direct oversight in Congress, but rather by petitioning Glickman 
through correspondence, and ultimately including a comment in the rule’s docket and openly encouraging 
others to comment on and criticize the rules as proposed.  
 
222For its innovations with e-rulemaking, the USDA won the 1998 Governmental Technology Leadership 
Award.  
 
223Julian, “An Organic Roar over USDA Labeling.” 
 
 150
and a wealth of additional information on-line, an early instantiation of an e-docket.224 
Soon, participants were not simply emailing comments to the USDA, but were also 
responding to “other people’s comments and interpretations.”225 The process became 
self-sustaining, reinforcing and conducive to multiple comments, rather than one-time 
contributions, and this format was central to the large number of public comments.226 
Concerning this massive response, one observer writes, “no strangers to protest rallies, 
these 60s-generation farm workers and their allies took to their computers and bombarded 
the USDA.”227 Networks emerged over the Internet and communicated information to the 
larger public, and soon ordinary consumers were as engaged in defeating the new rules as 
were the organic farmers themselves. Furthermore, because of the increased attention 
facilitated by the Internet, the broader national media got wind of the massive public 
outcry and reported a story that might otherwise have gone largely unnoticed.228
 Driven by the quantity and intensity of the public outcry, and directed by 
Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman – who had been drawn into the quagmire through 
the overwhelming and unprecedented public response – the USDA conceded to public 
                                                 
224Shulman, Stuart et. al. “Democracy and the Environment on the Internet: Electronic Citizen Participation 
in Regulatory Rulemaking.” Unpublished Manuscript. Located online at: 
http://www.drake.edu/artsci/faculty/sshulman/Papers/DEI.pdf.  
 
225Shulman et. al. “Democracy and the Environment on the Internet: Electronic Citizen Participation in 
Regulatory Rulemaking.” P. 11. 
 
226The USDA declared that they had received 275,603 public comments, including about 100,000 pieces of 
“regular” mail. The remaining 175,000 comments, therefore, were comprised almost exclusively of 
electronic mail messages. 
 
227Julian, “An Organic Roar over USDA Labeling.” 
 
228As evidence of this, consider that these rules regulated an extremely small segment of the larger food-
producing industry, accounting for only about $3.5 billion of a nearly $500 billion industry. By some 
accounts, there are only a few thousand organic farmers in the U.S. Yet very shortly after release of the 
proposed rules, dozens of articles had already appeared in the mainstream media. A Lexis-Nexis search 
reveals more than 40 articles on the subject between December 1997 and 2000 in major newspapers, as 
well as several stories on “National Public Radio” and one on the “Cable News Network.”  
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pressure and decided to begin the process of classifying and regulating organic food and 
its marketing again, decided to begin the rulemaking process anew. The proposed rule of 
December 1997 was abandoned. 
The rule-writers in the USDA went back to the drawing board, and in March of 
2000 issued a revised proposed rule defining standards required before classifying, 
labeling and marketing foods as organic. Notably, in the revised proposed rule municipal 
sludge, irradiated food and genetically engineered products were no longer deemed 
acceptable as organic methods. Indeed, under the revised rule many existing informal and 
state-level standards of organic production defended by organic farmers were adopted, 
and the new rules tended toward “the stringent end of existing standards around the 
country.”229 The revised rule was again opened for a period of public comment – an 
extended one of 90 days again – and the USDA received another large influx of roughly 
40,000 comments, most favoring the revised proposed rules. Buttressed by broad public 
support, the USDA adopted the NOP and regulatory standards of organic production 
similar to – and in some cases, more stringent than – those proposed by the NOSB. And 
in 2002, the first foods marketed as organic under these new rules hit the shelves. 
 Undoubtedly, the quantity and intensity of the comments received by the USDA 
on the NOP rules, much of which is attributable to this process being more open and 
accessible through the medium of the Internet, forced the USDA to change its position. In 
announcing the release of the final proposed rule, the one which would eventually be 
adopted, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman stated that the process surrounding the 
final rule was a “living example of our democracy at work. The people spoke – very 
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loudly I might add.”230 Somewhat less truthfully, upon adopting the final rule in 
December of 2000, Glickman stated that “there is a misperception, I think, about how 
government rules are drawn up. Some people believe it’s done behind closed doors, 
without accountability or public input. The reality is that it is a transparent, fully inclusive 
process…They [the adopted rules] are the product of a full-throated debate.”231 The 
reality, of course, is that the rules were drawn up behind closed doors initially, and only 
because public access to the information surrounding the rulemaking process was made 
easier via the Internet was the USDA forced to concede to an unprecedented public 
response. Held accountable to the public in this way, the USDA was forced to pursue the 
intent of Congress in enacting standards of organic production.  
 
I.3. Summary Analysis of the USDA NOP Rulemaking 
 
 Before proceeding to discuss e-rulemaking in the case of the USDA NOP as a 
useful model of deliberative-democratic bureaucratic accountability, and the more 
general future potential of e-rulemaking to this end, let us first consider this case study in 
relation to the critical claims made about bureaucratic discretion and processes of 
bureaucratic rulemaking previously. For in reality, the USDA NOP example is a “tale of 
two rulemakings,” and one of these tales reinforces some of the critical assessments of 
rulemaking made earlier.  
 When first authoring and proposing rules and regulations intended to implement 
the OFPA, how did the USDA manage to so clearly disregard the intent of Congress? The 
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two interconnected answers to this question seem clear. In the first instance, and as we 
discussed in Chapter Four, there was obviously only limited legislative oversight of the 
rulemaking process as it moved forward. Once the OFPA was passed and the NOSB was 
assigned the task of making recommendations to the USDA, the agency was largely 
allowed to write a rule based on its own internal procedures, a rule that would ultimately 
disregard both the intent of Congress and the recommendations of the Congressionally-
mandated advisory committee, the NOSB. While it is difficult know for sure, it would 
seem undeniable that Senator Leahy, the “father” and strongest defender of the OFPA in 
Congress, became considerably removed from the implementation process, but was 
forced, only after the fact, to become deeply involved once again – only this time his 
purpose was fighting against the rules as proposed. In short, the proposed and flawed set 
of rules emerged at least in part, it seems clear, through a lack policing of the rule-writing 
process as it occurred. 
What is more, the USDA included the participation of a range of interested groups 
in the rule-writing process – largely through informal channels, as this was an informal 
rulemaking – and these interest groups wielded considerable control over the process. Yet 
at this initial stage, this participation was not instrumental in helping to steer the USDA 
towards the realization of the intent of Congress through rulemaking. On the contrary, it 
seems that these groups had precisely the opposite purpose in sight. There was, in fact, 
one group that most benefited from the inclusion of sludge, irradiated feed and 
genetically engineered products in the NOP as valid organic agricultural techniques: the 
agribusiness industry.232 With these methods included as organic, the agribusiness 
                                                 
232Interestingly, there was another working diligently to convince the USDA to include these methods as 
valid organic methods, the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA is committed to these techniques – 
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industry would have been able to legitimately classify a huge portion of its products as 
“organic,” and in this way gain market share from a small but growing competitive 
industry. And even though these methods had been specifically excluded by the NOSB, 
and were rejected in existing state standards and in the understanding of nearly all 
organic farmers, they made their way into the proposed NOP regulations. In other words, 
“public” participation actually worked against creating rules and regulations 
commensurate with the intent of Congress.  
 It would seem undeniable, in sum, that during the initial stages of this rulemaking 
process, existing democratic forms of accountability and control failed to adequately 
protect the OFPA from the abuse of discretionary authority delegated to the USDA. 
Bureaucratic rulemaking, in at least this one case, did pose a threat to democracy as 
defined earlier. Understood as either a direct or indirect (through elected representatives) 
connection and identity between the people and the rules which govern them, it would be 
difficult to claim that the creation of the initially proposed set of NOP regulations was 
done democratically, given that existing forms of democratic accountability, oversight 
and control did little to defend or reassert this connection. 
Yet in the end, the USDA was responsible for passing a set of regulations that 
would win wide approval, among a large swath of the interested general public, those 
most-affected individuals within the organic farming community, and the members of 
Congress largely responsible for authoring and championing the OFPA. How did the 
course get righted, and how did a new set of much more agreeable regulations get written 
and passed? In large part, I would argue, this occurred because of the e-rulemaking 
                                                                                                                                                 
and particularly the use of human waste sludge as fertilizer – and thus lobbied the USDA vigorously to 
have this process classified as “organic.” In short, an outside bureaucratic agency can be seen to have 
worked to convince the USDA to contravene the intent of Congress.  
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process, and the ways this process approximates a deliberative-democratic model of 
bureaucratic accountability. In the next section, we will more closely examine the 
intersection of the two.  
 
II. Analyzing the Deliberative-Democratic Potential of E-Rulemaking 
 
II.1. E-Rulemaking as an Innovation in Deliberative Democracy  
 
 As we mentioned in the last chapter, any proposed application of a model of 
deliberative democracy to actual political practice, or any analysis of an existing political 
practice thought to approximate or prove useful for realizing a deliberative one, must 
evidence how well the principles of deliberative theory have been or might be achieved 
therein. That is, as these principles are instrumental to the perceived benefits of a 
deliberative democracy, so too must we analyze the realization of these principles within 
particular political processes. And through such an exercise in this context, we might 
better understand both the potential and the limitations intrinsic to a reliance on e-
rulemaking as a model of deliberative-democratic bureaucratic accountability.  
 In the first instance, it should be noted that e-rulemaking, a form of informal, 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, reflects a type of political process informed more by the 
two-leveled, Habermasian model of deliberative practice than by a centered model rooted 
in the classical republican tradition (see Chapter Five). That is, this process integrates 
public participation in a fashion cognizant of the limitations modern social scale and 
technical complexity present for any political process, and particularly one hoping to 
realize both deliberation and democracy. Through this process, a thin but permeable wall 
is erected between bureaucratic decision-makers and the public, with authoritative power 
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to render decisions maintained with expert bureaucrats, but with opportunities for the 
deliberating public to render judgment on and influence the conditions of those decisions. 
In this process, in other words, public participation is designed to, as Habermas 
suggested, “influence the premises of judgment and decision making in the political 
system without intending to conquer the system itself.” At the start, then, this model 
avoids the first-order objections from empirical plausibility that have been brought – 
often reasonably and fairly – against deliberative democratic theory.  
Be this as it may, and as was also discussed in the last chapter, any deliberative 
practice guided by or following this two-leveled model must respond to the criticisms of 
skeptics, those who claim such a model is ill-suited for realizing the principles critical to 
a deliberative model of democracy because of a reliance on the public sphere. And from 
this perspective as well, I would argue, e-rulemaking approximates and proves capable of 
incorporating the principles of deliberative democracy in important ways, although 
certainly not perfectly. A critical examination of these principles and their attainment 
through e-rulemaking, thinking both generally and drawing specifically from the USDA 
NOP case examined above, makes this clear. In short, due in large part to the 
technologically innovative medium utilized in the e-rulemaking process – the Internet – e-
rulemaking provides opportunities for a type of political process different (because both 
more deliberative and more democratic) than most others.  
Adopting the approach suggested in the last chapter, then, in what follows we will 
look at the two cluster concepts “deliberation” and “democracy,” as well as the principles 
which underlie these two categories, for their existence or attainability through processes 
of e-rulemaking. Beginning with the reasons e-rulemaking might be seen to offer 
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optimism for realizing these principles, we continue by examining some reasons for 
skepticism, possible weaknesses that might require address as e-rulemaking develops and 
grows in the future.  
Deliberation. You will recall from the last chapter, the notion of deliberation, or 
the deliberativeness of particular political processes, can be defined by the existence of 
three core underlying concepts, concepts defined in some detail earlier: reciprocity, 
reason and publicity. With this in mind, how well can or does e-rulemaking incorporate 
and realize these principles, and thus realize the goal of deliberativeness central to a 
deliberative model of democracy? 
In the first instance, a principle of reciprocity would seem to be at least 
adequately approximated in a process of e-rulemaking. Reciprocity, you will recall, 
demands that individuals receive ethical justification from other actors (citizens and 
public officials) for mutually binding decisions and outcomes as central to an assumption 
of universal moral agency. With this in mind, in the USDA NOP example the ability of 
all interested and participating actors to access and read the positions and reasons of 
bureaucrats, other citizens and even the interest groups attempting to influence the rule 
through the publicly-accessible e-docket facilitated a type of inter-subjective ethical 
justification, it could be argued. Further, the tendency of participants to actually access 
and read the reasons and positions of others, and to respond directly to the ideas offered 
by others (a tendency undoubtedly inspired by the ease and accessibility of the Internet as 
a medium of interaction), would seem to enhance the reciprocal nature of this process. 
While in this case it seems undeniable that, at least initially, the justifications given failed 
to gain acceptance or achieve recognition from a large portion of the population, this was 
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the case only because a process of ethical justification between subjects was to some 
extent realized. In short, in this process both comment contributors and the bureaucratic 
decision-makers were forced to justify their positions.  
Moreover, it could also be argued that the e-rulemaking process utilizes a mode of 
interaction rooted in reason-giving. In the first instance, the Internet as a vehicle through 
which individuals can offer their own reasons, positions and ideas through electronic 
comments, as well as read and analyze the comments of others (all made simpler and 
more accessible through the use of an e-docket), would seem to provide a solid 
mechanism for reason-giving. Conversely, it would be difficult to imagine, at least 
through this open and publicly accessible electronic comment process, that efforts at 
coercion or force, for instance, would prove successful in winning the favor of the public 
or bureaucratic agents. What is more, the vehicle of the Internet would seem an ideal one 
for overcoming some of the more common sources of power, traditional domination or 
economic advantage often infiltrating political processes, characteristics which often 
undermine reason as a dominant mode of interaction. In short, it has been noted that 
many face-to-face political processes tend to advantage already-dominant economic and 
social groups, because of characteristics such as race, manner of speaking, gender 
attributes and other characteristics present and apparent to all participants.233 Yet over the 
Internet, where all participants maintain a kind of anonymity and the written word 
provides the only real mechanism for convincing and persuading others, reason would 
seem to function as the dominant mechanism for influencing outcomes.  
Finally, e-rulemaking would appear to allow for a relatively robust kind of 
publicity, one where both the reasons of nearly all interested participants and the reasons 
                                                 
233For this argument, see Sanders, Lynn. “Against Deliberation.” Political Theory. Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997. 
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of the state (in this instance, the USDA), as well as a wealth of important and related 
background information, are available and easily accessible thanks in large part to the 
medium of the Internet. E-rulemaking, as discussed above, provides interested 
individuals the ability to access the information needed to effectively participate in the 
rulemaking process, such as the proposed rule itself, the authorizing legal statute, relevant 
procedural information, and so forth. This is the critical “stuff” of deliberation, the 
information individuals need to acquire before offering their own ideas and rendering 
their own critical verdict. Moreover, through the advent of e-dockets, interested 
individuals were also able to access the positions and reasons of various public officials, 
as well as the reasons of other citizen-participants and organized actors. In short, the 
technological innovations of the Internet allow for greater publicity, not necessarily in the 
sense that all actors tend to more openly or truthfully reveal information, but in the sense 
that available information is at least more easily or “publicly” accessible.  
 
 Democracy. You will recall from above, the concept of democracy, or the 
democraticness of particular political processes, is defined for deliberative democrats by 
the existence of three core underlying concepts: accountability, equality and inclusion. 
And here too it must be asked: How well can or does e-rulemaking incorporate and 
realize these principles, and thus realize the goal of democracy central to deliberative 
democracy? 
 The first principle to address is accountability, the demand that all participants 
must be responsible and answerable for their decisions and actions, and that all those 
potentially affected by an outcome must be included in a deliberation. In the case of the 
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USDA NOP, the ease and accessibility of e-rulemaking through the medium of the 
Internet would seem to have facilitated accountability. Indeed, as was mentioned above, 
because of the greater accessibility of this process many contributors tended to go beyond 
one-time participation as a single comment, and instead there were many instances of 
individuals not only offering their comments, but also offering multiple comments 
addressing and responding to the comments of others. There was, that is, “answerability” 
to other participants in this process, and instead of a unidirectional monologue, this 
process tended more towards a (large) dialogue. In particular, the group of those most 
affected would seem to have been both included and responsible to one another in this 
process, as both the broader food producing industry and the smaller group of organic 
farmers (and consumers of these products) comprised a large portion of the participant 
base.  
 What is more, the egalitarian nature of the e-rulemaking process, measured by the 
ability of differently situated actors to both access a process and have a fair opportunity 
to influence the outcome, would seem promising. Indeed, the medium of the Internet 
would appear (and has often been claimed) to have something of a “leveling” effect by 
allowing less well-off actors the opportunity to “enter” political processes that were once, 
because of their distant location or apparent exclusivity, for all intents and purposes off-
limits. Regarding e-rulemaking specifically, any citizen can with relative ease access the 
process, author a comment and contribute it to the proceedings, so long as they have 
available a computer and a modem, and possess basic computing competencies. No pre-
existing relationship with an interest group is needed, for instance, to know when a 
rulemaking will occur, to learn the important dates surrounding the process, and so forth, 
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and thus some of the advantages possessed by well-placed individuals evaporate. In short, 
at least in regards to the public comment process, e-rulemaking would appear to hold-out 
potential as providing an egalitarian format.234
 Lastly, it is difficult to know how inclusive e-rulemaking is generally or was in 
the specific case of the USDA NOP examined above. That is, without drawing a 
representative sample of the participants and measuring their demographic 
characteristics, it cannot be known whether or not a diverse group of participants actually 
contributed comments to or became involved in the process, and thus we must leave this 
principle to one side for now. Yet as I will examine below, there are reasons we might be 
skeptical about the participation of an inclusive cross-section of the population in this or 
any e-rulemaking process.  
 Taken on the whole, therefore, it is clear that e-rulemaking offers much to like in 
working to realize a deliberative-democratic process, and more specifically a 
deliberative-democratic mode of bureaucratic accountability, a process useful for 
reconnecting the people and the rules which impact them (again, given the weaknesses of 
existing forms of oversight and accountability discussed in Chapter Four). In some ways, 
this conclusion represents a different angle on the well-done commentary concerning the 
democratic nature of the Internet as a technological innovation. The Internet, it could and 
has been argued, allows us to move beyond the vicious circle placing in opposition wide 
and deep political participation – with this new vehicle of public participation, we need 
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not choose one over the other, even when dealing with the political processes of the 
Federal government. Perhaps, in short, information technology advances like the Internet 
reopens the possibility of both deliberative and democratic participation within modern 
mass societies.  
Be this as it may, there are also reasons to approach the idea of e-rulemaking 
somewhat cautiously, to resist praising this practice as containing revolutionary potential 
prematurely. Because e-rulemaking is a decidedly new process only recently adopted by 
agencies, there is a possibility that this process might take any number of forms, 
including some decidedly non-deliberative or undemocratic forms. Indeed, many of the 
potential weaknesses of e-rulemaking can be gleaned from a more general critical 
analysis of the democratic potential of the Internet, and this sort of critique has become 
more prevalent over the last few years. In the next section, several potentially 
problematic features of e-rulemaking are noted, things that we ought to be mindful of as 
it develops in the future.  
 
II.2 Deliberative Democracy and E-Rulemaking: Critiques and Enduring Questions 
 
As described above, the Internet as a medium or vehicle through which the 
process of bureaucratic rulemaking occurs holds considerable potential in striving 
towards a deliberative-democratic model of bureaucratic accountability, one that 
overcomes the problems this type of bureaucratic exercise of power poses for our 
democratic institutions and traditions. Nevertheless, e-rulemaking is still very much in its 
infancy, and its future success depends in large part on the bureaucratic institutions 
controlling rulemaking processes; that is, it is largely incumbent on these institutions to 
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maintain, support and build-upon the above-mentioned positive characteristics, and 
without their support these processes could easily disintegrate.  
Given this reality, it would be premature to declare e-rulemaking the solution to 
the problems of bureaucratic rulemaking given deficient forms of oversight, control and 
accountability based on the single case of the USDA NOP. Indeed, it is not unreasonable 
to suggest that the USDA had no idea transferring rulemaking to the Internet would result 
in such a broad, robust type of response, and agencies in the future may be more careful 
to limit opportunities for public participation. (The history of government is full of 
examples where policy processes and choices have resulted in unintended consequences 
such as this, consequences which were better addressed later). In short, the USDA NOP 
may serve as a case study for agencies for what not to do in the future in an effort to 
maintain decision-making power within the agency and among a smaller group of 
stakeholders. 
Moreover, beyond the uncertain political forces surrounding the future of e-
rulemaking, there are other considerations to be mindful of in working to insure that e-
rulemaking realizes its potential as a deliberative-democratic innovation. To be sure, 
following a wave of unbridled optimism, there has been a similarly intense wave of 
criticism of the democratic potential of the Internet and other information technologies, 
particularly as a medium of public discourse, and many of these criticisms relate directly 
to the potential of e-rulemaking as a model of deliberative-democratic bureaucratic 
accountability. In what follows, a few more important criticisms will be examined. For 
some of these, correctives will be suggested; for others, only a cautionary note that these 
problems be recognized.  
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E-Rulemaking: Deliberation in Private? John Stuart Mill, one of the earlier 
political thinkers to systematically advocate deliberation as a central political activity for 
a democratic society, juxtaposed this practice with the most common expression of 
democratic political participation: secret-ballot voting.235 While instituted to protect the 
sanctity of the ballot-box and allow citizens to exercise their own independent judgment, 
secret ballot voting, Mill argued, also allowed citizens to exercise their political will in 
private with no need to justify their positions to others or consider the position of others. 
That is, in secret-ballot voting, citizens are allowed to make choices that reflect their own 
prejudices and selfishness, for instance, and are not held publicly accountable for these 
choices. Deliberation as a democratic procedure undermines this political privatism, Mill 
thought, forcing citizens to present reasons, accept the reasons of others, and possibly 
come to an objectively better decision as a consequence. From this perspective, our 
analyses of processes of e-rulemaking and the Internet as a vehicle of deliberation beg the 
following questions: Does e-rulemaking sufficiently support the underlying conditions of 
a principle of deliberation (such as principles of reason and reciprocity), taking 
democracy from the privacy of the ballot-booth into the public domain? Or from another 
angle, we could ask, what type of relationships and social interactions actually take place 
over the Internet? 
The Internet is the ultimate example of a communications medium guaranteeing 
an individual nearly unlimited privacy. The Internet has become the preferred medium 
for many in seeking new relationships, for instance, in part because it bridges social space 
(or offers an alternative type of space, “cyberspace”), but also because it guarantees 
privacy so long as one desires to maintain this condition. Furthermore, consider that the 
                                                 
235Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. 1993. London, England: Everyman. 
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most searched and accessed websites on the Internet (by far) are pornographic 
websites.236 The Internet has become the primary venue for this type of activity precisely 
because it guarantees a type of privacy not to be found elsewhere. Why would someone 
interested in pornography risk a socially awkward situation when they can avoid going 
“out in public” altogether and instead use the Internet?  
The fact that the Internet provides the new chief source of pornographic materials 
speaks volumes about both the freedoms provided by and the limitations intrinsic to this 
medium, and should lead us to ask several basic questions. What kind of public 
deliberation can we expect over the Internet? Will we find a type of civil discourse 
founded on even minimal standards of reason and reciprocity, or will we instead find in 
practice a version of deliberative pornography, wherein participants rely on the safe 
anonymity provided by this medium to make propositions and defend positions that they 
might not defend otherwise? While some scholars have suggested that public discourse 
over the Internet does tend to maintain basic standards of civility and politeness,237 for 
instance, it is nonetheless important to remember that in a strict sense deliberation 
through this medium does not force the participant to “present” reasons to others, and this 
fact must be minded when working to guarantee reasonable and reciprocal deliberation.  
 
E-Rulemaking: Just a More Efficient Mechanism for Aggregation? From a similar 
perspective, and given that the Internet does not force us to enter into the same type of 
                                                 
236On a similar note, for an analysis arguing that the Internet tends to reinforce oppressive gender 
relationships, see Heider, Don and Dustin Harp. “New Hope or Old Power: Democracy, Pornography and 
the Internet.” The Howard Journal of Communications. Vol. 13, 2002.   
 
237Papacharissi, “Democracy Online: Civility, Politeness, and the Democratic Potential of Online Political 
Discussion Groups.” 
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relationships of interaction, there is a possibility that e-rulemaking will over time become 
little more than an alternative, even more efficient mechanism for aggregating large 
numbers of public comments without truly promoting or offering opportunities for 
deliberation. In other words, there is little reason to believe that simply shifting to 
electronic media will create the conditions for deliberation between citizens and citizens 
and public officials about rules, so long as the purpose of receiving comments continues 
to be perceived by citizens and administrators as a method of registering “votes.” On the 
contrary, there are reasons to believe that any existing emphasis on deliberation within e-
rulemaking might wane over time; assuming that the practice of accepting public 
comments through the Internet proves conducive to a greater and more diverse array of 
comments and commenters (as the USDA NOP example would suggest), it would seem 
likely that this medium will in fact increase the need for bureaucrats to hunt for 
agreement or dissent within comments, aggregate comments into “for” and “against” 
groups and use this data as the basis for moving forward with a proposed rule.  
A possible solution to this problem lies in appending onto the normal comment 
procedures of e-rulemaking additional opportunities for citizens and public officials to 
engage one another in a more discursive format, augmenting the already-enhanced 
opportunities to read the comments of others and find a wealth of information provided 
by the Internet. To take one example, besides pornography the Internet is currently 
overloaded with discussion groups, chat rooms and “blogs” designed for the exchange of 
political opinions and argument. In these fora citizens regularly engage one another in 
debate, explaining their positions and demanding answers and reasons from others. Some 
have even claimed that these arenas are reinvigorating public discourse and debate, 
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encouraging citizens to talk about politics in a more open, passionate and truthful way.238 
And it is precisely this type of electronic forum for deliberation that can and should be 
included and emphasized as a central part of the e-rulemaking process, added to agency 
websites and providing an opportunity for citizens to discuss the merits of policy 
problems, regulatory mechanisms and outcomes prior to submitting a comment.  
 
 E-Rulemaking and the “Digital Divide”. Shortly after the Internet emerged and 
began to gain acceptance and popularity in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the group of 
individuals using this new communications technology was almost perfectly 
homogenous, comprised almost exclusively of economically well-off, highly educated 
white males who were, in the words of one author, “hobbyists, nerds and pioneers in 
forging a brave new society.”239 Over time, the universe of Internet users has become far 
more heterogeneous (at least, as an Internet user, I would like to believe so), but this elite 
group of Internet users in the first generation should lead us to ask an important question, 
one that bears directly on who we might expect to participate in processes of e-
rulemaking over the Internet: Who potentially could utilize the Internet to comment on 
proposed rules and take part in e-rulemaking? 
 Following the explosion of rabid enthusiasts praising the potential of the Internet 
in the 1990’s was a group of more critical analysts. While many were convinced that the 
“information age” would radically transform information access, making information 
                                                 
238Papacharissi, “Democracy Online: Civility, Politeness, and the Democratic Potential of Online Political 
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239Murdock, Graham. “Review Article: Debating Digital Divides.” European Journal of Communication. 
Vol. 17, No. 3, 2002.  
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more open and accessible to all, others wondered who precisely would be able to take 
advantage of this new and abundant source of information. Subsequent studies have 
confirmed what many intuitively feared: access to and the use of the Internet is not equal 
(both within societies and certainly across societies), and in fact there exists a substantial 
“digital divide.”240  
 A recent report by the Pew Foundation’s “Internet & American Life Project” 
illuminates some enduring realities about precisely who has access to the Internet, and the 
current state of the digital divide.241 According to the report, and perhaps not surprisingly, 
as a proportion of these populations within the United States, whites are more likely to 
use the Internet than either Blacks or Hispanics. Similarly, as individuals move up the 
economic ladder their likelihood of becoming an Internet user also increases. Those with 
a higher level of education and those living in suburban or urban (as opposed to rural) 
areas are also more likely to have access to the Internet. Indeed, Internet access is not 
equal, and the list of those tending to be excluded is not surprising when thinking about 
general patterns of political exclusion in the United States.242
As discussed earlier, deliberative democracy is predicated on – and in some sense, 
centrally concerned with – the egalitarian nature and inclusivity of political processes. 
The enduring existence of the digital divide should surely, therefore, make us stop short 
of proclaiming e-rulemaking to be a fully realized democratic innovation, at least at this 
stage. Rather, without equal access to the Internet e-rulemaking remains only a 
                                                 
240For some examples, see: Norris, Pippa. Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the 
Internet Worldwide. 2001. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Wilhelm, Anthony. Democracy in 
the Digital Age: Challenges to Political Life in Cyberspace. 2000. N.Y., N.Y.: Routledge Press.  
  
241Lenhart, Amanda et. al. “The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at Internet Access and the 
Digital Divide.” 2003. http://www.pewinternet.org.  
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potentially democratic process. Yet it is likely that time alone will provide a bridge across 
the digital divide, that as computers and Internet access become more affordable and 
accessible to a diverse cross-section of the public, Internet users will become a roughly 
representative group (with universal access in the future being likely).  
But until this time has come, e-rulemaking agencies must remain cautious that 
they are granting equal opportunities to a diverse, inclusive population. More specifically, 
in order to ensure that a representative sample of the population is participating in e-
rulemaking, agencies should actively collect demographic information on those 
contributing comments to an e-rulemaking process, something that is not currently done. 
Made simpler and more cost effective by the Internet, the collection of participant 
demographics will allow for a check on who actually is participating, and perhaps 
position agencies to actively elicit greater participation from certain underrepresented 
groups.  
 
 E-Rulemaking and “Digital Capture”. The digital divide, while narrowing and 
becoming less vast over time, raises the specter of unequal and exclusive access to e-
rulemaking processes. Additionally, processes of e-rulemaking are still prone to some 
level of unequal influence across participants, arising not only from unequal abilities to 
craft and defend positions and perspectives to others, but more basically the ability to 
utilize the medium of the Internet to full advantage. That is, just as interest groups and 
other organized actors tend to possess the resources to acquire the capabilities to most 
effectively influence traditional rulemaking processes, so too should we expect these 
groups to best utilize this new communications technology.  
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From this perspective, we ought to be wary of the possibility of “digital capture,” 
of organized interests undermining the more egalitarian public space of the Internet in 
order to again gain dominant influence over e-rulemakings. This may take the form of 
interest groups bombarding agencies with electronic comments (something that is, in fact, 
already done), a practice similar to the “docket cards” agencies now sent in on behalf of 
citizens. In any event, it is important to note that e-rulemaking does not fully undermine 
the often-intimate relationship between organized interests and rulemaking agencies, and 
thus we must remain mindful of these relationships.  
 Certainly, this list of potential problems confronting e-rulemaking, both now and 
in the future, is not comprehensive. Particularly as this practice will undoubtedly evolve 
over time, new problems are likely to arise. Nevertheless, we can look to e-rulemaking as 
a type of rulemaking process full of possibility for realizing deliberative-democratic 
bureaucratic rulemaking, while remaining mindful of these stumbling blocks.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has fulfilled several tasks critical to the larger goals of this 
dissertation. In the first instance, this chapter has provided evidence of some of the 
critical claims made earlier. While Chapter Three argued that a process like bureaucratic 
rulemaking is commensurate with our model of democracy, it was also argued that if this 
process fails to render rules pursuing the intent of Congressionally-enacted statute, 
because of inadequate forms of control, oversight and accountability, then this practice 
should be viewed critically. In examining the case study of the USDA NOP, or at least its 
“first stage,” some evidence of the disconnection between legislatively-made law and 
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bureaucratic rules was given. While not a systematic, “large n” study of bureaucratic 
rulemaking, few would argue that the processes surrounding the USDA NOP were an 
anomaly. In short, rulemaking processes often fail to realize the intent of the law, a fact 
which presents a challenge for our model of democracy.  
 But more importantly, this chapter has analyzed e-rulemaking as a form of 
rulemaking with considerable potential for realizing a deliberative-democratic model of 
bureaucratic accountability. While not a silver bullet, catch-all solution to a difficult set 
of circumstances, and while not without some potential problems, the fact that both 
deliberative and democratic principles were to some extent respected in the “second 
stage” of the USDA NOP process evidences both the desirability and empirical 
plausibility of deliberative democracy under modern conditions. What is more, such a 
process provides hope regarding the potential for making bureaucratic agents more 
democratically accountable, and in the process better protecting the core set of 
relationships between the people and the law critical to our model of democracy.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion: Democracy, Bureaucracy and a Deliberative-
Democratic Model of Bureaucratic Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Summary of the Dissertation 
 There have been presented an assortment of arguments and ideas in this 
dissertation. While all have revolved around one core theme – reconciling the tension 
between bureaucratic administration and our democratic institutions and traditions – the 
central ideas require a brief summary nonetheless. This summary will allow us to both 
appreciate the contributions of this dissertation to the fields of public administration and 
democratic theory, and to understand how this work informs and guides a broader 
research agenda. 
 This dissertation began in the belief that, because our democratic institutions and 
traditions remain tied to and informed by historical-theoretical models of popular 
government, returning to these models might prove useful in better understanding the 
intersection of democracy and administration. Chapter Two pursued this idea, looking to 
the political thought of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as two useful and 
representative theorists of popular government – theorists consistent in their core 
understanding of popular government, while differing in their institutional prescriptions. 
The generic models of popular government (and later, democracy) these two theorists 
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defend remain relevant, as these two models continue to inform both our understanding 
of democracy and the means employed for reconciling democracy with instances of 
executive and administrative authority. 
 Several lessons were gleaned from this exercise, lessons which informed and 
helped guide the remainder of the dissertation. In the first instance, this investigation 
provided a reminder of a basic fact not to be ignored, but one that is often overlooked 
nonetheless: democracy and administrative authority are not inherently at cross purposes, 
in that both are instituted as instrumental to the same underlying purpose – realizing the 
public good. Yet, and this leads us to our second (and perhaps most important) 
conclusion, this argument only holds true so long as means for guaranteeing the 
predominance of the legislative authority (whether vested in the people or elected 
representatives) and the law through democratic forms of administrative control are 
present and effective. In short, so long as the makers of the law are empowered and 
capable of controlling the authority delegated through law to executive and 
administrative institutions, the relationships central to democracy are reasserted and 
protected.  
 Moving from historical-theoretical foundations forward, Chapters Three and Four 
examined bureaucracy – and particularly processes of bureaucratic rulemaking – and the 
effectiveness of existing democratic modes of administrative control. Processes of 
bureaucratic rulemaking, a central and essential form of discretionary authority within the 
modern bureaucratic system, are often argued to conflict with democracy because of a 
disregard for the democratic principle that law be made exclusively by a legislative 
authority connected to the people (through an act of consent, for instance), or challenged 
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because of an apparent conflict with the principles of the law and the rule of law. 
However, bureaucratic rulemaking should in fact be deemed commensurable with our 
model of democracy; as this type of delegation to bureaucratic agencies to make rules is 
both practically necessary and instrumental to the creation of effective regulations 
essential to the broader public good, bureaucratic rulemaking should not be seen as 
contradictory to democracy. Indeed, even theorists like Locke and Rousseau – both 
fundamentally concerned with the location of the lawmaking authority and its popular 
source, and committed to the law and the rule of law – envision and defend this type of 
delegated authority. Nevertheless, this idea only holds true, so it was argued, if 
democratic modes of administrative control are effectively overseeing and holding 
accountable bureaucratic agents and agencies, keeping these agents faithful to the law 
and the public good, and reaffirming the relationships central to democracy in the 
process.  
 Chapter Four investigated the effectiveness of existing democratic modes of 
control, oversight and accountability, and found reasons to be skeptical of their efficacy 
(an argument subsequently confirmed by the case study in Chapter Six). The strategy 
informed by a representative model of democracy – legislative oversight – relies on 
elected representatives to control bureaucratic agents and agencies. Yet because of certain 
characteristics intrinsic to and regularly exhibited by this type of principal-agent 
relationship, skepticism concerning the effectiveness of these forms of control has often 
been expressed. Similarly, forms of public accountability informed by a direct model of 
democracy and visible in the procedures mandated by the APA should be viewed 
critically as well; because powerful organized actors tend to dominate these processes, 
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the law and the public good are in fact regularly undermined by these forms of control. 
While not entirely ineffective, there are sufficient grounds to challenge these existing 
forms of control, strategies handed down by earlier theorists of popular government, but 
unable to foresee the dramatic growth of bureaucratic power.  
 With theoretical frameworks and problems identified, Chapter Five began the 
process of discerning an alternative democratic model of control and accountability, one 
useful for counteracting the problems a process like bureaucratic rulemaking poses for 
democracy when not sufficiently checked and controlled. To this end, the deliberative 
theory of democracy was explored. While the deliberative theory of democracy has been 
envisioned and applied to a variety of contexts, scholars have been surprisingly silent 
about the potential usefulness of this model in relation to bureaucratic administration, and 
the problems this institutional nexus is often seen to present for democracy. This has been 
the case, so I argued, because of a deep-seeded hesitancy to prescribe broad and deep 
public participation to the expert-technocratic processes of bureaucratic institutions, a 
critique which largely melts away if deliberative democracy is properly conceived.  
 Finally, Chapter Six worked to tie together many of the arguments in the 
dissertation, but was most centrally concerned with evidencing the empirical plausibility 
and normative desirability of a model of deliberative democracy applied to the context of 
bureaucratic rulemaking – a deliberative-democratic model of bureaucratic 
accountability. Looking at one particularly informative case of rulemaking – the 
rulemaking processes surrounding the Department of Agriculture’s National Organic 
Program – and the form of rulemaking employed in this case – a new form labeled e-
rulemaking – several arguments were made to this end. Perhaps most importantly, this 
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case study evidenced the benefits of a model of deliberative democracy applied to the 
context of bureaucratic rulemaking, showing how such a process is both desirable and 
attainable within the context of mass modern societies.   
 
II. Contributions to the Literature 
 There are three primary contributions to the literature this dissertation claims to 
offer, contributions to two distinct bodies of scholarship within the discipline of political 
science. While these contributions were discussed earlier, they require additional 
comment here.  
 In the first instance, scholarly works seeking to reconcile the tension between 
bureaucracy and democracy, or focused on relieving the tension between these two 
principles and institutional manifestations, tend to view democracy from outside its 
historical and theoretical contexts. That is, within these studies democracy is either seen 
as detached from an essential foundation, or worse still, left under-defined and utilized as 
a concept inclusive of a nearly limitless range of norms and values. By returning to 
essential foundations, models of democracy projecting a core notion of popular 
government which has and continues to inform contemporary democratic systems, this 
dissertation has avoided this pitfall. What is more, these fundamental models of 
democracy were shown to be enduringly useful in guiding and informing the nature of the 
tension between bureaucracy and democracy.  
 Such an approach is, I think, not only useful, but worthy of further development. 
Among political and democratic theorists, careful examination of various scholars of 
popular government, scholars wielding influence over modern democratic systems, and 
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the importance of the smallest difference across their ideas, are not uncommon. It would 
be worthwhile as well, I would suggest, to undertake a broad comparative study of these 
influential theorists’ understanding of administration within popular systems. For as these 
scholars continue to guide our understanding of our own norms, traditions and 
limitations, so too do these scholars continue to guide our understanding of controlling 
administrative authority within a democratic system. The insights a broader study of this 
kind might yield would likely justify it.  
 Additionally, by seeking an application of deliberative democracy to a 
bureaucratic context, this dissertation fills a noticeable gap in both the democratic theory 
and public administration literatures. As mentioned earlier, deliberative democracy is 
often understood and treated as applicable mostly – if not exclusively – to already 
deliberative processes and institutions. This tendency, so I argued, is driven by the idea 
that the scale and scope of modern societies, coupled with the technical expertise 
assumed necessary to participate in bureaucratic processes in an even limited way, works 
against any prescription of mass public participation in these processes.  
But by looking to and adopting Jurgen Habermas’s model of deliberative practice, 
one conceived for and situated specifically within the context of modern mass societies, 
this work has attempted to dispel the notion that deliberative democracy is limited in 
potential application. Once the simplistic image of deliberative democracy as face-to-face 
discourse among citizens with authority to render binding decisions over even the most 
complex issues is dispelled, many of the critiques against deliberative democracy melt 
away. Indeed, Habermas’s model is deeply sensitive to the difficulties and complexities 
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surrounding many decision-making contexts, and for this reason his model is an attractive 
one for thinking about deliberative democracy within a bureaucratic context.  
 Finally, and to some extent connected to the above, this dissertation has provided 
evidence of deliberative democracy in action, and in the process has attempted to reveal 
both the empirical plausibility and the desirability of this practice, something that is often 
lacking in works of this nature. That is, too often deliberative democracy is presented as a 
normative ideal devoid of empirical plausibility, particularly when considered outside the 
bounds of the most local political contexts. The tendency to look to deliberation and 
democracy as either/or values, essentially incompatible under modern conditions, is 
proliferate. Indeed, it is not uncommon to read comments like: “Deliberation is not an 
activity for the demos. I don’t mean that ordinary men and women don’t have the 
capacity to reason, only that 100 million of them, or even 1 million or 100,000 can’t 
plausibly ‘reason together’.”243 In other words, while deliberation may be desirable and 
possible, and democracy may be desirable and possible, their combination, particularly at 
the highest levels of government, is simply not possible.  
 Yet in Chapter Six, or so I would argue, we did in fact provide some evidence of a 
robust type of public participation at the “highest” levels of government including, 
though not 100 million citizens, certainly 100,000. Reasons were exchanged, some 
respect for the positions and ideas of others was realized, broad and relatively equal 
opportunities for participation were created, and so forth. It is now incumbent on all those 
advocating and defending deliberative democracy in practice to replicate this kind of 
investigation in other contexts. And to be sure, the more evidence in this area that we are 
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N.Y., N.Y.: Oxford University Press.  
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able to unearth, the tendency to reflexively dismiss deliberation as not an activity possible 
for the modern demos will diminish.   
 
III. A Future Research Agenda 
 There are several aspects of this dissertation which, given time and space 
constraints, have been left underdeveloped. In what follows, I would like to propose two 
separate but interconnected research programs derivative of some of the ideas offered 
here.  
 First, while left implicit as an idea in Chapters Four and Six, the two dominant 
modes for democratically controlling bureaucratic discretion – oversight centered in an 
elected legislature, and direct modes of public accountability – are not and should not be 
viewed (either practically or theoretically) as entirely distinct. On the contrary, the two 
often assume and rely on one another. For instance, as mentioned briefly in Chapter Four, 
because of time constraints, information deficiencies and a lack of technical 
competencies, elected representatives often adopt a “fire alarm” style of oversight. 
Assumed by this approach, of course, is that the elected representative must rely on 
outside forces – most typically interest groups or other “prominent” constituencies – to 
“pull” these fire alarms, to relay information about potential instances of bureaucratic 
abuse of statutory law. Here, elected representatives and the public, or at least portions of 
the public, enter into a symbiotic relationship in holding accountable and controlling 
bureaucratic discretion.244 In reality, then, a complicated and interconnected relationship 
                                                 
244Furthermore, some evidence of this type of relationship was revealed in Chapter Six. Senator Leahy of 
Vermont was in part drawn back into the rulemaking processes surrounding the USDA NOP because of the 
proposed set of regulations and the public reaction to these regulations, as well as the perception that these 
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between the public, elected representatives and bureaucratic agencies exists within the 
dominant fire alarm model of legislative oversight, and must be seen as central to 
controlling and holding accountable bureaucratic agents and agencies.  
 With this set of relationships in mind, it would be useful to more fully 
conceptualize – both theoretically and empirically – the various “points of contact” 
between a deliberating public, elected representatives and bureaucratic agents. That is, 
what is now needed is a more completely developed model of how a deliberating public 
ought to and might practically intersect with elected representatives in monitoring and 
controlling bureaucratic discretion. Many questions central to such a research agenda 
come to mind. For instance, how might we envision generically the intersection of the 
deliberating public and elected representatives in a manner that best respects the 
principles of deliberative democracy, but at the same time best holds bureaucratic 
agencies accountable when exercising discretion? What type of venue of deliberation and 
form of constituent contact allows us to realize this goal in a manner inclusive of all 
citizens? And, when complete, how might this model instruct us about the nature of 
representation itself, particularly in relation to elected representatives performing their 
oversight tasks?  
 In short, while I have treated them separately for purposes of simplicity and 
clarity throughout this dissertation, often the direct and representative forms of 
democracy active within the United States intersect and intermingle in important ways, 
and this includes activities central to controlling bureaucratic agencies. Thus developing a 
model which takes into account this fact and works to better understand and articulate the 
                                                                                                                                                 
regulations violated the intent of Congress. Indeed, he became something more like a leading member of 
the general public in criticizing these rules than a Congressman overseeing the bureaucracy.  
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various ways deliberating citizens and elected representatives come into contact is 
required as well.  
 Second, and in part connected to the above, Chapter Six has allowed us to 
envision a model of deliberative-democratic bureaucratic accountability through public 
comment and participation in e-rulemaking. Yet this example is, to be sure, limited, 
touching on only one possible form of deliberative-democratic bureaucratic 
accountability within one particular venue. This example was selected specifically to 
evidence the desirability and empirical plausibility of deliberative democracy, but it 
certainly does not encompass and describe the entirety of venues with this type of 
potential. Other venues – such as the “public meetings” mandated by the Government in 
the Sunshine Act – require examination as well.  
In short, a broader, larger “n” study of rulemaking processes – and particularly 
rulemakings which, using the criterion set-out in Chapter Five, tend to approximate the 
principles and values of deliberative democracy – would be helpful. Through such a 
study, we might discover a variety of different forms of rulemaking which tend to better 
realize deliberative democracy and better hold bureaucratic agencies accountable as a 
consequence, and thus prove commensurable with our democratic institutions and 
traditions. Conversely, we might also discover a range of fora less or least conducive to 
deliberative-democratic participation, and thus to be avoided. It is in this direction as 
well, then, that this dissertation might lead us.  
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